

MASS POLITICS IN THE PROCESS OF TAIWAN'S REGIME CHANGE: Attitudes, Values, and Partisan Preferences (1980-1986)

Ying-Lung You*

Despite its theoretical and practical importance, mass variables have been largely overlooked in the existing literature of democratic transition. Based upon three election surveys from 1980 to 1986, I investigate the dynamics of mass politics right before and after the critical moment of Taiwan's liberalization. Specifically, my analysis focuses on the attitudes toward campaign issues, democratic values, partisan preferences and electoral choices of Taiwanese voters during that period of time. Survey-based findings confirm the following observations. First, the attentive public did increasingly respond to the Taiwanese democracy movement, but only mildly. Second, enhancing democratic beliefs in the whole population have been a significant factor in promoting the opposition-led democracy movement. Third, partisanship was the most important factor in shaping voter's choices. Fourth, ethnic cleavage has remained the gene of political strain in Taiwan since 1947. Finally, until 1987 main political conflicts in Taiwan have carried on without explicit class content. This suggests that the prevailing middle-class argument in explaining Taiwan's democratic transition must be fundamentally revised.

I. Introduction

It is my basic assumption that elite decision making during the critical moments of regime change can not be fully understood without an understanding of the dynamics of mass politics and of how these dynamics are per-

* Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Graduate Program of Political Science, Soochow University.

ceived by authoritarian rulers. Authoritarian rulers normally are concerned about the development of public opinion. This is particularly true when they are in the process of deciding whether they will relax authoritarian rule.¹ In this regard, Higley and Burton (1989: 22) provided a convincing argument,

Although elite transformation are fundamentally "elite events," mass variables obviously are important. Elites always need mass support. *Mass conditions and orientations thus establish fields of opportunity and constraint to which elites must respond.*

I agree with this observation. In this article I will analyze mass political attitudes and action. I focus specifically on the first half of the 1980s. The dynamic of mass politics during this period was crucial because it provided opportunity and restraint for elite's maneuvers and strategies in the dramatic second half of the 1980s. Four aspects of mass political behavior will be investigated: 1) attitudes toward campaign issues; 2) democratic values; 3) partisanship; and 4) electoral choices.

The reason to focus on these four aspects is simple. First, a study of issue positions of the general public shows the political orientations of the electorate in a rapidly changing political environment. Second, a systematic inquiry of democratic values may also help us trace the sources of democratic transition. Third, a study of partisanship may provide some information about the fluctuation of strength of political parties in the electorate as a whole. Finally, voting is perhaps the best indicator of public opinion. Analysis of voting behavior can illuminate the phenomenon of voter alignment and social cleavages.

¹ Despite the importance of mass politics, the recent proliferation of studies of transition to democracy have been heavily oriented on the elite's maneuverings, strategies, and leadership. Accordingly, the role of mass public has been overlooked.

II. Attitudes Toward Campaign Issues

To understand the formation of public opinion of the 1980s, four significant political and social parameters must be noted. First, the state under the hegemony of the KMT had been forceful enough to bend civil society to its will ever since the 1950s. By nearly monopolizing the education system and mass media, the ruling KMT had been very effective in shaping mass political orientation and in manipulating public opinion.

Second, Taiwan's economic growth through the 1970s had been outstanding. Income distribution had been quite equitable. The rate of unemployment and inflation had also been low. This unprecedented economic growth led to a significantly improved living standard for each stratum of society. Conceivably, economic success was a positive factor for the consolidation of the KMT authoritarian regime.

Third, the repeated diplomatic defeats of the Nationalist government in the 1970s culminated in the end of formal diplomatic ties with the U.S. in 1979. These setbacks had a profound impact on domestic politics. In particular, a strong sense of uncertainty about Taiwan's future increasingly permeated among the more educated sector of the population. The future destiny of Taiwan's twenty millions residents became one of the most explosive issues on the political agenda.

Finally, the turbulent 1970s ended with the occurrence of the Kaoshiung Incident, the largest confrontation between the ruling KMT and the Taiwanese opposition elites since the Ehr Ehr Pa Incident of 1947. The Kaoshiung Incident and the subsequent massive arrests and convictions also sowed the seeds of a deeper and wider conflict between the KMT and the Tang-Wai in the 1980s.

These diverse social and political processes presumably had an enor-

mous impact on the formation of public opinion in the 1980s. Some of them helped to create a favorable opinion climate for the rise of opposition movement whereas some of them tended to reinforce the continuing authoritarian regime. Altogether, in light of the above-mentioned factors, I hypothesize that mass political attitudes in the first half of 1980s would be quite moderate but increasingly favorable to political liberalization. I now turn to an analysis of public opinion during the 1980s.

A. Public Opinion in the 1980 Election

The 1980 supplementary election of members of the three central elective bodies was pivotal in the history of Taiwan. It was held to complete the unfinished 1978 election, interrupted by the normalization of Sino-American diplomatic relations. It was also the first national election after the crack-down of the Kaoshiung demonstration in 1979. With these two major historical antecedents, the 1980 election resulted in intense competition between the ruling KMT and the Tang-Wai. For the competing sides the stakes in the election were regarded as big enough to determine their destiny.

The campaign issues exhibited what this election was all about.² Table 1 contains the ten most salient campaign issues according to the issue voters

² In the three post-election surveys (1981, 1984, 1987), conducted by a group of political scientists in the National Taiwan University, issue voters operationally refers to those who vote chiefly because he/she supports the issue position of certain candidates. In the 1980 investigation, around 38 percent of the Taipei electorate claimed themselves as issue voters. In the 1983 investigation, around 31 percent of the National electorate was issue voters. In the 1986 survey, around 24 percent of the National electorate was issue voters. The degree of saliency of each campaign issue is determined by the frequencies the issue voters identify that particular issue. The higher the frequencies, the more salient the campaign issue. In this study, I use the following terms: issue voters, attentive public, and opinion leaders interchangeably.

of Taipei city.³ In general, the 1980 election was about national security, political order, and social welfare. The foremost concern of the Taipei electorate was how to save the deteriorating international status of the country. The series of diplomatic reversals at the period undoubtedly caused widespread national security concerns. However, poor diplomatic performance did not fundamentally shake the ruling basis of the Nationalist government. Indeed, a considerable portion among those polled who expressed their concern for the deteriorating international status were loyal to the KMT.

Correlation analysis identified a significant positive relationship between the attitude toward external national security and the attitude toward domestic political order (You, 1982). In other words, although the discontented element was becoming more vocal, many people still did not blame the KMT for the diplomatic failure. In fact, the continuing diplomatic failure actually stimulated a sizable part of the public to give even stronger support to the KMT.

This phenomenon is not so incomprehensible as it first appears, however. Human subjective cognition and interpretation determines the meaning and significance of an objective political event.⁴ What matters is the way that

³ I do not infer the distribution of public opinion of national electorate by using a sample of Taipei voters. This is because Taipei is the capital city and has been one of few major posts of opposition forces on the island. Thus, the electorate of Taipei city has been relatively more informed and sympathetic to opposition movement.

⁴ According to Fiske and Taylor (1984: 44), attributions are important "because attributions are the underpinnings of further judgements, emotional reactions, and future behavior."

Table 1: Ten Most Salient Issues in the 1980 Supplementary Election of the Members of Legislative Yuan: The Electorate of Taipei

Issues	FREQ	Percentage
1. Improve the international Status of our country.	133	45.55
2. Consolidate central leadership and strengthen political stability.	122	41.78
3. Support the government in recovering mainland China.	115	39.38
4. Preserve social order; oppose violent political activity.	106	36.30
5. Clean up administrative bureaucracy and eliminate corruption.	91	31.16
6. Build additional housing facilities so that all citizens could have their own dwelling.	89	30.48
7. Maintain social harmony, prohibit improper speech.	87	29.79
8. Reduce the gap between the haves and the have-nots, improve the life of the lower-middle income people	84	28.77
9. Extend unemployment and medical insurance to the whole population, enhance social welfare.	79	27.05
10. Raise the income level of the soldiers, civil servants and school teachers.	70	23.97

people explained the growing diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. The KMT leaders obviously understood that. They launched a massive propaganda campaign in order to convince the electorate that the diplomatic isolation was not the fault of the government. The official explanation was that it was a consequence of an ongoing "international adverse current of appeasement" — the d'étente between the Western democratic countries and the communist block. Because the KMT nearly monopolized the mass media, public opinion was manipulated to be favorable or not-so-unfavorable to the ruling KMT.⁵

In addition to the issue of the country's international status, three of the five top campaign issues in the 1980 election were directly related to the concern of political order. Specifically, among the attentive public, 41.8 percent voted for the consolidation of the central political leadership and political stability; 39.4 percent voted to express their support for the government to complete its mission to recover the mainland; 36.3 percent voted for preserving social order and against violent political activity. These findings indicate that people were very worried about domestic political stability after the cessation of formal diplomatic ties with the U.S. and the occurrence of the Kao-shiung Incident.

Intense anxiety over issues of political order within the general public, ironically, benefitted the ruling party. For many people, internal political order and national security were interconnected: to defend national security,

⁵ Conover and Feldman have suggested (1986: 128), "any study of the processes underlying candidate perception must take into account the nature of the political environment that voters operate in."

the political status quo must be sustained. In other words, high anxiety with regard to political order seemingly drove many people to ignore the disastrous consequences of the ruling KMT's rigid foreign policy.

Along with the concern for foreign relations and domestic political stability, four of the ten most salient campaign issues were closely related to social welfare. Specifically, among the attentive public, 30.5 percent voted for building large housing facilities so that every resident would have their own dwelling; and 28.8 percent supported a further reduction of the gap between the rich and the poor, and an improvement in the life standard of the lower-middle income people. In addition, 27 percent asked for unemployment and medical insurance for the entire population while 24 percent wanted to raise the income levels of soldiers, civil servants and school teachers.

The political implication of these figures are noteworthy. They indicate that many people voted for more social welfare and their economic interests. Statistical analysis shows that there was a significant positive correlation between the value of social welfare and the value of social order (You, 1982: 338). People emphasizing social welfare were often inclined to neglect or even ignore the problem of political structure. It appears that for many voters, as long as the government showed ample sincerity in providing social welfare benefits, it did not really matter that an authoritarian regime persisted. In sum, mainstream public opinion stressed national security, political order and social welfare.

However, there was another opinion trend that was becoming more visible, and which favored democracy and civil and political liberties. Among the attentive public 18.8 percent voted against the extra-legal privileges of

politicians and bureaucrats; 18.5 percent voted for establishing an effective opposition force to check and balance the ruling party and prevent political corruption; 16.44 percent voted for expanding the scope of political participation and for increasing the quota of the members of three central elective bodies in the supplementary elections; 12.67 percent voted for founding an impartial and independent court; and 12.34 percent voted for more freedom of speech (You, 1982: 291).

The most dramatic event in the 1980 election, however, was the remarkable triumph of the families of the opposition leaders who were put in jail due to the Kao-shiung Incident. For instance, Chou Ch'ing-yi, the wife of Yao Chia-wen (who was one of eight major victims of the Kao-Shiung Incident), campaigned for the National Assembly. She won the election by 153,604 votes, which was extraordinarily high. Hsu Jung-shu, the wife of Chang Chun-hung (who was also one of the eight opposition leaders being imprisoned), also campaigned for the Legislative Yuan, and was elected by a handsome margin over the adversary.

The central theme of the campaign of these prisoner's wives was straightforward: democracy and liberties. These women appealed to the sentimentality of the crowd to support their husbands' unfinished mission, that is, to create a real democracy and a free society in Taiwan. Their electoral triumph symbolized that the Tang-Wai opposition group remained have strong societal support since the occurrence of Kao-shiung Incident of 1979.

B. Public Opinion in the 1983 Election

Based upon a study of Taipei electorate, we may conclude that the

trend of national public opinion in the 1980 election was already bifurcated. While mainstream public opinion favored the political status quo, dissident voices were slowly emerging. This pattern of public opinion was displayed even more lucidly in the 1983 national election. Table 2 illuminates this fact.

Among the top five campaign issues of the 1983 election, three were about the well-being of social underdog while the other two involved administrative corruption and political stability. The other five salient issues were in the following order: public security, China unification, anti-privilege, international status and the well-being of the solidier, civil servants and school teachers.

More specifically, among the attentive public, about one third cited as most important a reduction in the gap between the haves and the have-nots, as well as improvement in the life of the lower income classes. Besides, 30.1 percent mentioned guarantees of working rights for peasants, laborers and fishermen, whereas 25.7 percent wanted the extension of unemployment and medical insurance to all people.

Next to social welfare as a crucial issue was concern over administrative corruption and political stability. About one third of the opinion leaders cited elimination of administrative corruption while one fourth expressed their loyalty to the supreme political leader and their concern with political stability. The problem of public security was also salient: Close to one fourth of the attentive public mentioned the need to enhance the police forces in order to protect public security.

Table 2: The Ten Most Salient Issues in the 1983 Supplementary Election of the Members of Legislative Yuan: The Electorate of Taiwan*

Issues	FREQ	Percentage
1. Reduce the gap between the haves and the have-nots; improve the living standard of the lower-middle income groups.	183	32.6
2. Clean up administrative bureaucracy and eliminate corruption.	183	32.6
3. Protect the right to work of peasants, laborers and fishermen.	169	30.1
4. Extend unemployment and medical insurance to the whole population, enhance social welfare.	144	25.7
5. Consolidate central leadership and strengthen political stability.	142	25.4
6. Enhance the forces of police maintain public security.	133	23.7
7. Urge the government to complete the mission of Chinese unification as soon as possible.	127	22.6
8. Oppose the practices of special privileges for bureaucrats and politicians.	90	16.00
9. Break the country's diplomatic impasse, improve the international status of our country.	89	15.90
10. Raise the income level of soldiers, civil servants and school teachers.	83	15.00

*Not including the electorate of Taipei city.

The issue of Chinese unification remained on political agenda. More than one fifth opinion leaders would urged the Nationalist government to continue the unfinished task of unification. The emotion against any form of extra-legal prerogative was still intense among the attentive public. Also, the increasingly isolated diplomatic situation appeared quite irritating to 15.90 percent opinion leaders. Finally, the plea to increase the income of the soldiers, civil servants and school teachers was quite welcome among the attentive public.

Comparing the patterns of public opinion in the 1980 and 1983 elections, we find discernable differences. While mainstream public opinion in the 1980 election stressed political order, it was economic interests and social welfare which characterized public opinion in 1983. However, a common feature of these two elections deserves some attention: a struggling dissident voice.

In the 1980 election, the Tang-wai opposition group began functioning again, after being severely damaged due to the Kao-shiung Incident. Tens of thousands of people swarmed to the forums where the Tang-wai candidates were lecturing. The Tang-Wai candidates' speeches were about the injustice of the KMT government in dealing with the Kao-shiung Incident. When the wives of the political prisoners stood on the platform and lamented, the audience appeared to be silently sharing their misery. Extraordinarily high popular votes for the families of the political prisoners on election day revealed a little light for the long-suffering Taiwanese opposition movement.

Nevertheless, even if the remaining Tang-Wai candidates were able to bring together their old supporters after the Incident, it proved very difficult

for them to entice new constituencies. For one thing, mainstream public opinion still favored continuation of the status quo. For another, the proportion of popular votes which the KMT candidates received had not been substantially reduced.

In the 1983 election, Tang-wai leaders launched a subtle campaign on the problem of Taiwan's destiny. They claimed that the future of Taiwan must be determined by all of Taiwan's inhabitants rather than by a small group. This claim represented a serious challenge to the authority of the KMT government. Actually this action was unprecedented under the rule of the KMT. Without regard to the official prohibition, the Tang-wai candidates took the issue of self-determination as their primary common cause, and intensively advocated it throughout the election. However, the voter's response to this matter was not as strong as expected. Empirical evidence shows that only ten percent of issue-oriented voters supported the idea of Taiwanese self-determination.

Voter indifference was not limited to self-determination only. It was also displayed on other significant issues of political structure. For instance, only 12.5 percent of issue-oriented voters supported the establishment of a strong opposition force to counterbalance the ruling KMT. Concerning the issues of the ban on new political parties and on newspapers, less than 5 percent of issue voters opposed those practices. As to the issue of the entire reelection of the members of the three central elective bodies, less than one tenth of issue voters casted a ballot favoring a complete reelection.

C. Public Opinion in the 1986 Election

The 1986 supplementary election of the members of three central elective bodies was the first election after the establishment of the Democratic Progress party (DPP). However, the 1986 election did not represent democratic transition. This was because no major political change occurred at the time except for the implicit official tolerance of the birth of a genuine opposition party. Admittedly, the political atmosphere was fundamentally different, but martial law was still enforced.

Did the pattern of public opinion change significantly? Yes, but not completely. Table 3 illustrates this. Three characteristic features may be identified from the ten most salient issues in the 1986 election. First, there was a strong rebound of opinion regarding the importance of the issue of Chinese unification. Among the attentive public, about one third expressed their strong support for unification. This can be understood as a reaction by many voters against the DPP which had become a symbol of separatism, antithetical to the idea of China unification.

Second, the issue-oriented voters who favored the values of the DPP also significantly increased. Four of the ten most salient issues disfavored the ongoing political structure and regime norms. Specifically, among the issue-oriented voters, more than one third voted for the elimination of administrative corruption; more than one fourth voted against special political privilege and power monopoly; 18.7 percent voted for establishing an independent court system; and, 18.1 percent voted for the re-election of the entire membership of the three central elective bodies.

Table 3: The Most Salient Issues in the 1986 Supplementary Election of the Members of Legislative Yuan: the Electorate of Taiwan*

Issues	FREQ	Percentage
1. Clean up administrative bureaucracy and eliminate corruption.	105	35.00
2. Insist Chinese unification by the three Principles of people, and oppose separatism and localism.	100	33.30
3. Oppose political prerogative and power monopoly.	79	26.30
4. Reduce the gap between the have and the have-not, improve the living standard of the lower-middle income groups.	76	25.30
5. Protect the right to work of peasants, laborers and fishermen.	74	24.70
6. Extend unemployment and medical insurance for the whole population, enhance social welfare.	69	23.00
7. Improve tax system and reduce people's tax load.	61	20.50
8. Protect ecological environment, eliminate industrial pollution.	58	19.4
9. Establish judicial independence, eliminate any type of political intervention.	56	18.7
10. Re-elect the entire members of three central elective bodies to expand the scope of political participation.	54	18.1

*Including the electorate of Taipei city.

Moreover, 15.1 percent of the issue-oriented voters opposed the prohibition of new newspapers; 12 percent called for the termination of martial rule; and, 11 percent expressed their disagreement with the ban of new political parties. Although these percentages were not large, it was significant, especially contrasted to the of 1983. Generally, these numbers revealed a discernable attitudinal change within a small sector of the mass public in favor of the new-born opposition party.

The third feature was concern for the well-being of socially disadvantaged groups. Thus, among the issue-oriented voters, 25.3 percent supported a reduction of the gap between the have and the have-nots; 24.7 percent stressed the need to protect the right to work of peasants, laborers and fishermen; 23 percent called for an adequate insurance of health and unemployment for the whole population; and, 20.5 percent asserted a reduction of tax load. These facts concretely showed how much the electorate was concerned with the life of ordinary people.

The 1986 election was mainly about national identity, political democracy, and social welfare. These three broad concerns superseded the concern of political order, which was the prominent feature of the 1980 and 1983 elections. These developments suggest that a part of the mass public was becoming more future-oriented. A growing minority of the people were questioning the political structure. Foreseeably, a mood of searching for political change will become stronger in the near future.

III. Democratic Values

The relationship between values and democratization has been well

documented in the scholarly literature of democratic development. Almond and Verba (1963) suggested that the civic culture would be most appropriate for a democratic system. In his classic study, Moore (1966) found that the legacy of western feudalism favored the arrival of democracy in some West European countries.⁶ Dahl (1971) also asserted that political beliefs had a significant impact on the character of a political regime. Thus, the significance of political beliefs and values in the making of political regimes appears quite certain. No thoughtful scholar would deny the association between political culture and political structure.

The remaining question, however, requires us to ask what cultural values a democratic regime needs. To answer this question, Dahl (1971) identified some crucial beliefs in favor of polyarchy. These include legitimacy of polyarchy, proper attitude toward authority, expectation about government effectiveness, sense of mutual trust, and cooperation. Huntington (1984) has offered a similar answer to this question.⁷

⁶ Barrington Moore (1966) identified three ingredients of Western feudalism which favored democratic possibilities. These were: 1) the growth of the notion of the immunity of certain groups and persons from the power of the ruler, 2) the conception of the right of resistance to unjust authority, and 3) the conception of contract as a mutual engagement freely undertaken by free persons.

⁷ Huntington suggested that the establishment of democracy needs certain types of political culture, which does not value highly hierarchical relationships and extreme deference to authority. In addition, a high degree of mutual trust among members of the society; a willingness to tolerate diversity and conflict among groups and to recognize the legitimacy of compromise; and a greater willingness to accommodate others, instead of putting great stress on the need to acquire power.

In order to provide a more systematic analysis of democratic values, Hu Fu (1977) developed a scale of power values. The scale of power values is based upon a reconceptualization of power relationships in a political system. According to Hu, the basic power relationship of a political system consists of four dimensions. These four dimensions are: 1) the ultimate location of sovereignty, 2) the proper relationships among the members of a political system, 3) the proper relationship between government and people, and 4) the proper relationship among different branches of governmental power.

In terms of these four dimensions of basic power relationships, Hu Fu further derives five different power values essential for democracy. These five power values are sovereignty, equality, liberties, pluralism, and division of power.

First, popular sovereignty is the primary component of democratic political systems. In democratic states, the ultimate source of governmental power lies in the people's consent. In non-democratic political systems, however, the ultimate source of political power lies somewhere else. For instance, sovereign power could be in the hand of a despotic emperor, monarch, oligarchical authoritarian rulers, modern dictators, or elsewhere. Mass political beliefs about sovereign power, therefore, are crucial in shaping the nature of a political regime.

Second, political equality is a central principle of democracy. It refers to a particular relationship among the members of political system. According to this principle, all adult citizens have the same rights of political participation, regardless of sex, class, race, ethnicity, or religion. Universal adult suffrage embodies the conception of political equality: one person, one vote,

with each vote being equal. Besides, most citizens are equally eligible to compete for a position in public office. McClosky and Zaller (1984) have succinctly stated that equality is a major presupposition of democracy.

Third, individual freedom is the core value of democracy. From a perspective of power relationship of political system, liberty implies a particular relationship between government and individuals. In the libertarian tradition, liberty is always above authority. Individual liberty is the purpose of the existence of governmental authority. Thus, Clinton Rossiter (1962) pointed out that it is the protection of individual freedom that proves the worth of the existence of authority.

Fourth, pluralism is also an essential component of democracy. From a perspective of the power relationship of political system, pluralism denotes a particular relationship between government and social groups. Governmental power has limits in restricting the associational life of citizen. In the libertarian tradition, group liberty is as important as individual liberty.⁸ The protection of freedom of association and assembly is required if democracy is to be maintained.

Finally, separation of power is a principal characteristic feature of modern constitutional democracies. From the perspective of the power relationships of a political system, it refers to the relationship among the major branches of governmental power, namely, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Separation of power and checks and balances are two indispens-

⁸ For example, Alexis de Tocqueville (1954) highlighted the freedom of assembly and association as the backbone of American democracy.

able elements in the operation of modern democracy. In the evolution of democratic history, independent legislative and judicial powers appear particularly important for the sustainment of democracy.

According to this reconceptualized notion of democratic values, Hu Fu and his colleagues designed a scale of power values. In the 1983 and 1986 national election surveys, the scale of power values was used to observe the democratic value-orientation of the general public. The findings of these two surveys are particularly valuable because they represent the intensity of democratic values among the general public right before the lifting of martial law.

A. Popular Sovereignty

In order to test the attitudes toward popular sovereignty at the level of the mass public, two items were designed to serve this purpose (see Table 4). The respondents were asked to express to what extent they agreed or disagreed with each statement. The stronger the extent of agreement, the weaker the value orientation of popular sovereignty; conversely, the stronger the extent of disagreement, the stronger the value orientation of popular sovereignty. In 1983, almost four-fifth of the respondents disagreed with the idea that allows the central government to appoint the executive head of villages, towns, or city, instead of direct election. In 1986, more than four-fifth of the respondents (83.5 percent) expressed their disagreement with the aforementioned idea. This indicated that the respondents of both 1983 and 1986 already had a strong consensus on how local executive heads should be chosen: they should be elected.

However, if we look at the responses to the second question in Table 5.4, a different profile of the mass public emerges. In the 1983 investigation, over half of respondents (53.6 percent) said they depend on governmental leaders to handle any public affairs. In the 1986 investigation, there were still more than one third of the respondents (36.2 percent) inclined to rely on governmental leaders to deal with public affairs. This result indicates an apparent mental state of dependence on political authority, at least by a significant percentage of the population. Nonetheless, from 1983 to 1986 there was a significant decrease in the percentage of respondents who were inclined to rely on authority.

Table 4: Attitudes toward Popular Sovereignty

	1983	1986
1. In order to avoid bothersome election procedures, why not let the executive head of village, town, or city be appointed by the Central Government.		
— Strongly Agree	2.4	3.2
— Agree	7.7	6.2
— Slightly Agree	10.3	7.1
— Slightly Disagree	17.2	11.1
— Disagree	32.5	35.8
— Strongly Disagree	30.0	36.6
	(N=1985)	(N=1330)
2. Governmental leaders are just like the head of our large family; hence all the affairs of the state, no matter how small or big, should be decided by them.		
— Strongly Agree	10.5	8.8
— Agree	23.5	15.7
— Slightly Agree	19.6	11.7
— Slightly Disagree	19.0	13.0
— Disagree	16.8	29.9
— Strongly Disagree	10.6	20.8
	(N=1994)	(N=1328)

B. Political Equality

To test the value orientation of political equality at the level of mass public, two items were selected (see Table 5). In both the 1983 and 1986 national surveys, more than nine-tenth of the respondents took a clear position opposing on the first question. Regarding the second question, 82.9 percent respondents of the 1983 group disagreed with sex discrimination in political matters while 90.1 percent respondents of the 1986 group espoused a similar position. These findings suggest that Taiwanese strongly valued political equality during the first half of 1980s. Indeed, there was no clear difference between the 1983 and the 1986 respondents with respect to egalitarian values.

Table 5: Egalitarian Values

	1983	1986
1. The positions of elective officials like assemblymen, mayor or county magistrate are best assumed by rich men.		
— Strongly Agree	1.1	1.3
— Agree	2.7	3.1
— Slightly Agree	5.2	4.6
— Slightly Disagree	11.4	7.0
— Disagree	33.9	37.5
— Strongly Disagree	45.7	46.5
	(N=2012)	(N=1383)
2. Politics is a man's game, in which women should not be involved.		
— Strongly Agree	2.6	2.0
— Agree	6.7	4.5
— Slightly Agree	7.8	3.4
— Slightly Disagree	15.6	7.3
— Disagree	37.1	39.8
— Strongly Disagree	30.3	43.3
	(N=2013)	(N=1385)

Table 6: Libertarian Values

	1983	1986
1. Cruel criminals must be punished immediately, and it is not necessary to go through long judicial process.		
— Strongly Agree	15.6	11.4
— Agree	18.9	14.8
— Slightly Agree	12.0	9.3
— Slightly Disagree	15.3	11.5
— Disagree	22.6	29.8
— Strongly Disagree	15.6	23.1
	(N=1992)	(N=1328)
2. If we, the people, do not think in the same way, society is bound to be in chaos.		
— Strongly Agree	21.9	18.3
— Agree	31.9	28.9
— Slightly Agree	20.5	16.1
— Slightly Disagree	11.9	10.5
— Disagree	9.8	17.0
— Strongly Disagree	4.0	9.2
	(N=1989)	(N=1320)
3. It should be decided by government whether one's opinion may be disseminated in society or not.		
— Strongly Agree	8.8	6.4
— Agree	21.0	18.4
— Slightly Agree	24.3	13.3
— Slightly Disagree	20.9	16.1
— Disagree	17.3	30.5
— Strongly Disagree	7.8	15.2
	(N=1965)	(N=1281)

C. Political Liberties

Three items were employed to test the value orientation of political liberties in both 1983 and 1986 (see Table 6). This table yields some interesting results. As noted earlier, Taiwanese people were extremely anxious to pursue

egalitarian values. Nevertheless, they appeared much less determined to pursue libertarian values. In the 1983 survey, approximately half of respondents (46.5 percent) tended to ignore personal freedom. In the 1986 survey, although a visible attitudinal change regarding personal freedom occurred, more than one third of the respondents (35.5 percent) downplayed the importance of personal freedom.

In addition, Taiwanese people appeared extremely uneasy with the existence of multiple voices or ways of thinking in the society. In the 1983 survey, nearly three-fourths of the respondents (74.3 percent) worry about social chaos if the people do not think in the same way. The 1986 survey result exhibited a sizeable drop of percentage in the same concern. However, still more than one half of the respondents (54.3 percent) believed that unanimity of public opinion is important for social order.

As for freedom of speech, Taiwanese people appeared quite ambivalent. This was particularly true in the early 1980s. As seen in Table 6, the 1983 respondents divided on the issue of freedom of speech. The majority of respondents (54.1 percent) believed that government should have the power to decide which opinion may circulate in society, whereas 45.9 percent of respondents took an opposite position. In the 1986 investigation, the majority of respondents (61.8 percent) shifted to the position which favors freedom of speech. Nevertheless, close to two-fifth of the respondents rejected freedom of speech.

Table 7: Pluralistic Values

	1983	1986
1. The existence of too many associations would hurt social order and harmony.		
— Strongly Agree	18.3	14.6
— Agree	30.3	28.3
— Slightly Agree	24.1	16.9
— Slightly Disagree	12.3	11.5
— Disagree	10.2	18.9
— Strongly Disagree	4.7	9.8
	(N=1971)	(N=1298)
2. The existence of too many political parties in a country will lead to political chaos.		
— Strongly Agree	17.6	15.7
— Agree	30.6	32.2
— Slightly Agree	26.1	16.6
— Slightly Disagree	11.7	9.4
— Disagree	9.7	17.1
— Strongly Disagree	4.4	8.9
	(N=1957)	(N=1270)

D. Pluralism

Two items were used to test pluralistic values at the level of the general public. As shown in Table 5.7, an overwhelming majority of Taiwanese people worried that too many social groups or political parties would cause social and political disorder. Specifically, in the 1983 survey, 72.7 percent of respondents thought that the existence of too many associations would undermine social order.

Likewise, in the 1986 survey, 59.8 percent of respondents believed so. Concerning the issue of party politics, 74.3 percent of respondents, in the 1983 survey, believed that political instability would occur if too many political parties existed in the country. In the 1986 survey, nearly two thirds of the

respondents adopted a conservative position on the matter of party politics.

Apparently, the majority of Taiwanese people did not fully appreciate the value of a pluralistic society and politics. This phenomenon persisted through most of the 1980s. Such a result represented an unfavorable conditions for the development of an open and free polity. However, one thing is noteworthy. From 1983 to 1986, the respondents who disadained pluralistic values dropped by about ten percent. In addition, the intensity of attitude favorable to pluralism was enhanced as well.

E. Division of Power

In order to test the value orientation of separation of power, two items were formulated. The first was about the relationship between executive power and legislative power. The second concerned the relationship between judicial power and executive power. As seen in Table 8, in the 1983 survey, 56.6 percent of respondents considered that the government would be ineffective if legislative power was too strong. In the 1986 survey, the result was somewhat different: 44.5 percent of respondents believed that an active legislative power would handicap the operation of executive power.

Viewing it in terms of attitudinal intensity, the picture of value change appears even clearer. In the 1983 investiagation, only one quarter of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the notion that a strong legislative power may paralyze executive power. In the 1986 investigation, however, 42 percent of respondents clearly objected to the idea that executive power may be handicapped by a strong legislative power. For the development of a democratic state, this type of attitudinal change appears quite pos-

itive.

Table 8: Values of Power Division

	1983	1986
1. The government would be ineffective if its operation is frequently checked and supervised by the assembly.		
— Strongly Agree	8.8	6.5
— Agree	21.7	19.9
— Slightly Agree	26.1	18.1
— Slightly Disagree	18.5	13.4
— Disagree	18.4	29.1
— Strongly Disagree	6.6	12.9
	(N=1889)	(N=1215)
2. The court should accept the advice of executive branch when deals with major cases of public security.		
— Strongly Agree	5.9	4.8
— Agree	1.56	14.9
— Slightly Agree	22.0	13.1
— Slightly Disagree	19.5	13.4
— Disagree	20.2	25.8
— Strongly Disagree	16.9	28.0
	(N=1739)	(N=1221)

Regarding the relationship between judicial power and executive power, the 1983 and 1986 surveys indicated that Taiwanese people were a bit more interested in an independent judicial power. In the 1983 investigation, 56.6 percent of respondents disagreed that the court should accept the advice of executive branch when dealing with major cases of public security. In the 1986 investigation, over two-third of the respondents expressed the same attitude. If we look at the distribution of attitudinal intensity on the same issue, we also find a significant difference between 1983 and 1986. The 1986 respondents clearly took a much stronger position in favor of an autonomous court. In sum, the 1983 and 1986 national survey studies of democratic val-

ues in Taiwan provide some intriguing findings.

First, in terms of the overall scale of power values, a clear majority of Taiwanese people appreciate democracy. This was the case in both 1983 and 1986. The 1983 survey indicated that 58.4 percent of the respondents may be considered as having democratic beliefs. The 1986 survey evidenced that 74.5 percent respondents had clear democratic beliefs.

Second, in breaking down the scale of power values and inspecting each of its five components, we find a very interesting pattern of political beliefs. The Taiwanese people showed strong beliefs in popular sovereignty and in egalitarian values, and moderately strong feelings toward the value of separation of power, but they were rather weak in libertarian and pluralistic values. This was the case not only in the 1983 but also in the 1986.

Indeed, there was a clear overall growth trend in the intensity of democratic values at the level of the mass public from 1983 to 1986. Regarding the overall scale of power values and each of its five components, the average score of the 1986 respondents was significantly higher than that of 1983 respondents.

The existence of a strong democratic consensus among the general public constitutes a favorable cultural condition for the development of political democracy (Wiarda, 1982, 1986; Tumin, 1982). "[T]he greater the belief within a given country in the legitimacy of the institutions of polyarchy, the greater the chances for polyarchy" (Dahl, 1971: 129). Our empirical studies evidence that these beliefs can be traced back at least to the first half of 1980s. Taiwanese people appeared psychologically ready for the arrival of political democracy.

However, one important caveat must be made. In spite of a strong sentiment in favor of popular sovereignty and egalitarian values, the Taiwanese people seemed hesitant in supporting of libertarian values. Perhaps this is a consequence of the mixed effect of Confucianism and modern authoritarianism. Confucianism emphasizes authority, hierarchy, order, and discipline, and is antagonistic to autonomous associations (Huntington, 1984; Pye, 1985). This unique combination of power values may have allowed the KMT authoritarian rulers to slow down the pace of democratization.

Historically, libertarian and egalitarian values have been vital for the making of democracy. In the historical experience of Western European and North American countries, the pursuit of libertarian values came first and then was followed by the attainment of egalitarian values.⁹ In Taiwan, however, the order of sequence seems to be reversed.

In contrast to egalitarian values, libertarian values apparently are far more difficult to take root in at least some non-Western countries. This is perhaps a major cultural cause of delayed democratization in some non-Western countries. If this observation is correct, democracy will come more easily when libertarian values begin to prevail.

IV. Partisanship

To understand political change in an authoritarian context, the partisan

⁹ In the study of American political culture, McClosky and Zaller (1984) argued that "[E]quality and popular sovereignty, of course, are given their due, but liberty is more deeply embedded in the nation's system of values than any others."

disposition of the mass public may provide some useful cue. This is particularly true in stable authoritarian regimes. Along with other things, long-term political stability itself means the existence of a more favorable condition for the development of partisan identification toward the ruling party. In short, the rulers of stable authoritarian regimes should have a better chance to shape people's subjective political orientation, including partisan disposition.

Partisan disposition or partisanship is an attitudinal propensity toward contending political groups or parties. Partisan disposition is not easy to change. It may be a result of early political socialization, or it may result from adult political experience. In any case, partisanship represents a stable feature of political attitude. By learning more about the configuration of the partisan disposition of the mass public, we shall be more capable of understanding the dynamics of political change.

Table 9: The Partisan Dispositions of Taiwanese Electorate: 1983 and 1986

Partisan Disposition	1983	1986
— Strong TangWai\DPP	1.8	1.4
— Moderate TangWai\DPP	2.6	3.9
— Somewhat TangWai\DPP	2.3	2.9
— Independent	52.1	47.2
— Somewhat KMT	11.7	14.3
— Moderate KMT	16.5	22.1
— Strong KMT	12.9	8.1
	(N=1987)	(N=1359)

Table 9 presents a picture of partisanship in 1983 and 1986. The distribution of partisanship of the mass public was extremely skewed. In both the 1983 and 1986 surveys, over two-fifths of the respondents were pro-KMT while less than one tenth were pro-Tangwai or pro-DPP. Furthermore, about one half of the respondents were Independents. This pattern of partisanship

embodies the ongoing institutional structure of a hegemonic one party system.

As mentioned earlier, the official ban on new political parties continued until July of 1987. Before the birth of the DPP in the fall of 1986, nominally there were three political parties in the ROC. However, two of them were ornamental. The KMT, in actuality, maintained one-party rule for almost four decades. Therefore, it is no wonder that only the KMT would be the object of partisan identification.

One other phenomenon deserves attention. The difference in partisan composition between 1983 and 1986 was small. In other words, the pattern of partisan disposition did not change a lot because of the establishment of the DPP in 1986. This indicates that it would take a certain period of time for the general public to acknowledge the DPP and then to identify with it. In any event, as a new political party, the DPP had gained strong identification only from a tiny portion of the mass public.

V. Social and Psychological Bases of the Ruling KMT and the Opposition Tang-Wai\DPP

There is a giant puzzle in the electoral history of Taiwan. That is, why has the KMT, an immigrant ruling power, been able to reap consistently seventy percent or even more of the popular vote in national and local elections.¹⁰ Several compatible reasons come to mind.

¹⁰ The KMT has been doing well in the supplementary elections of the members of the Legislative Yuan. In 1972, the KMT candidates as a whole collected 74 percent popular votes; in 1975, it was 79 percent; in 1980, it was 73 percent; in 1983, it was 71 percent; and in 1986, it dropped to 67 percent.

The first is that the KMT party-state was not only a strong ruling apparatus but also a powerful machine for electoral mobilization. The KMT, as a quasi-Leninist party, has been able to dominate the state and civil society. During non-election periods, the huge party-state apparatus operates to serve its constituency, to manipulate public opinion, and to impede the growth of any potential opposition force. During election campaign, it utilizes all of its organizational resources, including every sector of the state machine, to mobilize electoral support.

The second is that individual political dissident or opposition groups had never been able to join together to form a strong united opposition force in the past. In the name of emergency state and martial law, the ruling KMT had minimized the possibility for political dissidents to be organized. Under the KMT's intentional repression of the growth of opposition forces, atomized political dissidents and fragmentary opposition groups could never assemble together as a cohesive group in elections.

Thirdly, the KMT had been successful in integrating local factions into its ruling machine since its arrival in Taiwan (Chen, 1990). Local factions were, in effect, the incarnation of the KMT in elections. By taking advantage of its patron-client network, the leaders of local factions who campaigned with the KMT party label usually could draw large votes from their constituencies.

Finally, the practice of ballot-buying has been a very common but subtle phenomenon in the election of Taiwan. It is an effective campaign strategy, especially in the rural area and in old communities of the urban area (Hu and Chu, 1989). Everybody knows this practice except law-enforcing of-

ficials; so, it lasts. And, because financially the KMT candidates have a tremendous edge, it is no wonder that the KMT could maintain a long-term electoral triumph.

These four explanations appear rather convincing and supplement one another. However, none of them can help us to understand the social bases of the KMT and of the opposition Tang-Wai/DPP. Who comprises the KMT's constituency, which as represented seventy percent of the entire electorate over the years? Who are represented in the remaining thirty percent? Answers to these questions are important. They may reveal some insightful clues about the dynamics of mass politics.

To address these questions, I analyze Taiwanese voting behavior. My data sets are derived from the national election survey of 1983 and 1986. Instead of log-linear models, logistic regression models are selected to serve the analytical purpose.¹¹

Models of Electoral choice

A model comprises a set of variables. In my models of electoral choice, the dependent variable is electoral choice. I utilize seven explanatory variables: gender, age, ethnic groups, group membership, occupation, partisan disposition, and democratic values. A more detailed discussion of these vari-

¹¹ Both dichotomous and polytomous logistic regression analysis will be used. The logistic regression model is a robust tool to handle categorical data. It is particularly useful in dealing with mixed data which contains discrete and continuous data simultaneously. In this sense, the logistic regression model is superior to the log linear model because log-linear models can only handle categorical data. In fact, logistic regression can be considered as a refined form of the log-linear model (Swafford, 1980).

ables is in order.

Cross-country election studies have found that gender has a discernable effect on partisan choice (Tingsten, 1937; Lazarsfeld et al., 1954; Rose et al., 1974). In general, female voters are politically more conservative than male. Female voters will generally vote for predominant parties while male voters are more likely to support left-wing, radical, socialist, or dissident elements. We want to know whether gender makes a difference on voting in the context of Taiwan.

Age is an important component of political behavior. It appears even more significant when we try to understand political change. This is because generational difference in political attitudes and actions may trigger a major political reform (Samuels, 1977). In the case of Taiwan, we hypothesize that the young generation is a key factor in pushing the authoritarian regime toward democracy. Youth are more likely to vote for the Tang-Wai or DPP.

Surface differences of political generations are detectable in Taiwan. The KMT's leaders and their followers escaped to Taiwan in 1949 due to the communist revolution. In other words, the old generation of authoritarian rulers and their adherents shared an extremely unhappy historical experience. Disaster, fear, defeat, and frustration were featured in their common memory. In contrast, the post-World War II generations grew up in a relatively peaceful and prosperous era. In this sense, the young generation would appear to be far more impatient with regard to slow democratic reform than their older counterparts. The opposition movement, therefore, may draw stronger support from the younger generation. Conversely, the ruling KMT should be able to keep the loyalty of older generations, especially mainlanders.

Ethnicity is an ancient and significant source of political strain in many human societies. In Taiwan, ethnicity appears even more decisive in the conflicts between the rulers and the ruled. Differences in ethnic background may determine an individual's political cognition and sentiments, which in turn shapes a voter's choice. Hence, in terms of the pattern of people's voting decision, a close relationship between ethnic cleavage and opposition movement in Taiwan may be confirmed. Specifically, native Taiwanese are the main social base of the opposition movement in Taiwan.

Education is a crucial social indicator. Its importance is multi-faceted. Education shapes individual political beliefs, values, and action (Almond and Verba, 1963; Milbrath, 1976). It determines, to a large extent, individual social status as well. From a macro perspective, education is a crucial factor of political modernization (Coleman, 1965). The impact of education on political behavior is simply undeniable. What interests me here is whether there exists a close relationship between education and the rise of an opposition movement. Are people with higher education more likely to vote for the opposition forces than the ruling party? Are the supporters of the ruling KMT less educated? These are some of the question I try to answer.

In the social sciences, occupation has long been used to operationalize the variable of social class. This is because occupational division of labor is a major source of social conflict in modern time. Different occupations represent contradictory social interests and are aggregated in different ways by various political parties. Thus, if we know the social base of the KMT or of the Tang-Wai/DPP, we will be in a much better position to understand to which interests the two parties appeal.

Group membership is a variable to measure the individual's participation in various voluntary associations or interest groups. As an intermediary organization between the state and individuals, voluntary associations play a significant role in the process of political participation. Thus, Verba and Nie (1972) concluded that a rich political life of citizens often rests on a rich associational life. Organizational affiliation is one of the best predictors of citizen activity. Campbell and his colleagues (1960) discovered that partisanship is one of the most decisive factors in shaping voter's choice.

Conventional wisdom in voting behavior studies is that party identification, to a substantial degree, determines voting direction. In the context of Taiwan, the formation of partisan disposition has been distorted by the structure of a hegemonic one party system. Until 1986, there were still more than two-fifth's of the Taiwanese people who stood together with the KMT. In contrast, people who tended to identify with the Tang-Wai or DPP never represented more than ten percent of the population.

What interests us here is whether partisanship is also a critical factor of voter's decision in Taiwan. If partisanship is influential, a restructuring of partisan dispositions will be politically consequential. Without major change in the structure of partisanship, the KMT will continue to dominate in elections.

Finally, democratic values may play a special role in the transition toward democracy. Theoretically, people with strong democratic commitment will vote for the candidates who advocate democracy. Conversely, people with strong anti-democratic beliefs will vote for the candidates who insist on the continuity of authoritarian rule. In the case of Taiwan I assume that

people with strong democratic commitment will most likely vote for Tang-Wai or the DPP while people with weak democratic beliefs will vote for the KMT candidates.

I have explained why it is pertinent to put these variables into the models of electoral choice. I will now discuss the meaning of our empirical findings in the following sections. Table 10 to 12 present the results of a logistic regression analysis.

In Table 10 and 11, there are five models of electoral choice. Model one contains seven independent variables. Model two adds six more dummy variables of occupation. Model 3 introduces two dummy variables of partisanship but eliminates the previous six occupation variables. Model 4 contains all the explanatory variables except democratic values. Model 5, the final model, puts all related variables together, including democratic values.

To ascertain how well these logistic models perform, two methods are used, i.e., log likelihood and correctly predicted probability. As seen in the tables, statistical diagnosis indicates that all of these models fit the observed data exceedingly well.¹² The purpose of constructing five models will become clearer as the analysis proceeds. Now let us see how each explanatory variable behaves.

¹² Based on the method of likelihood ratio, we have done significant test for each model. All of the five models are significant at the probability level lower than 0.001. In addition, the correctly predicted probabilities of the five models ranges from 84.4 to 86.3, which means those models fit our empirical data very well.

Table 10: Logistic Regression Analysis of Voter's Choice, 1983

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	-3.105*** (0.5508)	-4.0998*** (0.7017)	-4.3205*** (0.6099)
Sex (male)	0.3046 (0.1654)	0.3484 (0.1885)	0.2694 (0.1748)
Age	-0.0829* (0.0402)	-0.0617 (0.0421)	-0.0553 (0.0423)
Ethnic Groups			
Taiwanese	2.0583*** (0.4019)	2.0579*** (0.4049)	1.9547*** (0.4223)
Education			
college	-3.234 (0.3465)	-0.1609 (0.3807)	0.0043 (0.3701)
mid-high	-0.1415 (0.2947)	-0.0779 (0.3026)	0.0695 (0.3109)
grade	-0.0503 (0.2736)	-0.0709 (0.2775)	0.283 (0.2872)
Group			
Membership	-0.4528** (0.1879)	-0.4199* (0.1902)	-0.3747 (0.2033)
Occupation			
entrepreneur		0.9328* (0.4495)	
employees		0.6820 (0.4894)	
professional		1.0522* (0.5387)	
working class		1.0656** (0.4377)	
state employee		0.1402 (0.5304)	
others		0.9488* (0.4400)	
Partisanship			
Tang-Wai			2.8807*** (0.2993)
Independent			1.2203*** (0.2193)
N	1319	1319	1319
-2xLLR	73.86	87.97	197.26
DF	7	13	9
% Correctly			
Predicted	84.8	84.8	86.3
Psuedo R2	0.231	0.235	0.376

Parenthesis = Standard Error *P < .05 **P < .01 ***P < .001

B. Gender. The data indicate there was no significant difference between male and female voters regarding their voting. Although our beta coefficients suggest that males were slightly more likely to vote for the Tang-Wai, the differences are not large enough to be statistically significant. This was also the case in the 1986 election, as Table 12 shows. Thus, we conclude that gender has not been a key element in Taiwan's electoral process.

C. Generations. Generational difference was also insignificant in the elections. No visible difference existed among various age groups regarding their behavior of electoral choice. This was also the case in the 1986 election, as seen in Table 12. The finding seems to be counter-intuitive. It suggests that political conflicts between the KMT and Tang-Wai had little or nothing to do with generational difference.

D. Ethnicity. Ethnicity did have a salient effect on people's choice. This result was anticipated. As seen in Table 10 and 11, one unit change in the explanatory variable of ethnicity will produce a 1.86 to 2.05 change in the log odd of electoral choice being Tang-Wai. A non-technical interpretation of this result is: other things being equal, in comparison to mainlanders, Taiwanese (including Min-nan, Hakka, and aboriginal) were far more likely to vote for the opposition Tang-Wai's candidates.

This finding provides additional evidence to support the argument that political conflict in Taiwan was chiefly structured along ethnic line. The Tang-Wai candidates could draw electoral support much more easily from Taiwanese than from mainlanders. The same result happened in the 1986 election, as seen in Table 12.

E. Education. As shown in Tables 10 and 11, regarding the behavior of

electoral choice, no significant difference existed between illiterate or near-illiterate voters and other voters with higher educational level.¹³ In a word, despite having different educational background, people tended to vote in the same way. However, a polytomous logit analysis, based on the 1986 survey data, tells a slightly different story.¹⁴

As seen in Table 12, when compared with illiterate or near-illiterate voters, voters with college education were significantly less likely to vote for Independents than the KMT; so were the voters with middle-high school background. Voters with only an elementary education and illiterate or near-illiterate voters shared a pattern of electoral choice in deciding to elect Independents or the KMT.

As to the choice between the DPP and the KMT, the data suggests that in the 1986 election illiterate or near-illiterate voters and voters with high educational level shared a pattern of electoral choice. This is so probably because the supports of the DPP came quite evenly from each of educational strata; so did the KMT's supporters. The major difference may merely lie

¹³ To execute logistic regression analysis, I decompose the variable of education into four new indicator variables. The four indicator variables are college, middle and high school, grade school, and illiteracy. In Table 10 to 12, the group of illiteracy was selected as a reference group. The logistic coefficients of the other three categories are meaningful only in comparison with the reference group.

¹⁴ In our polytomous logistic analysis, the dependent variable, electoral choice, has three categories: 1) vote for Independents, 2) vote for the DPP, and 3) vote for the KMT. We use the third category as a reference group. Polytomous logistic analysis is a robust tool which allows us to compare the patterns of electoral choice of people with various social and psychological features.

Table 11: Logistic Regression Analysis of Voter's Choice, 1983

Variables	Model 4	Model 5
Constant	-5.0969*** (0.7550)	-6.1733*** (0.9800)
Sex (male)	0.2794 (0.1997)	0.1912 (0.2254)
Age	-0.0375 (0.0445)	-0.0040 (0.0517)
Ethnic Groups		
Taiwanese	1.9232**** (0.4238)	1.8640*** (0.4644)
Education		
college	0.0922 (0.4035)	-0.2706 (0.4744)
mid-high	0.1097 (0.3179)	-0.1521 (0.3743)
grade	-0.0057 (0.2912)	-0.1974 (0.3404)
Group Membership	-0.3499 (0.2058)	-0.4832* (0.2325)
Social Classes		
entrepreneur	0.7849 (0.4636)	0.4346 (0.5147)
employees	0.5024 (0.5107)	0.3339 (0.5563)
professional	1.0955 (0.5707)	0.6075 (0.6529)
working class	0.91818* (0.4489)	0.7945 (0.4946)
state employee	0.2077 (0.5509)	-0.2624 (0.6173)
others	0.7848 (0.4509)	0.4297 (0.5064)
Partisanship		
Tang-Wai	2.8683*** (0.3032)	2.7015*** (0.3206)
Independent	1.1877*** (0.2210)	0.8484*** (0.2412)
Democratic Values		0.0414*** (0.0130)
N	1319	1104
-2xLLR	186.6	161.08
DF	15	16
Pseudo R2	0.374	0.381
% Correctly Predicted	86.2	85.8

Parenthesis = Standard Error *P < .05 **P < .01 ***P < .001

in the size of the supporters of both sides. The KMT's voters obviously constituted the vast majority of the electorate.

The preceding discussion paved the way to our conclusion that while there may have been many different social characteristics between the KMT voters and the Tang-Wai/DPP voters, education is not one of them. Notwithstanding, education remained a good indicator to distinguish the KMT voters and the Independent voters. This interesting phenomenon raises another significant question: does education matter in people's partisan choice? My answer is: yes, education does matter, but only slightly.¹⁵

F. Group participation. Concerning participation in social groups, empirical evidence suggests that there exist a close relationship between group participation and electoral choice. by and large, voters having group member-

¹⁵ In fact, the answer is no in the 1983 survey whereas it is yes in the 1986 survey. My interpretation about this incongruity is a methodological one. In short, different methods induce different results. Since we use dichotomous logistic regression for the 1983 survey data and polytomous logistic regression for the 1986 survey data, it is not incomprehensible to generate different results. The reason for using different methods is data limitations. The DPP as the first real opposition party in Taiwan was established as late as the fall of 1986. So, before 1986 the opposition forces in elections were in actuality a loose coalition of independent candidates. No formal party label was available in 1983. The category of non-KMT candidates in our 1983 survey was therefore quite heterogeneous. Due to the establishment of the DPP in 1986, it became plausible to distinguish the DPP from the Independents in the 1986 investigation. Thanks to this distinction, we could employ the method of polytomous logistic regression to analyze the social and psychological similarities and differences among the KMT voters, the DPP voters, and the Independent voters. Thus, concerning electoral choice, empirical findings from the 1986 investigation would be more accurate than those from the 1983 survey.

Table 12: A Polytomous Logit Model of Electoral Choice, 1986

Variables	Independent	DPP
Constant	-2.2434 (1.3470)	-8.6480*** (1.1786)
Sex (male)	0.1927 (0.3737)	0.0499 (0.2734)
Age	-0.29826** (0.0901)	-0.0329 (0.0595)
Ethnic Groups		
Taiwanese	0.6619 (0.6480)	1.4218** (0.4830)
Group Membership	0.3251 (0.3380)	-0.3009 (0.2648)
Education		
college	-2.4225** 90.9399)	1.1591 (0.6834)
mid-high	-1.4619* (0.6612)	0.2025 (0.5955)
grade	-0.2016 90.5526)	0.5652 (0.5479)
Occupation		
entrepreneur	-0.3159 (0.6341)	1.5890** (0.6054)
private employees	-1.9704 (1.1407)	1.3064* (0.6519)
professional	-0.4909 (0.9152)	0.4992 (0.7586)
working class	-0.1999 (0.5640)	1.4616* (0.5871)
state employee	-0.6057 (0.9193)	0.3028 (0.7572)
others	0.2658 (0.5469)	1.0705 (0.5880)
Partisanship		
Pro-DPP	0.4827 (0.6148)	3.7724*** (0.3733)
Independent	0.0593 (0.3248)	1.5749*** (0.2727)
Indentity	-0.3414* (0.1270)	-0.0907 (0.0874)
Democratic Values	0.0458* (0.0188)	0.0750*** (0.0144)
N = 984	-2LLR = -564.1689	
Overall Chi-Square=326.76142	DF = 30	

Parenthesis = Standard Error *P < .05 **P < .01 ***P < .001

ship were not inclined to vote for the Tang-Wai candidates. The logistic regression coefficients of group membership are statistically significant in model 1 and 2, but not in model 3 and 4. The key for these different result seems to be the absence or presence of the partisanship variable.

We may make a reasonable inference that there must exist a close relationship between group participation and partisanship. So, if we hold the variable of partisanship, the significant effect of group membership on electoral choice will evaporate; otherwise, group membership will affect electoral choice. One other thing deserves a mention. In the 1986 investigation, the influence of group membership on electoral choice was no longer significant. these findings are interesting for two reasons. First, since the KMT party-state has long been able to control all major "voluntary associations" in Taiwan, it is not surprising that the members of these organizations would be much more likely to identify with the KMT. In this sense, rich associational life may be compatible with authoritarian rule.

Second, the different results of the 1983 and 1986 surveys may mirror real political changes taking place during the period 1983 to 1986. Accelerating political liberalization during that period may have helped voluntary associations to acquire a bit more autonomy. Consequently, it might have raised the possibility for the members of voluntary associations to back up the opposition force.

G. Social Classes (Occupation). The effect of occupation variables on electoral choice was not evident. Different models produce different results.

¹⁶ Model 2 indicates that in contrast with the peasants, entrepreneurs, professionals, the working class, housewives and students were more likely to vote for the Tang-Wai than the KMT. On the other hand, state employees and private rank and file employees voted the same way as the peasants did. That is to say, just like peasants, state and private employees were less likely to vote for the Tang-Wai than the KMT.

¹⁶ Seven occupational categories were created according to the nature of each respondent's occupation. These include peasant, working class, entrepreneur, professionals, rank and file private employees, state employees, and others. The category of peasants consists of owner-cultivators, tenant farmers, and fishermen. The category of working class consists of physical laborers and transportation workers. The entrepreneur category includes factory or store owner (or, business people, large or small). The rank and file private employees is self-evident. State employees include civil servants, employees of state enterprises, military personnel, policemen, the KMT and Youth Corps officials, and school teachers excluding college professors. The category of professionals includes college professors, lawyers, doctors, accountants, journalists, engineers, and managers. Finally, the residual category includes housewives, students, retirees, and the unemployed. In the following analysis, peasants are chosen as a reference group. The reason to use peasants as a reference group is straightforward. Peasants have been politically one of the most conservative groups. In the 1983 election, among the seven occupational categories, peasants were the second most likely group to vote for the KMT. In that category, the percentage voting for the KMT was as high as 89.29. The most likely group to vote for the KMT was state employees: 93.58 percent of this category voted for the KMT. In using peasants as a reference group, I want to know whether the working class, entrepreneurs, and other categories voted differently in comparison to peasants.

However, models 4 and 5 were quite different from model 2. Model 4 is equal to Model 2 plus the variable of partisanship. Model 5 is equal to Model 4 plus the variable of democratic values. As Model 4 indicates, other things being equal, only the working class voted differently from peasants. This result probably was caused by the partisanship variable. Likewise, Model 5 shows that other things being equal, no significant difference exists between the peasants and the voters of the other six occupational groups, with respect to electoral choice.

These inconsistent results suggest that we may have to examine possible joint effects of occupation variables. Before doing so, let us see Table 12 in which a polytomous logistic model of electoral choice, based upon the 1986 election survey, is presented. Apparently, polytomous logistic model generates a clearer picture about the effect of occupation variables on electoral choice.

Evidently, occupation variables could not distinguish Independent voters from KMT voters. Holding other variables constant, no significant difference exists between peasants and voters of the other six occupational groups, with respect to electoral choice of either Independents or the KMT. However, with regard to the choice between the DPP and the KMT, a very interesting pattern of electoral choice is observable.

Holding other variables constant, entrepreneurs, private rank-and-file employees, and the working class were clearly more likely to vote for the DPP than the KMT, when compared with peasants. However, state employees, professionals, and a residual category mainly comprised of housewives and students, voted about the same way as the peasantry did.

The test of total effect of occupation variables on electoral choice also produces a fascinating result. In the 1983 election, the occupation variables as a whole displayed no significant effect on electoral choice. However, in the 1986 election, occupation variable turned out to be a significant factor in determining electoral choice.¹⁷

The disparity in the empirical findings may be the result of two factors. The first is a methodological one, which I explained earlier in the section of education. The second possible factor lies in the change of political reality taking place during the period between 1983 to 1986. Indeed, these diverse empirical findings seem intuitively plausible.

By 1983, the cleavage of social classes had not yet become politically significant. Class effect on electoral choice was thus insignificant. However, as time and the opposition movement evolved, the effect of social class on voting gradually surfaced. By 1986, the relationship between social classes and voting in Taiwan became clearer. For the DPP, it was obviously less difficult to obtain electoral support from entrepreneur, private rank-and-file employees, and the working class than from peasants, state employees, professionals, and housewives as well as students. In short, *the DPP's supporters*

¹⁷ We have used the procedure of likelihood ratio to test the joint effect of occupation variables. For example, for the case of 1983, we use the $-2LLR$ of Model 3 to subtract the $-2LLR$ of Model 4. What we get is a C value which equals 10.33 with six degree of freedom. Chi-square test shows this value is not significant at .05 probability level. Following the same procedure for the case of 1986, we get a C value which equals 23.4679 with six degree of freedom. Chi-square test indicates that this value is significant beyond 0.001 probability level.

*are derived chiefly from the private economic sector, not directly under the control of the KMT party-state.*¹⁸

In contrast, the KMT's supporters consist of peasants, civil servants, employees of state enterprises, the military personnel, policemen, the KMT and Youth Corps official, teachers of elementary and middle schools, housewives, students, and retirees. As to professionals (including college professors, lawyers, doctors, accountants, journalists, engineers, and managers), their political disposition seems to lie somewhere in the middle of political spectrum. In other words, on the matter of electoral choice, professionals as a whole were more conservative than entrepreneurs or the working class, while they were more liberal than state employees or farmers.

H. Partisanship. Partisanship was a robust predictor of people's voting direction. As seen in Tables 12, in comparison with the KMT's identifiers, Tang-Wai's identifiers were far more likely to vote for the Tang-Wai candidates. Similarly, in comparison with the KMT's identifiers, the Independents were more likely to vote for the Tang-Wai than the KMT.

If we compare the effect of each independent variable on the log odd of electoral choice, we find that partisanship was stronger than any other variables, including ethnicity and democratic values. From this angle, we can appreciate the significance of partisan disposition in people's voting decision.

¹⁸ Fu and Chu (1989: 19) have correctly pointed out that "in Taiwan, a state-dominated society, the more salient aspect of socioeconomic cleavage is not defined by capitalist production relation but by state power"

A test for the joint effect of partisanship also indicates that partisan disposition is influential in determining for whom to vote.¹⁹ This finding again verifies the proposition that subjective psychological identity is more important than objective group membership in shaping political preference and action. Since partisan disposition is so important, we may predict that variation in partisanship configuration will be a pivotal factor in future political and electoral change.

I. Democratic Values. The intensity of belief in democratic values was decisive in people's partisan choice. This proposition was confirmed by both election surveys. In Model 5, other things being equal, people with stronger democratic sentiment are more likely to vote for opposition candidates. Technically speaking, one unit change in the explanatory variable of democratic values will produce a 0.0414 change in the log odd of electoral choice being Tang-Wai.²⁰

Likewise, in the 1986 survey, the variable of democratic values was significant for voters in helping them decide for whom to vote. Holding other

¹⁹ To test for the joint effect of a subset of variable, Adrich and Nelson (1984) suggest the use of a $C = 2 \log(C_2/C_1)$. L refers to a value of the Likelihood ratio. The 1983 and 1986 survey data indicate that joint effect of the partisanship variable was strongly significant. Specifically, in 1983 survey C value equals 98.62 while in 1986 survey C value equals 160.59. With two probability level by Chi-square test.

²⁰ The power of the democratic values variable is difficult to understand if one only considers the size of the beta coefficient. Indeed, the magnitude of the beta coefficient looks quite small. Nonetheless, just because the range of the levels of the variable of democratic values is large (from 15 to 66), the variable's influence become stronger as its level goes up.

variables constant, people with stronger democratic commitment were more likely to vote for the DPP or Independents than the KMT. If one considers the magnitude of the beta coefficient of democratic values, the coefficient of 1986 was nearly double of that of 1983. This visible difference perhaps meant that the behavioral consequence of democratic values was getting stronger as democratization became the central issue of political agenda.

VI. A Portrait of the Opposition Tang-Wai Voters

The preceding discussion has examined the behavior of each independent variable. However, the strength of logistic regression can be better appreciated if we put all the variables together. Let me use Model 5 to illustrate this. In Model 5, dependent variable is electoral choice, including two levels, i.e., KMT and Non-KMT. There are 16 explanatory variables, including 14 indicator variables and two continuous variables.

Model 5 can be expressed as the following equation:

$$\text{Prob (Vote for Non-KMT)} = \frac{1}{1 - e^{-Z}}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} Z = & -6.1733296 + \\ & \text{Sex} \quad * \quad 0.1912 + \\ & \text{Age} \quad * \quad -0.0040 + \end{aligned}$$

²¹ Z is a linear combination. $Z = B_0 + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + \dots + B_nX_n$

Ethnicity	*	1.8640	+
college	*	-0.2706	+
midhigh School	*	-0.1521	+
Grade School	*	-0.1974	+
Entrepreneur	*	0.4346	+
Professionals	*	0.6057	+
Private Employees	*	0.3339	+
Working class	*	0.7945	+
State Employees	*	-0.2624	+
Others	*	0.4297	+
Group membership	*	-0.4832	+
Pro-Tang-Wai	*	2.7015	+
Independent	*	0.8484	+
Democratic values	*	0.0414	;

Applying this to a voter who possesses the following social and psychological attribute: male, in his late twenties, Taiwanese, college graduate, professional, without any group membership, pro-Tang-Wai, and with strong democratic beliefs (score 50 points in the scale of democratic values). As a result,

$$\begin{aligned}
 Z = & -6.1733 + 0.1912 (\text{Sex}) - 0.0040 (\text{Age}) + \\
 & 1.8640 (\text{Ethnicity}) - 0.2706 (\text{College}) + \\
 & 0.6075 (\text{Professional}) - 0.4832 (\text{Group Membership}) + \\
 & 2.7015 (\text{Pro-Tang-Wai}) + 0.0414 (\text{Democratic Values})
 \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned}
 Z = & -6.1733 + 0.1912 (1) - 0.0040 (2) + 1.8640 (1) - \\
 & 0.2706 (1) + 0.6075 (1) - 0.4832 (0) + 2.7015 (1) + \\
 & 0.0414 (50) = 0.9823
 \end{aligned}$$

The probability of voting for the Tang-Wai candidates is then estimated to be the following:

$$\text{Prob (Vote for Non-KMT)} = \frac{1}{1 - e^{-0.9823}} = 0.7275$$

Based upon this estimate, I would predict that voters with those attributes are very likely to vote for the Non-KMT or Tang-Wai Candidates.²² Following the above-mentioned procedure, we can make predictions about all population groups in Taiwan.

The significance of our logistic regression model of electoral choice should be clearer now. According to these models, we may draw a more precise portrait of the Tang-Wai voters. To be a Tang-Wai voter, first and foremost, the individual must somewhat identify with the Tang-Wai as an opposition group. Second, the individual must be Taiwanese. Third, the individual must have rather strong democratic beliefs. Fourth, the individual's occupation must not belong to the categories which are directly under the state's control. Fifth, the individual is more likely a nonmember of voluntary association rather than the other way around. Finally, the individual may come from any strata of education or age.

Strictly speaking, three attributes appear to be indispensable to be a Tang-Wai voter: Tang-Wai identification, Formosan natives, and strong democratic sentiment. Voters without any one of these three elements are extremely unlikely to vote for the Tang-Wai candidates or to support opposi-

²² As a general rule, if the estimated probability of the event is less than 0.5, we predict that the event will not occur. If the probability is greater than 0.5, we predict that the event will occur. See SPSS Advanced Statistic User's Guide (1990: 48).

tion movements. At the same time, there were not many voters who possessed these three features in 1983 and 1986. This is a probable explanation for why the KMT was able to hold about seventy percent of the popular vote in the past forty years or so.

VI. Concluding Remarks

In this article I have closely examined mass political behavior during the first half of 1980s. It is appropriate to sum up the major empirical findings in this section.

1. The main themes of the opposition movement have been virtually the same ever since the KMT took over Taiwan from the Japanese occupation. These have been primarily: home rule, constitutional democracy, human rights, and social welfare.

The fact these political demands have changed so little over the decades itself provides evidence that the institutional structure and regime norms of authoritarian rule have changed very little. Over the decades opposition elites have worked extremely hard in seeking fundamental democratic reform. How did the mass public respond to the appeal of opposition groups? To what extent did the mass public share their concerns? These are the question I sought to answer in the first part of this article.

The data indicates that the mass public did respond to the efforts of opposition leaders, but not strongly, rapidly, or widely. The bulk of the mass public was either overwhelmed by official indoctrination or enjoyed the fruit of economic growth. Only a small part of the population was truly concerned

with the fundamental problems of political system.

Nevertheless, with the passage of time and other factors, the grave concerns of political stability and national security, by which the KMT leaders have so skillfully obstructed democratic reform, gradually declined. At the same time, democratic reform increasingly became perceived as an urgent task by growing numbers of the general public.

2. The empirical findings about democratic values were also fascinating. In general, Taiwanese people had strong democratic sentiments in the first half of 1980s. More importantly, the democratic beliefs of the mass public were becoming stronger. The Taiwanese people had a high consensus on the values of political equality and popular sovereignty while they appeared ambivalent toward libertarian and pluralistic values.

These findings suggest that it will be far more difficult to internalize libertarian values than egalitarian values in the Taiwanese society. This appears to be in part because traditional Chinese political culture does contain some equivalent concepts of equality and sovereignty, but no equivalent over for individualism and pluralism. Thus, as one of the most important areas of Confucian culture, Taiwan displayed a peculiar pattern of response to dominant Western democratic thoughts: it embraced the values of popular sovereignty and political equality, but hesitated to accept individualism and pluralism.

This unique pattern of democratic values has substantial political consequences. While democratic opposition movement can draw significant ideological support from it, the authoritarian rulers can also take advantage of it to delay the progress of liberalization and democratization. In other words, this mixed cultural pattern, on the one hand, supports the demand for

democratic reform; on the other hand, it provides some leeway for the ruling class to remain in power.

Furthermore, a solid connection existed between democratic values and political action. Other things being equal, people with strong democratic beliefs were more likely to support the Tang-Wai/DPP than the KMT. This finding may also help to clarify the relationship between cultural values and democratization in the existing literature. Consensual democratic values may not be a necessary condition for political democratization, but the existence of a strong democratic consensus is certainly a precious asset for the establishment of democracy.²³ Ultimately, for successful democratic consolidation it may be necessary.

3. Our empirical findings about partisanship are equally interesting. About half of the general public claimed to be Independents. The other half

²³ Wiarda (1982; 1986) strongly argues that the existence of a consensual democratic culture is required before the arrival of political democracy. Tumin (1982) asserts that democracy can emerge and become stable only if the political culture become sufficiently suffused with democratic ideological themes and values that exercise their own independent influences. In short, according to Wiarda and Tumin, the development of a prodemocratic political culture must precede the emergence of democratic institutions. In contrast, O'Donnell (1986), among many others, has strongly argued that it is unrealistic and profoundly ahistorical to argue that social conditions and political forces in a country that is in the process of political transition must uniformly favor democratic political arrangements. The consolidation and expansion of democratic institutions is always the result of a long process of learning and adaptation; no country was "democratic" from the outset.

chiefly consisted of the KMT identifiers. Identifiers with the Tang-Wai/DPP represented less than ten percent of the adult population. Such a configuration of partisan disposition reasonably mirrored the legacy of hegemonic one party system.

Furthermore, partisanship was a robust factor in shaping voter's choice. In effect, partisanship was stronger than any other social and psychological variables in determining vote choice. In this sense, the realignment of partisan disposition is bound to be a decisive factor in the future Taiwanese politics. At present, the KMT has an overwhelming edge over the DPP.

4. Ethnicity has been the root of structural political conflict in Taiwan. As repeatedly pointed out, the primary cause for the rise of the Taiwanese opposition movement is the unequal distribution of political power between Mainlanders and Taiwanese. As a minority group, mainlanders have nearly monopolized political power in Taiwan since the end of the World War II. In contrast, Formosans who consist of almost 85% population have been a politically disadvantaged group. To a considerable extent, the ruling KMT represents the interest of mainlanders while the opposition force stands for the interest of Taiwanese.²⁴

²⁴ As supplementary evidence, in the 1983 national election of the members of Legislative Yuan, 96.26 percent of Tang-Wai's supporters were Taiwanese whereas only 3.74 percent were mainlanders. In 1986, 96.28 percent of the DPP's voters were Taiwanese while only 3.72 percent were mainlanders.

Regarding the formation of ethnic conflicts, Comaroff (1987: 308) has a finegrained description:

The emergence of ethnic groups and the awakening of ethnic consciousness are, by contrast, the product of historical processes which structure relations of inequality between discrete social entities. They are, in other words, the social and cultural correlates of a specific mode of articulation between groupings, in which one extends its dominance over another by some form of coercion, violent or otherwise.

Indeed, the emergence of ethnic discord in Taiwan was a product of historical processes. If there had been no Ehr Ehr Pa Incident, if there had been no Communist revolution in China with the later withdrawal of the Nationalist government to Taiwan, and if the KMT had been willing to abandon authoritarian rule, there probably would have been no significant ethnic conflicts in Taiwan.

Wallerstein (1980: 186) also made a perceptive observation about the making of ethnic group and consciousness.

To the extent that the local area in question has educated cadres, whose own chances of advancement are in fact blocked by the absence of political autonomy of the particular area, these cadres may begin to agitate for greater self-rule. They begin to react against the arrogant style of cultural assimilation practiced by the politically dominant forces and reassert traditional cultural values and boundary lines, or invent them.

To a large extent these descriptions fit well to Taiwan's historical situation during the past four decades. Our empirical findings about mass political behavior clearly affirm the significance of ethnicity in Taiwanese politics.

5. The role of social classes in Taiwanese politics has been relatively insignificant. Over the decades the subject matter of major political disputes

had little to do with class interests. Trade unions have been inactive. The peasants have also been silent for nearly four decades. The eruption of their first antigovernment demonstration did not occur until May 20, 1988. The docility of the working class and of the peasantry is explained by a number of factors. Among them, two stand out. First, martial law and related statutes prohibited strikes. Second, the KMT has effectively controlled trade unions and the farmers' association.

As to the role of middle class, there is a questionable consensus in the existing literature on sociopolitical change in Taiwan. This consensus is that the emergence of a sizable middle class is the driving force of Taiwan democratic reform (Lu, 1985; King, 1988; Tien, 1989; Gold and Shieh, 1989).

However, examined closely, this argument is problematic. The major difficulty with the middle-class argument is twofold. First, researchers have failed to supply a convincing argument about the theoretical status of the middle class. Second, researchers apparently have difficulty in clarifying the concept of "middle class". Diverse operational definitions of middle class display confusion over middle class argument.²⁵

²⁵ For example, Lu (1985) considered that middle class is composed of owners and operators of small- or medium-size industrial and commercial establishments, professionals, school teachers, as well as white collar employees of private business organizations. Tien (1989) proposed a detailed list of the socioeconomic groups in the middle class, including the following: 1) entrepreneurs who have emerged since the 1960s in small- or mid-size enterprises; 2) managers in public corporations and state banks; 3) managers in private corporations; 4) upper-middle-level government bureaucrats; 5) elected representatives in the Provincial Assembly and the national legislature; 6) professionals like college professors, lawyers, physicians, architects, accountants, and artists; 7) school teachers, especially in secondary schools; 8) foreign trade businessmen; and 9) middle- and upper-middle-level KMT cadres.

The prevailing argument regarding the role of middle class probably has exaggerated the influence of middle class. As my results above indicate, the total effect of social classes on electoral choice was insignificant in the election of 1983. In addition, although the joint effect of social classes on electoral choice enhanced in the 1986 election, it remain relatively insignificant when compared to ethnicity, partisanship, and democratic values.

Finally, there existed salient behavioral differences among the occupational groups which are often considered as the elements of middle class. For instance, in the 1986 election, entrepreneurs, private rank-and-file employees, and the working class, in contrast to the peasantry, were more likely vote for the DPP than the KMT. In contrast, state employees and professionals did vote in a way similar to peasants.

Altogether, our empirical evidence suggests that independent middle class (out of the state's direct control) may constitute a mainstay of the Tang-Wai opposition force, while dependent middle class remains a major follower of the KMT authoritarian regime. The conventional explanation of middle class for Taiwan's political liberalization thus needs to be fundamentally revised.

References

- Aldrich, John H., and Forrest D. Nelson. 1984. *Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1986. "Civil Society in Africa," in Patrick Chabal (ed) *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 109-125.
- Berelson, Bernard R. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A Study of Opinion formation in a Presidential Campaign*.
- Campbell, Angus. Philip E. Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press.
- Chen, Min-tong. 1990. *The Mobility of the Local Political Elite under an Authoritarian Regime 1945-1986): An Analysis on the Taiwan Provincial Assemblyment*. An Unpublished Dissertation of National Taiwan University.
- Coleman, James S. (ed) 1965. *Education and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Comaroff, John L. 1987. "Of Totemism and Ethnicity: consciousness, Practices and the Signs of Inequality," *Ethnos* 52, 3-4: 301-323.
- Conover, Pamela J. and Stanley Feldman. 1986. "The Role of inference in the Perception of Political Candidates," in Richard R. Lau and David O. Sears (ed) *Political cognition*:127-158. Hilldale, New Jersey: LEA Publishers.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven : Yale University Press.

- Fiske, Susan T. and Shelley E. Taylor. 1984. *Social Cognition*. New York : Random House.
- Gold, Thomas and Gwo-shyong Shief. 1989. "Transitions from Authoritarianism in East Asia: Empirical Observations," Paper Prepared for the Conference on Democratization in the Republic of China. Taipei, Taiwan, January 9-11.
- Hu, Fu and Yun-han Chu. 1989. "Electoral Competition and Political Democratization in Taiwan," Paper Prepared for the Conference on Democratization in Republic of China. Taipei, Taiwan, January 9-11.
- Highley, John. and Michael G. Burton. 1989. "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 54: 17-32.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1984. "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99, 2: 193-218.
- King, Ambrose Y.C. 1988. "A Non-Paradigmatic Search for Democracy in a Post-Confucian culture: The ease of Taiwan," Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Conference on "Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries," *Hoover Institution*, September 17-17. 1988.
- Lu, Alexander Ya-li. 1985. "Future Domestic Developments in the Republic of China on Taiwan," in *Asian Survey*. Vol. xxv, No. 11 (November): 1075-1095.
- Milbrath, Lester. 1976. *Political Participation*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Moore Jr. Barrington. 1967. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Mcclosky, Herbert., and John Zaller. 1984. *The American Ethos*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1986. "The United States, Latin America, Democracy: Variations on a Very Old Theme," in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos

- Rico (eds) *The United States and Latin America in the 1980s*: 353-378. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
- Pye, Lucian W. with Mary W. Pye. 1985. *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Rossiter, Clinton. 1962. *Conservatism in America*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Samuels, Richard J. 1976. *Political Generations and Political Development*. Lexington Book.
- Swafford, Michael. 1980. "Three Parametric Techniques for Contingency Table Analysis: A Nontechnical commentary," *American Sociological Review*. Vol.45 (August): 664-690.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1954. *Democracy in America*. Vol.1. New York: Vintage Books.
- Tien, Hung-Mao. 1989. *The Great Transition: Political and social Change in the Republic of China*. Hoover Institution.
- Tumin, Jonathan. 1982. "The Theory of Democratic Development," *Theory and Society* 11 (1982): 143-164.
- Verba, Sidney. and Norman Nie. 1972. *Participation in America*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. *The Capitalist World-Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wiarda, Howard J. 1982. "Social Change, Political Development, and Tradition," in Howard J. Wiarda (ed) *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: the Distinct Tradition*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 3-25.
- 1986. "Can Democracy Be Exported?" in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico (eds) *The United States and Latin America in the 1980s*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 325-351.

You, Ying-Lung. 1982. *System Orientation and Voting Behavior*. Unpublished Master Thesis of National Taiwan University.

大眾政治與臺灣政治自由化： 態度，價值與黨派偏好 (1980-1986)

游 盈 隆

東吳大學政治學系暨政治學研究所專任副教授

在過去的十年當中，政治民主化的研究基本上是「菁英取向的」(Elite-Oriented)研究。政治菁英的領導能力與互動的策略，往往構成分析的重點。相形之下，大眾政治面的研究即很欠缺。儘管很少人會質疑大眾政治態度與行動的模式在政治轉型過程中所具有的理論與實際的重要性，但有關這方面的文獻，到目前為止，仍屬鳳毛麟角。本文的中心旨趣即在為填補這片空白稍盡棉薄之力。

本文的目標在釐清台灣解嚴之前大眾政治的動態與特徵。資料的來源是台大胡佛教授等在1981，1984和1987針對「中央民意代表選舉」所做的一次台北市，兩次全島性調查研究。本文的分析重點有四方面：(1)大眾的政見態度 (Issue attitudes)；(2)大眾的民主價值觀念；(3)大眾的黨派傾向 (Partisan disposition)；(4)大眾的投票行為。筆者即嚐試從這四方面來刻劃台灣政治自由化前夕大眾的政治取向。

本文的主要研究發現與論證有以下數端：

- (1) 台灣光復以後，在國民黨統治的四十年間，反對運動的主題一直環繞在台灣人民自治、民主憲政的建立、人權的保障及社會福利等四方面。儘管有各階段的反對運動領袖的奮鬥與努力，一般大眾雖對反對運動的基本訴求的支持有日漸昇高的趨勢，但反應並不強烈、迅速與廣泛。大多數的民眾若非臣服於主流的意識型態，即是安於

享受經濟成長的果實。真正關切政治體系的基本問題的人只佔人口總數的極少的一部份。

- (2) 在1980年代的前半段，台灣一般民眾的民主價值觀念已經相當的強。更重要的，這種民主價值觀念有不斷增強的趨勢。表現在投票行為上，民主價值的強弱已成為是否支持反對勢力候選人的重要決定因素。惟須注意的是，台灣一般民眾雖強烈地信仰平等與主權的價值，但對自由和多元價值的追求依舊模稜兩可。這對台灣民主化的推進兼具正面與負面的作用。
- (3) 解嚴之前，台灣一般民眾的黨派傾向呈現了如下的分佈：大約有一半的民眾沒有明顯的政黨認同或偏愛；不同程度地認同國民黨的民眾約略超過百分之四十；而認同黨外和民進黨的民眾則從未超過百分之十。這種黨派傾向的模式似乎很能夠反映台灣長期的霸權一黨學 (Hegemonic one party system) 的現象。

更值得注意的是，黨派傾向是影響台灣選民投票的最重要變數。它的影響力超過民主價值、省籍和職業背景等變數。這強烈地暗示，黨派傾向模式的重組將是影響台灣未來選舉結果的關鍵因素。

- (4) 省籍的分歧長久以來一直是台灣政治衝突的根源。這很明顯地表現在投票行為的模式上。1983和1986兩次立委的選舉中，黨外和民進黨候選人的支持者中超過百分之九十五是本省人。此外，舉其他解釋變數 (Explanatory Variables) 相比，省籍對選民投票的影響力僅次於黨派傾向和民主價值這兩個變數。但我們對省籍的影響力的評估應較謹慎，因為在缺乏精確的測量團體認同的工具下，只憑客觀的省籍背景變數，很可能會低估省籍分歧在投票行為上的重要性。未來研究者有必要去發展較精良的有關台灣人認同和意識的測量工具。
- (5) 在台灣的大眾政治過程中，社會階級的影響力，直到解嚴前，一直

都不明顯，儘管頗多學者樂於使用中產階級的論證來解釋台灣政治自由化的現象，但幾乎沒有任何具說明力的直接經驗證據可資估證。投票行為的研究發現卻不利於中產階級的論證——即中產階級的壯大是台灣政治自由化動力，根據我們的資料，在1983年的立委選舉中，社會階級，總約來說，對投票的影響是不顯著的。在1986年的選舉，社會階級的影響力較增強，但仍遠落於黨派傾向、民主價值和省籍等變數之後，這些發現對中產階級的論證提出了強有力的質疑。