SDS's Initial Ultra-Jeffersonian Activism In the North and SNCC's Jeffersonian/Ultra-Jeffersonian New Left Movement in the South

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This is the fourth essay of the series of essays on the relationships between the early American New Left and the American tradition of democracy. Though it deals with both SDS's initial ultra-Jeffersonian activism in the North and SNCC's Jeffersonian/ultra-Jeffersonian New Left Movement in the South, the bulk of its contents is concerned with the latter rather than the former. Among its five parts only the first one describes and analyzes SDS's initial (general and specific) supports for the new abolitionists' ultra-Jeffersonian civil-right movement, which were both directly stimulated by the movement and indirectly influenced by the ultra-Jeffersonian tradition of freedom and equality in America. The second part of this essay analyzes, first, the radicalization of SNCC's democratic goal from Jeffersonian (legal) equality to ultra-Jeffersonian (political, social and economic) equality and, then, SNCC's addition of a new form of ultra-Jeffersonian means of democracy (unqualified participatory democracy) to its older form (nonviolent direct action or civil disobedience), which once caused internal tension between

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respective advocates of the two forms within SNCC. The third and the fourth parts describe respectively two different practices of SNCC's participatory democracy: (1)its Jeffersonian practice in the form of voter registration campaign in the Deep South, especially in Mississippi which attempted to reform the anti-Jeffersonian democracy form within the Mississippi political system, encouraging adult negroes to actually exercise their political right to vote; and (2) its ultra-Jeffersonian practice in the form of the 1964 Mississippi Summer Project including establishment of community enter and Freedom Schools, both of which aimed at equal participation, on the part of negroes, in alternative institutions without the need of leadership and bureaucracy. The last part of this essay contains assessments of SNCC's ultra-Jeffersonian struggle for participatory democracy from different angles, including a praise of its success in its margin and a critique of its failure at its heart.

I. A DESCRIPTION AND AN ANALYSIS OF SDS'S INITIAL ULTRA-JEFFERSONIAN ACTIVISM

As we have seen in the last section of my essay, "SDS's Heritage of the Jeffersonian Spirit of Democracy", the SDS was reborn as a Jeffersonian democrat in spirit, and as the change of its name indicated, it was determined to challenge contemporary American democracy, not from a close ideology either of industrial democracy or of social democracy, but from an open mind, opening either to alien (foreign) critique of American democracy or to America's own traditional ideal of democracy, depending on the impact of subsequent events on the perception of the SDS leaders. (Kuo, 1989, pp. 29-32) The first and one of the most important events that had great impact on the early SDS leader's effort to challenge contemporary American pact on the early SDS leader's effort to challenge contemporary American democracy was the new wave of the ultra-Jeffersonian civil-rights movement initiated and conducted by black students, virtually

independent of adult leadership, in the South in early 1960. (Kuo, 1992, pp. 59-71)

1. SDS's initial Support for the Ultra-Jeffersonian Civil-Rights Movement

As we have seen in the third section of my another essay, "The Direct Jeffersonian/Ultra-Jeffersonian Stimuli to SDS's Initial Activism: The New Abolitionist's Ultra-Jeffersonian Civil-Rights Movement", the first sit-in took place on February 1, 1960, in a segregated Woolworth lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina. (Kuo, 1992, 9. 61) Before the month was over, sit-ins were held at segregated restaurants in twenty cities throughout the south; and by the end of that spring students at perhaps a hundred North colleges had been mobilized in support, and over the next year civil-rights activity touched almost every campus in the country: support groups formed, fund-raising committees were established, local sit-ins and pickets took place, campus civil-rights clubs began, students from around the country traveled to the south. The alliance-in-action between young Southern blacks and young Northern whites, founded on the Jeffersonian principle of equality, gave the student movement a strength that it had never before experienced. (Sale, 1973, p. 23)

A. Haber's Conception of the Changing Role of SDS, Inspired by the Southern Black Students' Use of the Ultra-Jeffersonian Means

The sit-ins erupted in the South and the campaign for equal rights immediately captured the attention and imagination of the people in SDS, especially Robert Allen Haber, then vice-president of SDS. Haber "had the consequential perception of how SDS could capitalize upon this new mood and become a central part of it," (Sale, 1973, p. 24) as indicated by Kirkpatrick Sale. What SDS should and could do to "capitalize upon this new mood and become a central part of it"? Sale summarized Haber's answer to this question as follows:

> First, he argued, SDS should play down the old SLID idea of establishing its own little chapters for its own little purposes at various campuses and concentrate instead on forming alliances with the existing campus groups that had already come into being in response to their own local needs-student political parties, single-issue organizations (peace committees, civil-rights clubs), and adhoc action groups built around civil rights picketing, sit-in support, and the like. Second, he said, SDS could play its most valuable role by trying to coordinate these groups and service their needs on a national scale, publishing newsletters, sending literature, organizing conferences, keeping the leaders in touch with one another, giving them a sense of participating in a wider movement beyond their particular campuses. Third, SDS should involve itself as much as possible with direct social action-support for and participate in pickets, sit-ins, freedom marches, boycotts, protest demonstrations-rather than limiting itself, as it had in the past, to strictly educational work. And finally, SDS should abandon the ideological linetoeing that had characterized SLID, work with any groups that were genuinely involved in seeking social change, and content itself with giving them a nonsectarian vision of the totality of the American system and the connections between the various single-issue maladies. (Sale, 1973, 99. 24-25)

The last point was "crucial" to Haber, as Sale emphasized, because it was "a vision which Haber felt must lie at the heart of any organization that is truly radical—that is, any organization that seek to understand, make connections between, and operate on the root causes of present conditions." (Sale, 1973, p. 25) As Haber himself put it:

> In its early stage, student activity is neither very radical nor very profound social protest. It generally does not go beyond a single issue, or see issues as inter-related, or stress that involvement in one issue necessarily leads to others. It does not, seek root causes. There is no recognition that the various objects of protest are not sui generis but are symptomatic of institutional forces with which the movement must alternatively deal. …
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> …the challenge ahead is to appraise and evolve radical alternatives to the inad-

> equate society of today, and to develop an institutionalized communications system that will give perspective to our immediate actions. We will then have the groundwork for a radical student movement in America. (Haber, 1996, pp.46, 47, 49)

From Haber's point of view, the new civil rights movement of black students in the South in 1960 did not go beyond a single issue and seek root causes, because the sit-ins "do not yet strike at the fundamentals of the social system when they act against Kim Crow." (Haber, 1966, p. 44) In this sense, Haber was, from the very beginning, an ultra-Jeffersonian who was not satisfied with Jeffersonian legal equality alone. What impressed him greatly, however, was the ultra-Jeffersonian means the Southern blacks students used rather than the Jeffersonian end they initially sought. Thus Haber wrote:

> They〔the Southern students〕have the power in the technique of direct action and the inspiration of nonviolence to press their demands with success. They have organization and community support-support of the Negro community that is-and, in contrast to the North, they have large parts of their student bodies and a great number of schools participating. And, if nothing else, their increasing tally of victories must persuade us that the sit-ins are indeed a mass movement. … Perhaps more important, they dramatize convincingly that Negroes-young and old-can and must take the leadership in the struggle. This is one of the chief factors which sets the sit-ins off from the rest of the year's〔1960〕student activity. The sit-ins operate in community context; they call on the members of that community and they eventually involve the resources, organizations, and manpower of the community in their success. (Haber, 1996, p. 44)

In the view of Haber, although the end the Southern black students sought was not radical, the means they used was so. He stressed his admiration of the merits of the radical mans employed in the new student movement in the South by expressing his discontent with the defects of the means used in the old student protests in the North:

> This year〔1960〕has been hailed as the coming of a new student radicalism.. We have spoken at last, with vigor, idealism, and urgency, supporting our words with picket lines, demonstration, money, and even our bodies. … The sit-ins are seen as a prototype, and the other activities-the sympathy pickets, capital punishment, atomic testing-are given an equivalent value that is not justified. … We must not be led into the popular characterizations of our activity as a "spontaneous new mass movement." In many of the protests-civil defense, capital punishment, the Uphaus conviction-what students did was to translate the undramatic campaigns of various adult organizations into dramatic student demonstrations. The direct action of the great peace movement has been similarly under adult auspices. ... There movements were thus neither spontaneous nor strictly a student movement. … It must be borne in mind that comparatively few students are involved in any form of activity and student action has been restricted to relatively few campuses. Much of the activity is disorganized, a great number of the projects never get off the ground or have to be abandoned for lack of support, and little has been penetrated into mainstream of campus life. The student action groups have been affected with the usual petty politics and internal power struggles, producing a negative reaction among many students who had been associated with liberal causes. (Haber, 1996, pp. 41-42)

Both the excitement of the new civil-right movement and the dullness of all other movements than it in respect of means were so great to Haber that he actually could not but to choose the single issue of civil rights as SDS's initial cause and to put aside all other current issues (anitbomb activity, peace research, academic freedom, poverty, or university reform), any one of which might have seemed the "inevitable" trigger to student activism. (Sale, 1973, p. 36) So the new civil-rights movement gave SDS its initial cause and the Ann Arbor conference gave SDS its initial identification with that cause.

B. SDS's General Support for Civil-Right Movement through Conferences

Led by Haber, SDS arranged a conference on "Human Rights in the

North" at the University of Michigan in the spring of 1960. Haber was one of the two directors of the conference, which unlike previous SCID conferences, sought to develop a program of action rather than simply to provide an "education" experience. Instead of speakers from the academic community, the conference brought leaders of black students from the South together with hundreds of white students from the North to discuss support for the Southern students. Several recommendations emerged from the conference, including a call for the publication of national student newsletter on civil rights the following fall. It called upon SDS to "take the initiative in calling a meeting of civil rights organizations for the purpose of planning the fall national students conference and putting out a newsletter" and it urged each delegate to organize a "broadly based interracial civil rights action group on his campus." Finally, the conference closed with an appeal: "All legitimate means of action and influence must be used to make civil rights the central domestic issue in American politics." Quoted, Vickers, 1975, pp.69-70)

Subsequently, SDS sponsored similar but smaller regional conferences in Vermont, North Carolina, and elsewhere in response to the sit-ins in the South. Through these conferences and individual contacts, SDS members met black students who later formed the Student Non-violent Coordination Committee (SNCC), making the beginning of a relationship so close that in its formative years (especially during its community organization phase), SDS was known as a Northern counterpart, or Northern parallel, of SNCC. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 110) After the sit-ins were under way, Tom Hayden, a prominent member of SDS, operated as a field secretary in the South, and, along with other members, worked in liaison with SNCC through 1961. SDS established an office in Atlanta, Georgia, where SNCC had its main headquarters, and SNCC members held positions on the SDS national executive committee.[2]

Following the Human Rights Conference, Haber was hired as field secretary of SDS[3] and immediately began planning for the annual

[2] In 1962, for instance, Timothy Jenkins, a SNCC founder, and John Robert Zeller, a member of the SNCC staff, sat fifteen others on the SDS national executive committee.

[3] Because of a grant to SDS of $10,000 from Detroit's United Automobile Workers Union,

convention to be held on June 17. Following up on the visible connection with civil rights that the May conference had given SDS, the theme of the convention was "Student Radicalism-1960," and it attracted seventy students from fifteen colleges. Instead of passing volumes of resolutions, the convention delegates devoted themselves to debating the fundamental orientation of the organization. It was at this convention that Haber was elected president of SDS, and not long thereafter that the spilt between the "old guards" and the newer radicals broke into the open. With his elected and appointed position, Haber was in a position to push for complete reorientation of the SDS, but his effort met considerable resistance.

C. The Disagreement and Conflict between the old LIDers and the young SDSer, Haber

In a report to the LID board of directors, in October of 1960, Haber reported that SDS had six functioning chapters, five more in active formation, and another five in early stages of formation.[4] He proposed a major effort to implement there recommendations of the Human Rights in the North Conference, to organize chapters in the South, and to establish close working relations with civil rights groups. This touched off a major struggle which first broke out at the LID Student Activities Committee meeting in December. Haber argued that SDS was "out of phase with what is going on campus," and that it should become a "national center for liberal activity providing background in areas such as civil rights." He was opposed by two of the "old guard" student members,[5] who argued: "We are an educational organization, not a protest group. … We don't want to be affiliated with civil rights or civil liberties groups as such-they must not be civil rights chapters, but simply chapters." (Quoted, Vickers, 1975, p. 70)

At a meeting of the SDS National Executive Committee the following

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SDS was able, for the first time in five years, to hire a full-time national officer with the responsibility of strengthening and energizing the organization. The position was to be called Field Secretary.

[4] The six functioning were: University of Michigan, Yale, Syracuse, New York City, Brooklyn College, and Western Reserve. Those in active formation were: University of Chicago, Ohio Wesleyan, Villanove, Harvard, and University of Wisconsin.

[5] The "old guard" student members were also members of the Young People"s Socialist League (YPSL) which had "realignment' tendency.

month, Haber was supported by only one other member and was forced temporarily to retreat. In stead, he used the administrative machinery to isolate those who opposed him within the organization, and began building a new network outside the formal structure of the organization. By May of 1961, most of the "old guard" had withdrawn from active participation. With the withdrawal and isolation of the Old Left within SDS, the possibility of a new political direction for the organization increased. Before this potential could be developed however, there remained the problem of relations between the adult LID and the young SDS.

As the "old guard" students withdrew, they lodged sharp protests with the parent organization, and throughout the spring of 1961, the future of the organization hung in the balance. Haber argued that under his leadership the membership had doubled, and that he had succeeded in developing a cadre of leaders interested in building the organization, but that in order to continue this process the LID must support a strong national office structure with a comprehensive program,. (Vickers, 1975, 9.71) The LID leaders initially rejected this approach, instead ordering a continued focus on education and a decentralized structure, and at the end of March, Haber offered his resignation. (Vickers, 1975, p. 71) He was bargaining from strength, however, for he had built up a network of people who were prepared to create a new organization if the LID was unwilling to provide a home. The LID elders asked Haber to withhold this resignation and to propose a new program for SDS, and on May 4 he responded with program proposals and a thinly veiled threat that he would attempt to form a new organization if LID rejected his proposals.[6]

D. SDS's Specific Support for Southern Civil-Rights Movement through Hayden

On May 24, 1961 LID accepted a compromise offered by Haber that instructed SDS to call a conference in September which would bring together under the SDS banner "the leaders of campus groups on the democratic left" —the purpose of which was to recruit new members into SDS.

[6] For Haber's program proposals, see Vickers, 1975, p. 72.

The conference was held on a farm near New York City from September 8 to 10. Those attending approved Haber's position on the future direction of SDS and decided to function as a Northern liaison for SNCC, and to establish an organizing program for Southern campuses. (Vickers, 1975, p. 72) Tom Hayden was selected as field organizer for the Southern project.

In the month following the September conferences, SDS moved to deepen its ties with the civil-rights movement. Hayden traveled the South on behalf of SDS, creating a visible presence in the Southern movement and reporting back in long letters that were distributed to the membership. And carrying out Haber's civil-rights strategy for SDS. Hayden operated in the South with the SNCC voter-registration drive (which we shall see in the section following the next one), sending back periodic reports which the National Office mimeographed and distributed to the campuses. Quietly, dryly he reported on the beatings, the murders, the harrowing lives of the SNCC youngsters trying to organize black voters in redneck country, "in more danger than nearly any student in this American generation had faced." These were practically the only writing coming out about the SNCC drive at that time, and they carried the unquestioned authenticity of one who had not only been there, but had been beaten (in McComb, Missisippi, in October) and jailed (in Albany, Georgia, in November). Through SDS—chiefly in a twenty-eight-page pamphlet called "Revolution in Mississippi" sent out late that fall—and through other student publications such as the Activist (which carried a vivid photograph in one issue showing Hayden getting beaten), Hayden's writings reached a considerable campus audience. Betty Garman, a Skidmore graduate then working for the National Student Asociation, reported what others had said, "These reports were very important to me: that's really the reason why I went into SDS." (Quoted, Sale, 1973, p. 36)

Sale attributed the early SDS's reputation among, and impact on, American college students to Haber's wise choice of civil rights as SDS's initial emphasis and Hayden's dramatic manifestation of that emphasis:

> It is significant the Haber chose civil rights as SDS's initial emphasis and that Hayden was able to manifest it so dramatically, because it meant that SDS was

> able to make a reputation and an impact which it might not if it had chosen, say, antibomb activity, peace research, academic freedom, poverty, or university reform, all of which were current in-sues and any one of which might have seemed the "inevitable" trigger to student activism Civil rights was the one cause with the greatest moral power, eventually the greatest national publicity, ultimately the strongest national impact, and having Haber's mind and Hayden's body so evidently on the line redounded to SDS's benefit. It was one measure of how accurately SDS was to read the student pulse, and profit thereby. (Sale, 1973, p. 36)

2. Causes of SDS's initial Connection with the Ultra-Jeffersonian Civil-Rights Movement

Why had the "student pulse" connected with the civil-right movement? Because "students have been exposed all their lives to the teachings of the great American scriptures of democracy, freedom, and equality," Fish University President Stephen Wright said, "no literate person should be surprised that they reflect those teachings in their conduct." (Quoted, Zinn, 1964, p. 21) Wright's remark referred to the black students in the South and could, of course, apply to the white students in the North, too. Generally speaking, as Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey emphasized, "Today, by and large, in the average college classrooms across the nation, it is their recounting of the American tradition and symbols (the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights being their major sources) that is accepted pretty much as gospel truth." (Kendall and Carey, 1970, 9. 137) It is needless to say that the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights are Jeffersonian symbols, and that the American tradition has been the Jeffersonian tradition of freedom and equality. And it is not surprising for us to find SDS's affirmation of this tradition near the very beginning of its founding document, the Port Huron Statement: Freedom and equality for each individual …—these American values we found good principles by which we could live as men."(SDS, 1969, p. 164) But it was surprising for SDS to find that "the declaration all men are created equal …' rang hollow

before the facts of Negro life in the South and the big cities of the North."

A. Lincoln's Causing the "Derailment" from the Non-Jeffersonian Tradition of Democracy in America

SDS's affirmation of the Jeffersonian tradition of freedom and equality is not surprising for us because the tradition has deeply taken root in American intellectual community ever since Abraham Lincoln, whose famed Gettysburg Address, according to Kendall and Carey, had the effect of creating a democratic tradition of freedom and equality in the minds of American intellectuals. On November 19, 1863, Lincoln opened his Gettsburg Address with the following words: "Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." (Current, 1967, p. 284) For Jeffersonians, all these words are key words, and they could, according to Kendall and Carey, deduce from them at least four fundamental propositions: first, the United States as a nation was born in 1776; second, she was conceived in liberty; third, in the very act of being born, she dedicated herself to the overriding proposition that "all men are created equal" as her basic commitment; and fourth, her basic commitment had not been modified or repudiated in the eighty-seven years between the time of the Declaration and the Gettysburg Address. (Kendall and Carey, 1970, p. 84)

But for Kendall and Carey, two modern non-Jeffersonians, if not anti-Jeffersonians, Lincoln's Gettysberg Address was the turning point for the "derailment" in America's non-Jeffersonian, if not anti-Jeffersonian, tradition of democracy. According to them, Lincoln was guilty of committing a very serious error, for the fixed American beginning as a people either at a point after its beginning (the Mayflower Compact) or before it (the American Constitution) in both of which while justice was listed as the first national goal, equality was not even mentioned. (Kendall and Carey, 1970, pp. 14, 39, 89) In other words, to fix upon the Declaration of Independence and to attract from it American basic commitment, Lincoln could not help but created "a distorted picture" of American democratic tradition: the tradition of "freedom" and "equality," the tradition of "rights

of the individual" or of the natural rights of the individual as proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence and as glorified and protected by the Bill of Rights. (Kendall and Carey, 1970, pp. 9, 94) In Kendall and Carey's view, America's non-Jeffersonian democratic tradition was most "detailed" after Lincoln in the following Jeffersonian or ultra-Jeffersonian way:

> Those who seize upon and stress the "all men are created equal" clause, quite in keeping with the Lincolnian view of the tradition, have slowly…fixed upon the symbol of "equality" as supreme. … For some, it is nothing more than "equality of opportunity." To other, it comes down to political equality in the sense of one man, one vote. For still others, however (and this includes many of our contemporary intellectuals …), the commitment to equality means that government should assume the role of advancing equality by pursuing politices designed to make "all men equal" socially, economically, and politically. (Kendall and Carey, 1970, p. 84)

B. American Intellectuals' Causing the "Derailment" and Dewey's Contribution to SDS's Ultra-Jeffersonian Support

The ultra-Jeffersonians who caused the "derailment" from the non-Jeffersonian democratic tradition were primarily, in Kendall and Carey's mind, intellectuals: [7] The derailment has been caused by intellectuals … who have seen in this phrase ("all men are created equal") a 'mandate' for action which involves, inter alia, a restructuring of American society so as to produce a condition of equality. This belief in a mandate is so dominant in our intellectual … circles that we could not possibly cite all those who have at one time or another publicly professed it". (Kendall and Carey, 1970, p. 84) More than mentioning some intellectuals, "old times" and their contemporary followers, as examples of defenders of Jeffersonian or ultra-Jeffersonian equality,[8] Kendall and Carey emphasized that from

[7] For Kendall and Carey, every major presidential candidate in recent times were also, in one fashion or another, either Jeffersonian or ultra-Jeffersonian who caused the "derailment" from the non/anti-Jeffersonian democratic tradition. (Kendall and Carey, 1970, p.9, n. 9)

[8] The Jeffersonian or ultra-Jeffersonian intellectuals in the United States whom Kendall and Carey mentioned included James Allen Smith, Charles Beard, Albert Kales, Raplh Gabriel,

Lincoln through the present time the ultra-Jeffersonian had enjoyed "remarkable and frightening success" in American intellectual community. (Kendall and Carey, 1970, p. 137) For our purpose, I shall single out for analysis only John Dewey, who not only typified the white American intellectuals, as Du Bois typified the black American intellectuals, (Kuo, 1992, pp. 20-23) dedicating themselves to ultra-Jeffersonian equality for all human beings, but also had direct and close relationship with SDS.

As seen by Harry M. Clor, Dewey had "an unlimited democratic perspective increasingly insensitive to any considerations that are not libertarian or equalitarian in character." (Clor, 1969, p. 97) In other words, Clor saw Dewey as extending Jeffersonian equality to its logical extremity:

> Dewey sought the solution of the economic inequalities and conflicts of modern times in a thoroughgoing democratization of all politics, society, and morality. He worked toward an all-embracing democratic culture in which the values of equality and freedom would permeate and shape every area of life. These values would rule not only in the political sphere, but also in social relations, in economic life, in education, in the family, and in the human personality. (Clor, 1969, p. 97)

In respect of democratic end, Dewey was, indeed, an ultra-Jeffersonian. For he not only thought that "the sole legitimate object of government" for Jefferson "is to secure the greatest degree of happiness possible to the general mass of those associated under it," (Dewey, 1939, p. 164) but also regarded economic equality as a prerequisite to Jefferson's equal right to pursue happiness:

> The right to pursue happiness stood with Jefferson for nothing less than the claim of every human being to choose his own career and to act upon his own choice and judgment free from restraints and constraints imposed by the arbitrary will of other human beings—whether these others are officials of government, of whom Jefferson was especially afraid, or are persons whose command of capital and control of the opportunities for

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Merle Curti, Richard Hafastadler, James McGregor Burns, and Robert A.Dahl.(Ibid,p.9,n.9)

> engaging in useful work limits the liability of others to "pursue happiness." The Jeffersonian principle of equality of rights without special favor to any one justifies giving supremacy to personal rights when they come into conflict with property rights. While his views are properly enough citied against ill-considered attack upon the economic relations that exist at a given time, it is sheer perversion to hold that there is anything in Jeffersonian democracy that forbids political action to bring about equalization of economic conditions in order that the equal right of all to free choice and free action be maintained. (Dewey, 1939, pp. 161-162)

The fact that Dewey was the late vice-president of LID, (Kuo, 1989. p. 14) SDS's parental organization, and that two of the first three SDS chapters were named as "John Dewey Discussion Club" (Kuo, 1989, p. 23) was only one measure of Dewey;s influence on SDS. Another was, as shown above, Haber's discontent with the Jeffersonian legal equality pursued by black students as the goal of the new civil-rights movement. From this point of view, SDS's support for the new civil-rights movement could hardly not be ultra-Jeffersonian in Character from the very beginning, though no obvious ultra-Jeffersonian form of support was visible at first. When that form became obviously visible, however, it was no longer supporting a pure civil-rights movement alone, but that which was changing to a black New Left movement whose core was SNCC in a new stage. It is to SNCC as the center of the emerging black new left movement, blacks' struggle for equal democratic participation, that we now turn.

Ⅱ. AN ANALYSIS OF SNCC'S NEW ULTRA-JEFFERSONIAN END AND MEANS OF DEMOCRACY

1. The Radicalization of SNCC's Original Democratic End: From Jeffersonian Equality to Ultra-Jeffersonian Equality

As I have argued in the third section of my essay, "The Direct

Jeffersonian/Ultra-Jeffersonian Stimuli to SDS's Initial Activism: The New Abolitionists' Ultra- Jeffersonian Civil-Rights Movement", the SNCC began with a Jeffersonian democratic end—equal rights for all including Negroes. To say so is, however, far from saying that SNCC grew with the same degree of Jeffersonian end unchanged. On the contrary, it is also my argument that SNCC grew with the radicalization of its original end. In other words, with SNCC's growth the degree of its democratic end changed: from Jeffersonian equality to ultra- Jeffersonian equality, that is, from Jeffersonian legal equality (equal rights) to ultra- Jeffersonian political equality (equal participation and equal power). (Kuo, 1992, pp. 66-69)

A. SNCC's Transformation from a Civil-Rights Organization into an Organiational Harbinger of the American New Left

My argument is supported by the observation of Vickers: "…by the end of 1962, the … objectives of the civil-rights movements had begun a profound transformation. From a … beginning as an attempt to broaden the areas of racial equality in American life, the movement gad begun to broaden its base in the black community and to face the imperatives of a political struggle for … power." (Vickers, 1975, p. 25)

With this new SNCC end in mind, Bacciocco wrote: "SNCC saw itself … as a political catalyst for drastic social change' and "its workers wanted power." On the basis of this new end, Bacciocco continued:

> SNCC regarded itself as a political organization grappling for tangible power in the form of office, authority, and patronage. Apart from the economic and political benefits accruing from office holding that would improve the lives of southern Negroes, SNCC wanted to remake the social order by fostering new leadership and new democratic institutions along equalitarian … lines.

Thus, Bacciocco concluded:

> SNCC can be defined as radical in terms of the degree of political change it sought …—independent centers of power and parallel institutions. It did not exhort southern Negroes to overthrow the United States government or the

> government of Mississippi. Rather, it urged southern Negroes to develop the determination and organizational potential to defeat the segregationist opposition at its own game of power politics. (Bacciocco, 1970, pp. 57, 58, 63)

SNCC's can struggle for political power was a challenge, not merely to anti- Jeffersonian segregation but also to anti-v systems, within the tradition of the v promise. This was what Newfield observed:

> By 1962 and 1963 SNCC workers had moved into the rural communities of the South. These they were shot, beaten, graned, whipped, and jailed. They became a hardened nonviolent guerilla army, challenging not merely segregation, but "the system," with voter registration, protest marches, and community organization. They leaned that a Northern corporation owned the racist mills in Danville, Virginia, and the segregating factories in Birmingham. But they still believed that America, if shamed with enough redemptive suffering, would honor its century-old pledge of equality for the black man." (Newfield, 1996, p. 72)

Since the SNCC's new goal was to struggle for "power" and to challenge "the system," it was obviously more than Jeffersonian equality-legal equality. It went beyond Jeffersonian equality to ultra-Jeffersonian equality-political, social, and economic equality. The escalade of SNCC's challenging end from Jeffersonian equality to ultra-Jeffersonian equality was seen by Bacciocco as the indication of SNCC's transformation from a civil-rights organization into the organization harbinger of the American New Left. The new SNCC, Bacciocco wrote, "wanted not integration but the means to realign politically and economically first Mississippi and then the entire South on behalf of black people and in the interests of a new social movement referred to as the New Left," Thus, Bacciocco continued, 'From 1963 on, SNCC's reputation and symbolic status eluded quantitative analysis. No longer regarded as simply a civil-rights organization, over the past three-and-a-half years it had evolved into the organizational forerunner of the American New Left," (Bacciocco, 1970,pp. 57, 85) The early American New Left, from my point of view, seemed to be essentially

nothing but an ultra- Jeffersonian challenger to anti- Jeffersonian means and end of democracy.

B. The Ultra- Jeffersonian Character of SNCC's New Aim: The Ultra-Jeffersonian Characters and Goals of SNCC's Leadership

One way to prove the ultra- Jeffersonian character of SNCC's new aim was to find out the characters and goals of its leadership in the period. But SNCC had many "leaders" instead of a single leader. At that period, John Lewis was the president or chairman of the board of directors and James Forman was the executive director of SNCC. Robert Moses also played a key role in the SNCC leadership team. As Kenneth B. Clark pointed out, all of them were "doggedly determined, assertive, and courageous in pursuit of the goals of unqualified equality" and were unwilling to "settle for anything less than uncompromised equality." (Clark, 190, p. 290) The unqualified of uncompromised equality as the new democratic end of SNCC's leadership was, certainly, human equality in its comprehensive sense, including not only legal equality, but also political, social and economic equality. The ultra- Jeffersonian equality as SNCC's new democratic goal was revealed in the original version of Lewis' speech prepared for delivery to over 200,000 people taking part in the Washington march in August 1963.(Kuo, 1992, pp. 82-84)

There and then, Lewis was going to say that "we are in a serious revolution." He used the term 'serious revolution' to emphasize SNCC's new goal of democracy. For him, SNCC's new goal was something more than the "burn" of "Jim Crow" or in other words, the destruction of all forms of legalized "segregation," and ore than the struggle for "mere civil rights." It was "true Freedom' for "all the people," freedom from "the chains of political and economic slavery" or from "political, economic, and social exploitation." For true freedom to come, SNCC must seek for "social exploitation." For true freedom to come, SNC must seek for 'social political and economic changes." (Lewis, 1969, p. 101) We must ask, change from what to what? Lewis' answer to this question seemed to be: not only from anti- Jeffersonian inequality (legal equality in the form of equal civil rights), but also from Jeffersonian inequality (social and economic inequality) to

ultra-Jeffersonian equality (political and economic equality). It was ultra-Jeffersonian full equality that seemed to be what Lewis called "true Freedom" for "all the people" and to be SNCC's new democratic end. For Lewis, this first essential step to comprehensive equality was the creation of "a source of power" which was "outside of any national structure." (Lewis, p. 101)

2. SNCC's Two Forms of Ultra- Jeffersonian means of Democracy: Direct Action Tactics and Community Organizing Campaign

As we have seen above, the priority in the set of goals in SNCC's new democratic end was to gain political power for Negroes in the South, which was not to supersede but to be independent of and equal to that of the Southern whites. Since the Southern whites had derived their political power from two sources, the disfranchisement of Negroes on the local level and the membership in the Democratic Party. And no less important for SNCC was the requirement of positive and effective participation, on the part f blacks, in major decision-making that would affect them, a kind of participation equal to that of whites. In fact, these were exactly what SNCC added a new form of ultra- Jeffersonian means of democracy which we have already reviewed, another favoring another form which we are going to examine. Let us first see in the following pages why this tension happened and how it was resolved.

A. The tension and Reconcilation within SNCC between Two Factions about Two Forms of Ultra- Jeffersonian Means of Democracy

The tension between two forms of ultra- Jeffersonian democratic means within SNCC happened as early as in the late period of the Freedom Rides. Why and how did such a tension happen then? Let us see Bacciocco's description and explanation of the tension:

> For SNCC, the Freedom Rides symbolized a juncture presenting two choices for the future: direct action (sit-ins, economic boycotts,. Freedom Rides) or

> community organizing (voter registration, etc.). Among the SNCC staff and the Freedom Riders released from jail in June and July, opinions were divided about which way to go. Marion Barry and Diane Nash led the faction favoring direct action tactics. Charles Jones who had distinguished himself at the Rock Hill sit-ins and Robert Moses supported community organizing. Both sides had convincing arguments.
>
> Direct action brought the movement national press coverage, mobilized northern support, enabled large numbers of activities to participate, and placed maxium and protracted pressure on segregationists. Advocates of direct action would point to tangible victories. … Opponents asked what more direct action could achieve. Would activists not be better advised not be better advised to aid Negro voters in registering to vote, thereby acquiring the power to advance their own interest?
>
> The reaction of violent segregationists to the Freedom Riders in the Deep South seemed to support the community organization position. Moreover, voter registration and community organizing was the first step to political power for black people disenfranchised and barred from the Mississippi Democratic party, though they constituted a majority in several south counties. Armed with the vote, the rural Negro in the Deep South could begin to build the self-confidence to manage his own affairs and control his own life, the very essence of participatory democracy. (Bacciocco, 1970, p. 42)

Debates about the proper form of ultra-Jeffersonian means of democracy were vigorous throughout 1961, with many in SNCC urging a continued emphasis on demonstrations and civil disobedience, while others favored shifting to a voter registration campaign. The tension generated by the division of opinion over direct action or voter registration erupted in a SNCC meeting at the Highlander Research and Education Center in Tennessee in August 1961. At the Highlander meeting, it seemed for a while that an impasse had been reached between the direct action people and the voter registration people, and that SNCC might even split into two groups. Ella Baker, advisor to SNCC sine it was founded at Raleigh in 1960, helped reconcile the opposing viewpoints. Schism was avoided and a compromise agreed upon. Two aims of SNCC were created to go ahead on both fronts:

Diane Nash was put in charge of the direct action campaigns, and Charles Jones headed up the voter drive. Robert Moses was already in Mississippi setting up voter registration schools when the decision was made, and he was added to the staff to handle Mississippi. (Bacciocco, p. 43)

SNCC's voter registration drive was held, first in Mississippi, then in southwest Georgia, Alabama, and the other states of the Deep South. As the drive took SNCC into local communities across the South, it increasingly became the dominant approach of SNCC, and those in the organization favoring direct action began to gravitate toward other civil-rights organizations. (Vickers, 1975, p. 24) As Vickers observed, "While other civil-rights organization were still thinking in terms of desegregation and integration as their main objectives, SNCC was already laying plans for a long-range effort to build a political base among southern blacks." (Vickers, 1975, p. 23)

B. Views on the Legitimacy of SNCC's Two Forms of Ultra-Jeffersonian Means of Democracy

Different ends need, of course, different means. In view of its newer end as distinguished form its older one, SNCC's present stress on its newer means seemed to be as justifiable as its previous emphasis on its older one. This was, at least, what Vickers thought to be:

> So long as the objectives of the movement were desegregation and integration, the technique of mass nonviolent direct action could be applied in concentrated doses to symbolic targets. A specific target (such as segregated buses) could be selected, a cadre of leaders could then move into a given community to build a mass movement focused on that target, and after victory or defeat the leaders could move on to other targets in other cities. The psychological obstacles were overcome in the process of mobilization, and the need for concrete victories was satisfied through legislature or judicial intervention. …In a certain sense, this strategy treated local communities as instrumental to a broader struggle, and because its objectives in any given community were limited and specific no long-term organization of the local

> population took place.
>
> Building a base of black political power throughout the South, however, required that permanent organizers be built in local communities. The task of the 'committee of organizers' was to go into a community, develop local leadership and organization, and then move on to repeat the process in other communities….
>
> This led to a form of what might be called "catalytic organizing.' Where SNCC workers acted as a stimulus, resource, and example to the local population, but shunned formal leadership. Just as the sit-ins and freedom rides had been "exemplary" actions, insofar as they served as models of individual and collective struggle against oppression, so the SNCC workers avoided giving strong political direction to the local blacks, insisting, instead, that the local community defend its own needs and objectives, which the SNCC worker would then help them to achieve. In the historical context of the political development of southern blacks, this approach represented a necessary stage in building the psychological and organizational base for a political movement. (Vickers, 1975, pp. 24-25)

What Vickers has shown to us is that SNCC's voter registration drive aimed centrally at building a base of black political power throughout the South by organizing local communities for participatory democracy. This was also Massimo Teodor's view of SNCC's voter registration campaign:

> In the rural areas, dominated by solitude, poverty and terror, as well as in the cities, rigidly segregated and violently controlled by whites, the voter-registration campaign served essentially as an instrument for organizing the black communities around specific objectives and for bringing activists into contact with the local population. Far above and beyond the mere acquisition of the vote for large numbers of blacks, the central objectives and most significant results of the campaign were that it educated citizens about their rights, catalyzed energy at the base of the most deprived levels of society and encouraged potential local leaders to adopt participatory methods, (Teodori, 1969, p. 15)

C. SNCC's Direct or Participatory Democracy as its Ultra-Jeffersonian Challenge to Traditional Representative Democracy in America

So SNCC's voter registration drive or community organizing campaign in the South was an instrument designed to make black people exercise their political right by either choosing their own political leaders or participating directly in making any kind of major decisions that might vitally affect them. For SNCC, this instrument was a revolutionally democratic way to gain political power for black people. And from m y point of view, this kind of direct or participatory democracy appeared to be an ultra-Jeffersonian challenge to non-Jeffersonian, or even anti-Jeffersonian, representative democracy. When John Lewis, SNCC's chairman, wanted to say, in the original version of his speech prepared to deliver to the crowd in the Washington March in August 1963, that "We are now involved in a serious revolution," he used the terms "serious revolution" to emphasize not only SNCC's new democratic end, as we have pointed out above, but its new democratic means as well, a revolutionary means challenging traditional means of American democracy.

> … the … revolution is saying "We will not wait for the courts to act, for we have been waiting for hundreds of years. We will not wait for the President, the Justice Department, nor Congress, but we will take matters into our hands and created a source of power, outside of any national structure that could and would assure us a victory." To those who have said, "Be patient and wait," we must say that "Patience is a dirty and nasty word." We cannot be patient, we must say that "Patience is a dirty and nasty word." We cannot be patient, we do not want to be free gradually, we want our freedom, and we want it now. We cannot depend on any political party, for both the Democrats and the Republicans have betrayed the basic principle of the Declaration of Independence. We all recognize the fact that if any social, political and economic changes are to take place in our society, the people, the masses, must bring them about. …(Lewis, 1969,p. 101)

Lewis' "serious revolution" in democratic means revealed SNCC's another form of ultra-Jeffersonian challenges to traditional representative democracy in America. It meant that SNCC not only distrusted represented democracy but tended to abandon it completely and supersede it with direct democracy. Whereas Jefferson stressed the importance of direct democracy without writing off the proper function of representative democracy, SNCC tended to completely give up the latter and exclusively rely on the former. This served to demonstrate SNCC's ultra-Jeffersonian use of Jeffersonian means of democracy, qualified direct democracy.

D. SNCC's Emphasis on the Co-existence of Two Forms of Ultra-Jeffersonian Democracy in America

In emphasizing SNCC's newer form of ultra-Jeffersonian democratic means—unqualified direct or participatory democracy, Lewis did not forget, of course, its older form of it—the nonviolent direct action or civil disobedience. In the original version of the speech, he also emphasized the continuous use of the latter: "Get in and stay in the streets of every city, every village and every hamlet of this nation until true Freedom comes": "We won't stay now. … We will march through the South, through the Heart of Dixie, the way Sherman did. We pursue our own 'scorched earth' policy—nonviolently, we shall crack the South into a thousand pieces." (Lewis, 1969, pp. 101, 102)

When Lewis equally stressed the importance of two different forms of ultra-Jeffersonian means of democracy in August 1963, the tension within SNCC staff between those who favored one form and those who advocated another had already resolved. It was resolved two years go, as we have seen above, in the Highlander meeting in August 1961. The fact that Lewis, as the chairman of SNCC, spoke for both two years later indicated the coexistence of two forms of ultra-Jeffersonian challenge to non/anti-Jeffersonian democracy. Since we have already seen the operation, achievements and limits of SNCC's ultra-Jeffersonian use of nonviolent direct action, we should, from now on, pay attention exclusively to the operation, achievements and failures of its ultra-Jeffersonian use of direct or participatory democracy in the deep South, especially in Mississippi, one of the most important places for SNCC's ultra-Jeffersonian practice of

participatory democracy. Nevertheless, though SNCC's idea of participatory democracy was ultr-Jeffersonian from the very beginning, its practice of it was Jeffersonian at first and for a considerable time. Before we turn to SNCC's ultra-Jeffersonian practice of participatory democracy, we should first focus on its Jeffersonian practice of it.

Ⅲ. SNCC'S JEFFERSONIAN PRACTICE OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: VOTER REGISTRATION CAMPAIGN IN THE DEEP SOUTH (MISSISSIPPI)

1. Sources of SNCC's Idea and Plan of Voter Registration Drive in the South

SNCC;s Jeffersonian practice of participatory democracy was its voter registration drive which was held, first, in Mississippi, then in southwest Georgia, Alabama, and the other states of the deep South.

A. The Political and Economic Status of Negroes in Mississippi

Why was SNCC's voter registration first held in Mississippi? This question is not difficult to answer. According to Jacobs and Landau, SNCC "views America as if it were one large Mississippi." (Jacobs and Landau, 1966, p. 17) If their statement is too simple to be a convincing answer, Zinn's description of the political and economic status of negroes in Mississippi in the beginning of the 1960s can be so.

> While 50 percent of the voting-age whites in Mississippi were registered to vote, only 5 percent of the Negroes were registered. Negroes were 43 percent of the population of the state—but held zero percent of the political affairs, zero percent of the political power of the state . The median income of Negro families in Mississippi (U.S census figures for 1960) was $1100. White family income was three times as high. Negroes were laborers, sharecroppers, farm laborers, maids, servants of various kinds. More than half of them lived in houses with no running water; for two-thirds of them there was no flush toilet, no bathtub or shower. They lived in tarpaper shacks and rickety wooden boxes sometimes resembling chicken

> coops. Most whites were also poor, though not so poor; Miississippi was a feudal land barony, in which a small number of whites controlled the political power and the wealth of the state using a tiny part of this wealth to pay the salaries of thousands of petty local officials who kept the system as it was by force. (Zinn, 1969, p. 64)

Although, at least, the political status of Negroes in Mississippi during the post-Civil War period of ultra-Jeffersonian Reconstruction was far from being so bad, and was on the contrary, god enough,[9]yet it was sacrificed by the great anti-Jeffersonian Compromise reached between Northern white politicians and Southern while politicians in 1877.[10]Accordingly, Mississippi took the leadership of the Southern states in enacting a whole series of laws which legalized the system of segregation "from the cradle to the grave." And Negro voting was squeezed down to nothing. (Zing, 1969, p. 65) To any one who violated the code, the punishment was swift.[11] With the threat of death, mutilation, or imprisonment at worst, economic destitution at best, the Negro was held down. Consequently, as Zinn emphasized, "Segregated Mississippi became as closed a society as slave Mississippi had been." (Zinn, 1969, p. 65)

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[9] Ultra-Jeffersonian Republicans in Reconstruction Congress passed, in 1869, a Fifteenth Amendment forbidding any state to deny the right of voting to any citizen on account of race or color; and they also passed, in 1870, a civil rights act to enforce the right of American citizens including Negroes. As far as Mississippi was concerned, Negroes had been sheriffs and judges and state legislators, and even lieutenant-governors in those few years of ultra-Jeffersonian Reconstruction after the Civil War when Negroes, supported by federal troops, voted in Mississippi. They never dominated Mississippi politics, but in those years, linked to the economic power of Repbulican white Southerns like Governor James L. Alcorn, they had a voice, and their record as public servants was a good one.

[10] With the ultra-Jeffersonian spirit that accompanied the post-Civil War Reconstruction vanishing, the political leaders of the nation began to see greater advantage in an alliance with powerful Southern while Democrats than with poor Southern Negroes, and in 1877 the great anti-Jeffersonian Compromise was reached between Northern white politicians and Southern white politicians at the sacrifice of the Negro. It was agreed, among other things, that the Jeffersonian Fourteenth Amendment, which wrote into supreme law that no state could discriminate among its citizens, would be considered dead in the Deep Sough. The national government would leave the Negro helpless in his semi-slavery now, as it had left him in slavery before the Civil War, it would not interfere with the desires of Southern politicians no matter what the Constitution said.

[11] Between 1890 and 1920 about four thousand Negroes were put to death in the South, without benefit of trial, and Mississippi accounted for a good part of these.

B. Moses' and Moore's Plan of Voter Registration in Mississippi

In the summer of 1960, two Negroes planned a campaign to, as put by Zinn, "dismantle, stone by stone, the prison that was Mississippi." (Zinn, 1969, p. 65) One of them was Robert Paris Moses, a former graduate student of Harvard University and a New York school teacher at that time,[12]who was a volunteer SNCC worker at first. In Cleveland, Mississippi, that summer, he met Amzie Moore, the head of the NAACP in that town. Moses and Moore planned a campaign to start registering Negroes to vote. Moses returned to Mississippi the following July 1961, now as a SNCC staff member. A NAACP leader by the name of C.C Bryant in the city of McComb in Pike County, read in Jet Magazine about Moses' voter registration plans, and wrote to him suggesting McComb as a place to work. (Zinn, 1969, p. 66) So Moses came to live in McComb as a starting point to work on voter registration.

C. Jenkin's Proposal on Behalf of the Kennedy Administration in the South

The idea that SNC should launch a voter registration drive in the South did not originate with Moses and Moore alone. It also came from some others, especially Jim Jenkins, the vice-president of the National Student Association (NSA) who had the ear of the Kennedy administration, and was asked by some people of certain Foundations to broach the idea of a large-scale voter registration effort in the South to his friends in SNCC.[13]Jenkins; proposal in the SNCC cording committee meeting held in

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[12] Robert Moses was raised in Hariem, one of three boys in a Negro family. He went to Hamilton College in upstate New York, majoring in philosophy, and then went to Harvard where he did graduate work in philosophy and received a Master Degree in 1957. He began teaching mathematics at Horace School in New York.

[13] Jim Jenkins came to SNCC's coordinating committee meeting held in June 1961 with a proposal that SNCC make the registration of Negro voters in the South its main activity. Jenkins did not speak for the NAS but for several philanthropic foundations, including the Taconic Foundation and the Field Foundation, both of New York, and he had the era of the Kenndy administration as well. Before talking with SNCC personnel, Jenkins had been attending a series of meetings in which representatives of several foundations, including the Taconic and the Field Foundations, discussed the raising of substantial funds to support a large-scale voter registration effort in the South. Present at these meetings were Burk Marshall, Assistant Attomey General in charge of the Civil Rights Division of the Justic Department, and Harris Wofford, special assistant to President Kennedy on civil rights.

June 1961 started a controversy which simmered, unsettled, through the summer of 1961. It came to a boil at the Highlander meeting in August, where the issue was posed sharply: would SNCC concentrate on a methodical, grinding campaign to register Negro voters in the Black Belt? Or would it conduct more sensational direct-action campaigns—sit-ins, kneel-ins, wadeins, picket lines, picket lines, boycotts, etc.—to desegregate public facilities? The Negro students who had gone through the sit-ins and Freedom Rides were somewhat distrustful of white liberals with money and of the national government. The fact that both these elements were behind the idea of concentrating on voter registration, on top of Robert Kennedy's call for cooling-off" period during the Freedom Rides, reinforced the suspicion that and attempt was being made to cool the militancy of the student movement and divert the youngsters to slower and safer activity. Led by Diane Nash and Marion Barry, many of the SNCC people at the Highlander meeting held to the idea that "direct action" should continue to be the primary policy. However, on the other hand, Jenkins, over the summer, convinced a number of people in SNCC that voter registration was the crucial level which could set progress in motion in the South, and if white liberals and the national government were willing to help, why not take advantage of this? (Zinn, 1969, pp. 58-59)

The Highlander meeting turned out, as we have seen above, to be a compromise between the "direct action" people and the "voter registration" people; and two arms of SNCC were created: Diane Nash was put in charge of direct action project, and Charles Jones, voter registration work. And Robert Moses was appointed to be SNCC's project director for voter registration in Mississippi. With the money raised by black entertainer Harry Belafonte and others, SNCC was able to hire its first field secretaries. Two of them were assigned to help Moses: Reggie Robinson from Baltimore and John Hardy of the Nashville student movement. On August 7, 1961 the first voter registration school was opened in Pike County to instruct adult Negroes the complexibities of registering to vote in Mississippi.[14]

Jenkins was asked by the Foundation people to broadh the idea to his friend in SNCC.

[14] Mississippi law requires that a person wanting to vote must fill out a twenty-one question form. He must interpret any section of the Constitution of Mississippi chosen by the registrar, who gas complete authority to decide if the interpretation is correct—there are

D. The Difference between SNCC's Voter Registration Campaign and that Advocated by the Kennedy Administration

From the very beginning, it must be noted, SNCC's voter registration campaign was different, in essence, from that advocated by the Kennedy administration, though Thomas Kahn had suggested SNCC to take advantage of the latter for its own purpose. (kahn, 1996, pp. 70-75) President Kennedy's interest in voter registration was not new. Administration officials had meet with leaders of NAACP, CORE, SCLC and SNCC, and had urged them to undertake a voter registration campaign. But the Kennedy administration was mainly interested in the issue of the vote, and it encouraged the registration drive without intending to protect the activists from violence or take any action to apply federal laws against the local authorities. The Kennedy's and other Washington Democrats saw the acquisition of the vote as part of their "liberal" strategy and looked mainly toward the potential this new electorate would provide for the expansion of their own electoral base and national influence. (Teodori, 1969, p. 15) "For above and beyond the mere acquisition of the vote for large numbers of blacks," as emphasized by Teodori, "the central objectives" of SNCC's voter registration campaign were to educate "citizens about their rights," catalyze "energy at the base of the most deprived levels of society," and encourage "potential local leaders to adopt participatory methods." (Teodori, 1969, p. 15)

2. The Initial SNCC's Jeffersonian Way of Conducting Voter Registration Campaign in Mississippi: A Task More Difficult than its Sit-ins and Freedom Rides

Led by Moses, SNCC invaded Mississippi in August 1961. It was in McComb in 1961, in Greenwood in 1962, all over the state in 1963 and 1964. One aspect of its practice of participatory democracy in Mississippi was voter registration campaign. At first SNCC conducted the campaign in a Jeffersonian rather than ultra- Jeffersonian way. Its objective was limited

825sections in the Mississippi Constitution.

and its method qualified. It attempted to reform the anti- Jeffersonian democracy in Mississippi from within its political system. In other words, it encouraged adult Negroes to actually exercise their political right to vote, that is, the minimum participation in regular Mississippi political partices to nominate their representatives. This was to realize Jeffersonian political equality—one man, one vote. The first step to this Jeffersonian goal was, of course, to register adult Negroes to vote. But for SNCC to do so in Mississippi was a task far more difficult tan sit-ins and Freedom Rides.

First, unlike the sit-ins and Freedom Rides that SNCC had joined, voter registration in the least accessible regimes of Mississsippi was almost entirely controlled, directed, and manned by SNCC personnel alone. Although early in 1962, the major civil-rights organizations agreed to concentrate much of their energy on registering Negroes to vote, and under the title Council of Federated Organizations (COFO), SNCC, CORE, NAACP, SCLC, and the National Urban League agreed to cooperate in a southwide program,[15]yet the civil-rights organizations working on voter registration rarely established effective liaison with one another, and when they did, disagreement was not uncommon. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 47) As Bruce Payne, a SNCC worker in Mississippi, pointed out, "COFO was theoretically a coalition of SNCC, CORE, SCLC, and the NAACP, but it was staffed primarily by SNCC people and a few CORE workers." (Payne, 1966, p. 87)

More importantly, though the sit-ins and Freedom Rides deeply offended southern sensibilities, the threat was still superficial, limited at present to store front, lunch counters, and bus terminals. Voter registration was another matter, however. To the white anti-Jeffersonian segregationist in Mississippi, this was a blow aimed at the vitals of white southern control, threatening the very foundations of southern domain. If successful, such a campaign could give the southern Negro the means to restructure the live of the voter registration either violently or insidiously. Violence would frighten Negroes to discontinues their registration, and conspiracy would invalidate

[15] COFO was originally formed in the spring of 1961 to facilitate meeting Governor Ross Bamett of Mississippi to secure the release of Freedom Riders. Robert Moses resurrected COFO in January 1962 to unify the facing Mississippi segregationists.

their efforts. For instance, the Negro registering would be asked to interpret one of the more than 250 sections of the Mississippi state constitution. If he should pass this question, he would have, then, to state the duites and obligation of citizenship under a constitutional form of government. The white registrar had the sole discretion to decide whether the applicant had answered correctly, and he, certainly, would decide that the applicant had not. (Bacciocco, 1974, pp. 46, 49)

Finally, but no less importantly, decades of submission had shaped the attitudes and personalities of Negroes in Mississippi, many of whom were tenant famers. Usually without recourse to an impartial judge, jury, or sheriff, earning only a subsistence wage, unable to get commercial credit for themselves or a decent education for their children, yet reluctant to leave the South, these rural Negroes had become dependent on their white landlords. Since they lacked funds to rely on if evicted, many were apprehensive about incurring the disfavor of their landlords or employers. Fear of retaliation by violent members of the white community also preyed upon them. Furthermore, many negroes believed in their own inferiority—a conviction fostered for generation by segregationists. These Negroes believed that political rights belonged to white people and that they failed to qualify because of their race. (Bacciocco, 1974, pp. 48-49)

Under such unfavorable conditions, SNCC field workers believed that only by immersing themselves in the Mississippian's way of life could they gain his confidence, and that only when his confidence was gained and they became familiar with the district could they begin to function. The SNCC field workers would begin by talking to Negro sharecroppers and tenant farmers about the necessity for registering to vote and of the possibilities that lay beyond. The specific goal, they would explain, was to gain a measure of control over one's own life and the life of the community by wresting local political offices from incumbent segregationists and by obtaining higher wages, more job opportunities and credit rating comparable to those enjoyed by while residents of the same community. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 45)

At first, the odds were overwhelmingly against SNCC field workers. The demoralized and impoverished rural Mississippi negroes whom they

had come to "liberate" were dubious and greeted them with quiet skepticism and distant unease. It was hard for these Negroes to believe that these former students would stay with them for three or four years and not simply give a speech or two, arouse the community, and then leave. (Bacciocco, 1974, pp. 45-46) In the meantime, while segregationists reacted to SNCC's voter registration drive far more violently than expected. Fortunately it would not take Negroes in rural Mississippi began to realize that SNCC would stay and help absorb some of the white retaliation for their daring to register to vote. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 46) But, unfortunately, on the other hand, the white segregationists' stubborn and stiff opposition to voter registration looked as if it would last forever. It was due to the latter, as will be shown below, that SNCC was radicalized and forced to change its performance of participatory democracy from Jeffersonian to ultra-Jeffersonian way.

3. The Practice of SNCC's Voter Registration in Mississippi and Its Opposition from the White Segregationists

A. SNCC's Voter Registration Drive and White Violent Opposition in McComb

Let us now see, in more detail, what really happened in McCOMB, Mississippi, where SNCC field workers helped Negroes to register to vote and confronted the white segregationist's stubborn and stiff opposition to voter registration.

On August 7, 1961, the first voter registration school was opened in Pike County and Negroes, in a slow release of resolve bottled up for a hundred years, began to study the complexities of registering to vote in Mississippi. In the school people patiently went over the questionnaire and the Constitution, and the first Negroes made the trek to the county courthouse. Sixteen Negroes went down to the county seat of magnolia to register and six passed the test. Word got out to two neighboring counties, Amite and Walthall Counties, and people began to ask for schools in their areas. Three Negroes from Amite County — an old farmer and two middle-aged ladies— decided to go to Liberty, the county seat, to register.

Robert Moses went with them. He got a small "victory," but had to pay a small price for it.[16]On August 29, Moses again accompanied two negroes to Liberty to register. There he was attacked on the street by Billy Jack Caston (cousin of the sheriff and son-in-law of a state representative named E. H. Hurst) who proceeded to hit Moses again and again with the butt end of a knife. Moses' shirt became very bloody and, later, he had his head wound sewn up with eight stitches. Moses was the first Negro McComb was, who filed charges of assault and battery against a white, Caston. But what was the result of the charges?[17]

More SNCC workers were arriving in McComb. One of them was Travis Britt, a student from New York City. Not long after his beating, Moses went with Britt and four Negroes eager to register to the county courthouse in Livery. There again an incident occurred, and Britt, after being questioned by fifteen white peoples, was beaten into a semi-conscious state by a white man named Bryant.[18] Two days later, John Hardy, another SNCC worker from Hashville, was beaten with a pistol by Mr. Wood, the registrat of Walthall County, and then arrested by the shefiff for disturbing the peace. (Zinn, 1969, p. 7) The Travis Britt incident and the John Hardy incident had the effect of deterring Negroes from registering to vote. "The farmers in both those counties were no longer willing to go down," said Moses. "There wasn't much we could do." (Zinn, 1969, p. 72) This was not surprising, at least, to a writer who made the following remark: "It was therefore not surprising that when violent white segregationists made an example of two SNCC field workers, Travis Britt and John hardy, by systematically pummeling them, registration ceased." (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 46)

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[16] For Robert Moses' description of the "victory" and the small price for it, see Zinn, SNCC: The New Abolitionists, pp. 67-68.

[17] Moses himself wrote later about the result of his charges against Caston: "Well, it turned out that … we did have his trial, that they had a six-man Justice of the Peace jury, that the courthouse in a twinkling was packed. That is, the trial was scheduled that day and within two hours famers, all white, came in from all parts of the county, bearing their guns, sitting in the courthouse. We were advised not to sit in the court-house except while we testified—otherwise we were in a back room. After the testimony was over the sheriff came back and told us that he didn't think it was safe for us to remain there while the jury gave its decision. Accordingly, he escorted us to the county line. We read in the papers the next day that Billy Jack Caston had been acquitted." Quoted, ibid., p. 69.

[18] For Moses' and Britt's reports of the incident, see ibid., pp. 69-70.

After the beatings of Moses and Britt and Hardy, and the killing of Herbert Lee,[19] there had been continuing violence in the city of McComb. (Zinn, 1969, p. 77) McComb, with all its bitter legacy, was only a beginning for SNCC in Mississippi. Just when the tide of misfortune appeared overwhelming, the new year brought SNCC encouraging news. Early in 1962 the major civil-rights organization agreed to concentrate much of their energy on registering Negroes to vote. Under the title Council of Federal Organization (COFO), SNCC, CORE, NAACP, SCLC, and the National Urban League agreed to cooperate in a Southwide Program. Charles McDew, the SNCC chairman, simultaneously announced the expansion of SNCC's voter registration efforts from McComb to Jackson, Mississippi, and also prepared for an intensive drive in seven other towns in the same state that summer. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 47) Leaving McComb in early 1962, Moses and an enlarged SNCC staff rented a house in Jackson and stayed there. In Jackson that spring they planned to set up voter registration projects in seven different Mississippi towns in a "crash program" for the summer months. Thus, the original nucleus that had gathered in McComb had spread out in the summer of 1962 to Holy Springs, Laurel, and other places. Curties hayes and Hollis Watkins were in Hattiesburg; other staff members were in Greenville, Cleveland, Vicksburg, and Rudeville. (Zinn, 1969, pp. 79, 81, 82)

B. SNCC's Voter Registration Drive and White Violent Opposition in Greenwood

But it was the city of Greenwood, seat of Leflore County, that was to become the focus of attention in Mississippi for the next year. A profile of Leflore County was very much a profile of the rural Deep South. The county in 1960 had about 50,000 people, of whom approximately two-thirds were Negroes. Whites owned 90 percent of the land and held 100 percent of the political offices; their median income was three times that of Negroes. Of 168 hospital beds in the county, 131 were reserved for whites. Ninety-five percent of the whites of voting age were registered to vote; 2 percent of the

[19] For Moses' and Britt's reports of the incident, see ibid., pp. 69-70.

Negroes of voting age were registered. (Zinn, 1969, pp. 82, 83-84)

Sam Block, a SNCC staff member who was a native of Cleveland, Mississippi, came to Greenwood in June, 1962. After his arrival, the newspapers in Greenwood reported that a voter registration drive was being organized among Negroues in town by SNCC workers. One day, while taking Negroes down to register in Greenwood, Block was stopped by the sheriff, and the following conversation took place:

Sheriff: Nigger, where you from?
Block: I'm a native of Mississippi.
Sheriff: I know all the Niggers here.
Block: Do you know any colored people?
(The sheriff spat at him)
Sheriff: I'll give you till tomorrow to get out of here.
Block; If you don't want to see me here, you better pack up and leave, because I'll be here.
(Quoted, Zinn, 1969, pp. 85-86).

That Block was not murdered on the spot was something of a miracle. His courage began to be contagious; more people began to show up at the SNCC office and to go down to the county courthouse to register. The next day, Block took some more Negro men and women down to the county courthouse to try to register. Though in Black's first six months there, only five Negroes were actually declared by the registrar to have passed the test, the stream of voting applicants in Greenwood kept increasing partly because of Block's personal courage to confront police brutality in Greenwood, and partly because of SNCC's food and clothing drive for Negroes.

In October 1962 approximately sixteen thousand Negroes, plantation hands and sharecroppers who normally relied on surplus food and clothing from the federal government to see them through the winter, received news that the county board of supervisors refused to distribute the supplies. Evidently the board was retaliating against these Negroes for accepting into their midst a few SNCC field workers led by Block, whose courage had aroused the interest of the Negro community. As winter progressed the

situation worsened, and SNCC's Atlanta headquarters requested food and clothing from friends in the North. Students on northern campuses sent the requested items to SNCC in cars, trucks and by mail. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 50) The food and clothing drive turned out to be a catalyst for the voter registration campaign in Mississippi. It brought the SNCC workers into direct contact with thousands of Negroes, many of whom came forward to help with, the distribution of the supplies, and stayed on to work on voter registration. Thus SNCC became identified in the minds of Negroes in Mississippi not simply with agitation, but with direct aid. The more food and clothing was distributed, the more people began to go down to the courthouse to register. (Zinn, 1969, p. 88)

But the brighter the prospect of voter registration on the part of Negroes, the stiffer the violent opposition to it on the part of white segregationists. For one thing, Robert Moses, Randolph Blackwell and Jimmy Travis were shot one evening when they were driving from Greenwood toward Greenville. Many bullets missed Moses and Blackwell by inches; but two bullets hit Travis and almost killed him. (Zinn, 1969, pp. 89-90) For another, a week after the shooting of Travis, a station wagon pulled up near SNCC headquarters in Greenwook and someone blasted away with a shotgun into a parked car where Sam Block and three other young SNCC workers were sitting. The car windows were smashed, but no one was injured. (Zinn, 1969, p. 91) In addition, on March 24, 1963, the voter registration office used by SNCC and other civil-rights organizations in Greenwood was destroyed by fire. All of the office equipment was ruined, records were burned, a phone was ripped from the wall. But Greenwood police said there was no evidence of arson. (Zinn, 1969, p. 91)

4. SNCC's Indignation with Local. State and Federal Governments

A. Factors for SNCC's Failure in Voter Registration Campaign in Mississippi

Shortly thereafter, the SNCC staff in Mississippi concluded that their undermanned forces, combined with the opposition of state and city governments and the aloofness of the federal government (in all acts of

violence in Mississippi, the federal government carefully confined its work to the filing of occasional lawsuilts and left the police power of the state of Mississippi to its own devices), (Zinn, 1969, p. 90) made large-scale Negro registration within the Mississippi political system virtually impossible. In fact, by the end of the summer of 1963, voter registration drives within that system had ground almost to a halt. And SNCC workers had been indignant not only with the local and state power structures but also with the Kennedy administration. Originally they regarded the latter's support as one of the most important factors that would contribute to the success of SNCC's voter registration campaigns in Mississippi. And they were in great hope of gaining support, a hope that was, according to Zinn, justified both legally and politically,[20]until they became frustrated again and again and finally disillusioned with the administration, according to Zinn again.[21]

Early in his administration, President Kennedy denied the need for a civil-rights bill, saying that executive orders could do effectively what had to be done. He proved to be slow and cautious, however, in this field as his moderate and much-delayed order on housing showed. Kennedy delayed almost two years in signing this order, and then did not extend its coverage to all federally connected housing, as the Civil Rights Commission had asked. (Zinn, 1969, pp. 205-206) He also refrained from making comments on the moral issues involving racial inequality. It took the severe violence in Birmingdam in the spring of 1963 to arouse the President to an excellent, forthright statement on racism as a moral light on the nation. (Zinn, 1969, p. 206) Then, curiously, instead of being roused to sweeping executive action, he flung the responsibility at Congress, by putting a new Civil Rights Act into the works. But the fact was that the already existing civil rights legislation was not being effectively enforced and that important Supreme Court decisions were not being followed by strong presidential action. The Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960. for instance, were specifically designed to end discrimination against Negroes in voting. (Kuo, 1992, pp. 80-81, n.1,

[20] For SNCCer's legally and politically justified hope for support from the President of the United States, see ibid., pp. 192, 196-97, 198-99, 200, 201, 203, 205, 207-8.
[21] For how SNCCers became repeatedly frustrated and finally disillusioned with the administration, see.ibid., pp. 192-94, 196, 203-5.

n.2) They did not succeed because the President and the Justice Department confined their enforcement actions to slow and cautious lawsuits. In that one area where the Attorney General aid have specific statutory authorization in voting, he did not act vigorously to enforce the law.[22]

B. A Theme of Negro Self-Reliance in Nashville Conference

SNCC first expressed its dissatisfaction with the local and state governments in the South and the Kennedy administration in a SNCC conference held in Nashville on 23-24 November 1962. The Nashville conference was well attended by militants from all over the South as well as by some form the North. A recurring theme was the question of to what extent black people should rely on self-help for their progress. The sustained and often violent opposition of the Southern white community provided one obvious reason for thinking in terms of Negro self-reliance. In addition, many at the conference felt that the Kennedy administration had not asserted itself through the Justice Department with sufficient force to bolster the Southern voter registration campaign. With the state and local governments in the camp of the segregationists, who would help the disenfranchised Negro if the national government procrastinated? The conference workshops considered the advisability of all-black unions and cooperatives, the workshop on political action engendering the most interest, chiefly because its discussion centered on the pros and cons of a third party in the South composed primarily of Negroes. If feasible, such a party would offer the disenfranchised a genuine second party alternative. Despite lively debate, however, the conference did not produce a workable program. (Bacciocco, 1974, pp. 49-50)

C. SNCC's Charge Against Kennedy Administration in the Original Version of Lewis' Speech

Nothing more clearly revealed SNCC's indignation with the Kennedy

[22] Vivid evidence of that was given on Freedom Day in Selma, 7 October 1963, when a corps of F.B.I men and Justice Department lawyers watched local policemen pull SNCC workers down the steps of a federal building and jab others with electric prod poles because they were bringing food to Negroes waiting in line to register. (Zinn, 1969, p. 206)

administration than the original version of the speech which SNCC's new chairman, John Lewis—who was a veteran of the Nashville sit-ins, beaten in the Freedom Rides, and jailed twenty times—prepared to deliver to 200,000 people gathering in the historic March on Washington, D.C. on 28 August 1963. He spoke that day for the SNCC people on the front lines in Mississippi, Alabama, and Southwest Georgia, for Negroes of the Black Belt, for people who had endured the unendurable and had been left on their own by the national government. Lewis knew that while the President and the Attorney General spoke out on civil rights in Washington, D.C., their voices were scarcely whispers in the towns and hamlets of the Deep South; that while Negroes were shot and beaten in Mississippi and Alabama, the federal government scrupously maintained a policy of minimum interference. Instead of confining his attack to generalized and customary targets—Southern racists and opponents of civil rights legislation, he attempted to lash out immoderately at the federal government itself, charging the Kennedy Administration with failure to fulfill its responsibility to Negroes in the South. (Zinn, 1969, pp. 190-91) The following are those parts of Lewis' prepared text which deal with the Kennedy Administration:

> In good conscience, we cannot support the administration' civil rights bill, for it is too little, and too late. There's not one thing in the bill that will protect our people from police brutality.
>
> This bill will not protect your children and old women from police dogs and fire hoses, for engaging in peaceful demonstrations. …
>
> The voting section of this bill will not help thousands of black citizens who want to vote. It will not help the citizens of Mississippi, of Alabama, and Georgia, who are qualified to vote, but lack a 6th grade education. "One man, one vote," is the African cry. It is ours, too. (It must be ours.)
>
> People have been forced to leave their homes because they dared to exercise their right to register to vote. What is in the bill that will protect the homeless? …
>
> This nation is still aplace of cheap political leaders who build their careers on immoral compromises and ally themselves with open forms of political, economic and social exploitation. What political leader here can stand up and say, "My

> party is the party of principles" ? The party of Kennedy is also the party of Eastland. The party of Javits is also the party of Goldwater. Where is our party? … we have learned … that within the past ten days a spokesman for the administration appeared in secret session before the committee that's writing the civil rights bill and opposed and almost killed a vision that would have guaranteed in voting suits for the first time fair federal district judges. And, I might add, this Administration's bill, or any other civil rights bill—such as the 1960 civil rights act—will be totally worthless when administered by racist judges, many of whom have been consistently appointed by President Kennedy.
>
> I want to know, which side is the Federal Government on? …
>
> We will not wait for the courts to act, for we have been waiting for hundreds of years. We will not wait for the President, the Justice Department, nor Congress, but will take matters into our own hands and create a source of power, outside of any national structure that could and would assure us a victory. … We cannot be patient, we do not want to be free gradually, we want our freedom, and we want it now. We cannot depend on any political party, for both the Democrats and the Republicans have betrayed the basic principles of the Declaration of Independence.
>
> We all recognize the fact that if any social, political and economic changes are to take place in our society, the people, the masses, must bring them about. In the struggle we must seek more than mere civil rights; we must work for the community of love, peace and true brotherhood. Our minds, souls and hearts cannot rest until freedom and justice exist for all the people. (Lewis, 1969, pp. 100-101)

Lewis' prepared speech startled Jeffersonian leaders of other liberal organizations sponsoring the march, (Kuo, 1992, p. 74, n.54) who looked on Jeffersonian President Kennedy as a friend of civil rights, who were impressed by the Kennedy administration' s sponsorship of a new Civil Rights Bill and by its endorsement of the great march. (Zinn, 1969, p. 191) Although they defended the march goals and criticized the reluctance of Congress to pass the civil rights bill, these Jeffersonian, liberal leaders believed it unnecessary and perhaps self-defeating to rail against a Democratic administration that was supporting pending civil rights legislation in Congress. So there was a tacit

agreement among them to avoid embarrassing President Kennedy and to omit ultimatums or revolutionary rhetoric. They reacted negatively to Lewis' prepared speech that he released the evening before the demonstration, as it apparently violated the agreement. They persuaded Lewis to rewrite parts of his manuscript. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 54) Lewis did this with misgivings and some of the most trenchant passages of the prepared speech had been removed just before it was delivered. (Zinn, 1969, p. 190) Immediately after the march, SNCC criticized the other civil-rights leaders for compelling Lewis to change his speech and regarded the incident as an indication of the pitfalls accompanying cooperation with Jeffersonian liberals. (Baccioуo, 1974, p. 54)

D. The Turning Point of SNCC' s Conduct of its Participatory Democracy from Jeffersonian to Ultra-Jeffersonian Way

From my point of view, Lewis' prepared speech signaled the turning point of SNCC' s conduct of its participatory democracy from Jeffersonian to ultra-Jeffersonian way. Since its Jeffersonian voter registration campaign within the Mississippi anti-Jeffersonian democratic system turned out to be infeasible without effective aid from the federal government (which encouraged it from different motives before it had started, but showed indifference to its frustration on account of local and state oppositions), SNCC began to realize that its participatory democracy had to be conducted in a radical, ultra-Jeffersonian way. To repeat Lewis' emphasis in his prepared speech:

> We will not wait for the courts to act. … We will not wait for the President and the Justice Department, nor Congress, but will take matters into our own hands and create a source of power, outside of any national structure that could and would assure us a victory. … We cannot be patient, we do not want to be free gradually, we want our freedom, and we want it right now. We cannot depend on any political party, for both the Democrats and the Republicans have betrayed the basic principles of the Declaration of Independence. … We all recognize the fact that if any social, political nd economic changes were to take place in our society, the people, the masses, must bring them about. In the struggle we must seek more than civil rights, we

must work for the community of love, peace and true brotherhood. Our minds, souls and heart cannot rest until freedom and justice exist for all the people.

This amounted to SNCC's declaration of its complete distrust and abandonment of representative democracy, and of its total reliance on unqualified direct democracy in Mississippi as an ultra-Jeffersonian challenge to anti-Jeffersonian democracy in that state. The challenge was mainly expressed in SNCC;s creation of its own democratic processed and structures which were parallel to those of Mississippi. As Norm Fruchter, a New Left activist involved in community organizing in the North and editor *of Studies on the Left*, observed:

> SNCC (by SNCC I mean the movement, and its evolving local organization, both SNCC organization, and the local people who sustain them and act with them) seems to have abandoned the goal of eventual integration into existing Mississippi society as both unrealistic and undesirable. In stead, SNCC seems to be working to develop alternative organizations and institution which are responsive to what local Negroes need and want, existing outside the majority society. (Fruchter, 1969, p. 113)

Ⅳ. SNCC'S ULTRA-JEFFERSONIAN PRACTICE OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: THE 1964 MISSISSIPPI SUMMER PROJECT

At the SNCC Leadership Training Conference in Washington, D.C., in late 1963, Moses outlined SNCC's overriding goal by stating that SNCC intended radically to overhaul the Southern system. The two-party system in the South did not work, he contended; the political process did not even exist for voteless Negroes who were denied permission to discharge their rights as American citizens. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 57) At the same conference Lewis recommended the creation of independent pockets, or centers, of power to enable the masses to achieve their political and economic objectivies. From these power centers, "alternative structures" or "parallel

institutions" would be built to run alongside the rival existing social and political organization. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 58) Thus SNCC can be seen as an ultra-Jeffersonian challenger in terms of the degree of political change it sought and of the methods it sanctioned to achieve a new social order, independent centers of power and alternative structures or parallel institution.

1. An Initial Test of the Feasibility of SNCC's Ultra-Jeffersonian Challenge to Anti-Jeffersonian Democracy in Mississippi: The 1963 "Freedom ballot" in Mississippi

In 1963 the November "Freedom Ballot" in Mississippi initially tested the feasibility of souch an ultra-Jeffersonian challenge to anti-Jeffersonian democracy in that state. With Negroes prevented—by intimidation and reprisal—from registering and voting in the regular gubernatorial election between segregationist Democrats (like Paul Johnson) and segregationist Republican (like Rubel Phillips), SNCC decided to give voteless Negroes a chance to vote for a Negro governor and a white lieutenant-governor of Mississippi in and unofficial Freedom Ballot. (Zinn, 1969, pp. 98-99) SNCC called the November gubernatorial election in Mississippi free because the local population would be called upon to express its own preference freely, that is, to vote for a black governor and white lieutenant governor of Mississippi on a ballot which would have nothing to do with the official one but would be organized by COFO[23]and white students from the North.[24]If voteless Negroes turned out in large numbers for the election, SNCC hoped, it would refute the constant assertion that Negroes did not vote because of apathy and not because the white segregationist community denied them the right to vote. Moreover, SNCC believed that giving to the polls would give these negroes a valuable

[23] From the end of 1962, the voter registration campaigns were coordinated by the Council of Federal Organization (COFO) which, in addition to SNCC providing the majority of the activists, included other civil rights organizations such as SCLC, CORE and NAACP.
[24] SNCC hoped that the presence of white students from the North at the November election in Mississippi would arrest the attention to the communications media on the Southern Negroes. SNCC also wanted the election to test the adaptability of Northern white college students to an entirely different world.

political education and contribute to their self-confidence. (Bacciocco, 1974, pp. 55)

In the fall of 1963, the SNCC workers concentrated I nGreenwood began to spread out all over the state I in the most daring political action undertaken by Mississippi Negroes since the post-Civil War Reconstruction. On October 6, the members of COFO met and norninated Aaron Henry and the Reverend Edward A. King as Freedom candidates for governor and lieuterant-governor of Mississippi.[25]COFO printed imitation registration forms to register the voters and imitation ballots with names of the Freedom candidates together with the regular Democratic and Republican party candidates. The registration books ballots became known as "Freedom registration books" and "Freedom ballots." (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 55) The majority of volunteers, some thirty or forth white students who had traveled from Stanford and Yale Universities, helped circulate Freedom registration forms and collect and tabulate the ballots. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 55) All the civil-rights organization in COFO cooperated in the campaign, and Robert Moses of SNCC directed it, with ballot boxes placed in churches and meeting places throughout the state, where adult Negroes could come and vote. In October and November, hundreds of workers canvassed the State of Mississippi, aided by visiting white students from Yale and Stanford. There were jailings, beatings, and shootings, all of which constituted what a Stanford student called "White Terror in Mock Election." (Moore, 1963, p. 1) But the campaign went on. And in spite of the climate of fear, 80,000 Negroes voted in November for Henry and king, four times the number officially registered in the state. (Zinn, 1969, p. 100) The 80,000 votes which the two candidates obtained was, as Moses declared, proof that great numbers of blacks would have voted if they had not been materially impeded from doing so. (Teodori, 1969, p. 17) The success of the mock elections also seemed to indicate to the local activists the concrete

[25] Aaron Henry, a forty-one-year-old pharmacist, army veteran, and NAACP leader, was from Clarksdale, Mississippi, and one of the pillars of the movement in the state. Edward King was a twently-seven-year-old white minister and Chaplain at Tougaloo College. King was born in Vicksburg, Mississipi, educated at Millsaps College inJackson, then went off to study theology at Boston University. He had been arrested four times since 1960 for various civil rights actions and was once beaten in a jail Montgomery.

possibility of reconstructing a different society, starting with free institutions formed by and for the people, without their delegating power to outside authorities and institutions. (Teodori, 1969, p. 17)

2. The Purpose, Spirit, Targets and Operation of SNCC's 1964 Mississippi Summer Project (Community Centers and Freedom Schools)

A. SNCC's Ultra-Jeffersonian Performance of Participatory Democracy on the Basic Level: It's Ultra-Jeffersonian Struggle for Equal Participation in the South

The process which had begun with the Freedom Ballot was developed by SNCC into its 1964 Mississippi Summer project.[26]No matter what the reasons for this project might be,[27]its primary purpose was, no doubt, to break the Southern whites' anti-Jeffersonian opposition to SNCC's ultra-Jeffersonian struggle for equal participation and equal power in the South. To attain this purpose, SNCC envisioned a mammoth project

[26] Although COFO was ostensibly in charge of the 1964 Mississippi Summer Project, SNCC was the prime mover. SNCC contributed 95 percent of the staff for the Jackson (Mississippi) headquarters and 90 to 95 percent of the money. (At the end of 1963, SNCC's financial condition had improved immensely. Soliciting money from individuals, foundations, colleges, churches, selected communities, and entertainers, SNCC had obtained from $250,000 to $700,000 for 1963-67). CORE had staff responsibility for one congressional district; SNCC for the remaining four. Dr. Aaron Henry, the President of Mississippi's NAACP, was the president of COFO. SNCC's Robert Moses became COFO's program director, Dave Dennis, CORE field secretary, was elected assistant program director.

[27] According to Edward Bacciocco, there were many reasons why SNCC ade the 1964 Mississippi Summer Project its maximum endeavor. At the beginning of 1964, SNCC had some 150 field workers operating in the South. The slow increase of full-time SNCC field workers—from 16 to 150 or so since the summer of 1961—suggested that no large number of volunteers was likely to swell SNCC's rank ; it was dangerous work with no fanfare or publicity. In Mississippi, the area of most intense concentration, after two-and-a-half years of travail, only 6 percent, or about 25,000 out of 400,000 eligible Negro adults were registered. The rate of registration made futile the continuance of small projects in select communities; another summer project on the scale of the past three was equally futile. The 100 to 150 additional organizers of the previous summer had concentrated on voter registration, with community education program left in the planning stage due to the shortage of personnel. SNCC hoped to force the state and local governments in Mississippi either to alter their social and political structure in favor of Negro citizens or to compel the federal government to intervene to protect white collegians from the North. (Bacciocco, 1974, pp.)

enlisting the aid of thousands of college students from the North to register potential Negro voters and to teach in Freedom Schools and adult community centers, all of which were to become parallel structures or alternative institutions offering the Mississippi Negroes opportunities for democratic participation not otherwise available. The spirit and foundation of SNCC's 1964 Mississippi Summer Project lay in its ultra-Jeffersonian performance of participatory democracy on the basic level. As Bacciocco pointed out, "SNCC wanted to remake the social order 〔in Mississippi〕 by fostering new leadership and new democratic institutions along more equalitarian and proletarian lines." (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 57) In other words, it wanted to practice participatory democracy at the bottom of the Mississippi society, just as it had done it within its own organization.[28] "In the final analysis," as Bacciocco stressed, "SNCC" wanted to create a new Negro man—or, at least, men and women in backwater southern communities who could help themselves. This is why it insisted that the development of local leadership be the first priority in every project. Without a definitive sense of self and the ability to transmit this quality to others, the larger social cohesiveness required for Negro advancement in the South could not gel." (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 58)

B. Community Organization for Equal Participation; Freedom Schools for Equal Capacity to Participate

In the final analysis, from my point of view, SNCC's 1964 Mississippi Summer Project was the first step towards its final ultra-Jeffersonian end of democracy: political, social and economic equality between whites and blacks in Mississippi. But as far as the project itself was concerned, only political equality was involved in it. It involved two ultra-Jeffersonian targets in this respect of ultra-Jeffersonian equality; black and whites should be equal in both political participation and political power. For equal

[28] The democratic system which SNCC followed within its own organization best represented its view of the way in which participatory democracy must operate: if it is to be real, it must begin at the bottom—with the lowermost SNCC field workers. This conception of participatory democracy allowed all members of the group to participate fully in discussions and decisions concerning themselves. All views would be expressed, and every coworker would feel comfortable with the outsome.

participation the project established community centers and Freedom Schools for training Negroes to make political decisions themselves that would vitally affect them. For equal power it created the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party Mississippi Democratic Party.[29] Despite the significance of the creation of MFDP and its challenge to political power in Mississippi,[30]it will be excluded from the remainder of this section for no

[29] SNCC was the prime mover behind the organization of MFDP. First prompted by Robert Moses, SNCC's Mississippi Project director, Jack Minnis, a member of the SNCC research department and a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Tulane University, convened a meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, on 1 February 1964, where conference participants agreed to challenge the credentials of the regular Mississippi Democratic party. Then a state-wide meeting of civil-rights activists in Mississippi was held on 26 April in Jackson, Mississippi. Their decision was to create a parallel Democratic Party —one that would, in every respect, comply with he rules and regulations set down by the Mississippi State Constitution for the conduct of political parties, and that would be Democratic because it was in the Democratic Party that significant decisions about the lives of the people in the South were made. However, the parallel Democratic Party was independent in the sense that it owned no patronage or appointments to the National or State Democratic party. Thus two hundred state delegates of civil rights organizational officially established the MFDP, choosing Lawrence Guyot, a native of Mississippi and SNCC field secretary, as chairman and electing a Temporary State Executive Committee composed of twelve representatives from the state's five congressional districts. This committee would supervise the precinct, county, district, and state meetings to determine the MFDP delegates to the Democratic National Convention to be held in Atlantic City, New Jersey in August 1964. The MFDP was thus the product of all civil-rights organizations', especially SNCC's resolution to enter electoral politics and invade the August 1964 Democratic National Convention, challenging the regular Mississippi Democratic Party in there. Underlying the challenge were three basic considerations. A special MFDP report named them as "((1) the long history of systematic and studied exclusion of Negro citizens from equal participation in political process of the state …; (2) the conclusive demonstration by the Mississippi Democratic Party of its lack of loyalty to the National Democratic party in the past …; (3) the intransigent and fanatical determination of the State's political power structure to maintain the status-quo …" At its meeting, the MFDP stated: "We are not allowed to function effectively in Mississippi's traditional Democratic Party; therefore, we may find another way to align ourselves with the National Democratic Party." (Miller, 1969, pp. 108-0)

[30] Teodori saw the establishment of MFDP as "a revolutionary phenomenon for the South." For, he explained, "even though blacks constituted a large minority, and in some areas the majority of the population, they had never before organized and expressed themselves politically in the South … Composed mainly, although not entirely, of blacks, it 〔MFDP〕 was a genuine expression of the local communities, free from the control of political bosses" (Teodori, 1969, p. 18). To SNCC and many black Mississippians, MFDP represented the parallel structure best suited to wrest political control from the regular Mississippi Democratic Party, to which all forty-nine senators and all but one of the 122 state representatives owed allegiance. In the event that the Democratic National Convention seated the MFDP's delegates, the first and most important step would have been taken to give SNCC and MFDP the access to state control and federal funds—the keys to better schools, housing, jobs, and welfare for the state's Negroes. So, as Bacciocco emphasized, "SNCC saw itself , in short , as a political catalyst for drastic social change. Its workers

other reason than that it was less relevant to our purpose than SNCC's establishment of community center and Freedom Schools.

While MFDP prepared for its challenge to the regular Mississippi Democratic Party at the Democratic National Convention to be held in Atlantic City, New Jersey in August 1964, SNCC made a last-minute appeal to Northern students coming South for the 1964 Mississippi Summer Project to help in the voter registration campaigns and to establish community centers and Freedom Schools.[31] The project began in the second half of June. Instead of several thousand volunteers that SNCC had hoped for, an aggregate of about 900—over 500 of them students—presented themselves for duty.[32] The first group of 175 arrived on 15 June in Oxford, Ohio, for a week of intensive training. The second contingent of 275, completed its basic training on 27 June. A third group of from 70 to 100 volunteers included 30 New York school teachers; 150 lawyers, 100 law students, 100 clergymen, and about 100 field workers from SNCC and CORE rounded out the task force that manned the project. Whites outnumbered black students by a margin of five to one in the first class and held 85 percent plurality in the second class.[33]

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wanted power, and as time passed they deluded themselves into thinking that what could not be achieved in the byways of the Mississippi Delta could be attained in one blow at the summit of Democratic party politics" (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 63). That ambition was expressed by Stokely Carmichael, SNCC's field worker and project direct fro the second Mississippi congressional district: "We've always seen ourselves 〔SNCC〕as a political force. … That parallel structure 〔MFDP〕was grasping for power. Had they gotten the power they would have received all the political patronage inside the state of Mississippi. They would have been the governing force: (Editoria, "Interview with Stokely Carmichael," Movement, February 1967, p. 4; reprinted in International Socialist Journal 4〔August 1967〕: 669). Thus it was clear the MFDP was used by SNCC as an instrument to gain political power for Negroes in Mississippi.

[31] SNCC and its allies had made every effort to notify northern students about the project and to interest them in it. In February and again in April 1964, Robert Moses, Martin Luther King and others visited various universities to impress upon students the importance of the project.

[32] The rigorous preselection, personal expense and risk involved had eliminated many students. SNCC staff members methodically separated desirable from undesirable northern applicants. The number finally chosen might have tripled or quadrupled if the selection had been less discriminating, but large numbers and poor quality were in SNCC's opinion counter-productive. Each student paid for his own travel, brought about $150 for personal expenses, and arranged in advance for $500 bond money. In addition, the ominous atmosphere of Mississippi and the leadership and sacrifices entailed deterred many others who agreed with the project in principle.

[33] Although SNCC would have preferred more black students, the scarcity of funds made

When the basic training in Ohio ended,[34] the students traveled to prearranged locations throughout Mississippi to engage in voter registration, to instruct adults in community centers, and to teach in Freedom Schools. Students assigned to voter registration tried to follow the procedures established by SNCC since 1961. As the summer wore on, however, the emphasis in voter registration shifted from encouraging people to register officially at the courthouse to organizing Negroes to fill out Freedom registration forms in preparation for the delegate challenge at Atlantic City. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 70) The new emphasis was more connected with Negroes' participation in choosing their own leaders for equal power than with their participation in deciding their own affairs for equal participation. It was community organization and Freedom Schools that aimed at equal participation. Community organization was for equal participation per se; Freedom Schools for the equal capacity to participate.

3. An Analysis of SNCC' **Organizing Community Centers in Mississippi**

A. Community Centers Functioning for the Practice of Participatory Democracy: A Politics without Leadership = A Politics of Consensus

Under the direction of Snell Ponder, a SNCC field secretary, the 1964 Summer Project created between ten and fifteen community centers in Mississippi. According to Bacciocco's observation, these centers had the following functions:

> Primarily for adult Negroes, the centers utilized students in such endeavors as job training, literacy classes, health programs, adult education, and Negro history classes. These centers furthered voter registration by enabling the Negro to expand his education, to become literate and politically conscious, thereby improving his chance of registering successfully or become a political activist. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 70)

This observation alone seemed to be superficial. But Bacciocco also had a much deeper insight into the purpose for which these functions were

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this impossible.

[34] For the training week's schedule, see Bacciocco, 1974, pp. 67-69.

designed. That purpose was the practice of participatory democracy.

> … SNCC wanted to remake the social order by fostering new leadership and new democratic institutions along more equalitarian and proletarian lines. It had become progressively impatient with what it regarded as middle-class complacency and values centered in material rather than human considerations.
>
> The system which SNCC followed … represents its view of participatory democracy: if it is to be real , it must begin at the bottom—with the lowliest SNCC field worker, with the lowliest black Mississippi tenant farmer. This concept allowed all members of the group, whether of SNCC or a Mississippi township, to participate fully in discussions and decisions concerning themselves. All views would be expressed, and every coworker or fellow citizen would feel comfortable with the outcome.
>
> In the final analysis, however, SNCC wanted to create a new Negro man—or, at least, men and women in backwater southern communities who could help themselves. This is why it insisted that the development of local leadership be the first priority in every project. Without a definite sense of self and the ability to transmit this quality to others, the larger social cohesiveness required for Negro advancement in the South would not gel. (Bacciocco, 1974, pp. 57-58)

Indeed, the development of local leadership in the "counter-community" established by SNCC was, form SNCC's own point of view, the development of self-leadership on the part of local adult Negroes without their need to be led by outsiders, including SNCC field workers and students from the North. In the minds of SNCC staff, as Norm Fruchter emphasized in his Notes on SNCC in Mississippi: "SNCC ought not to lead local people or impose leadership, solutions, programs on them, but should become the tool by which local people can begin to transform, and control, the organizations and institutions which presently dominate their lives." (Fruchter, 1969, p. 114) This emphasis on encouraging local self-leadership in Mississippi was only a particular case of SNCC's general, hostile stance toward leadership in American society. Robert Moses' stress on the unnecessariness of leadership represented SNCC's general position of

anti-leadership: “The people on the bottom don’t need leaders at all, what they need is the confidence in their own worth and identity to make decisions about their own lives.” (Quoted from Payne, 1966, pp. 96-99) In the view of Bruce Payne, a SNCC fireld worker in community organizations in Mississippi, a politics without leadership was a politics of consensus which was the aim of SNCC’s community organization:

> The style of community organization pursued by members of SNCC aims at a political consensus, with neighbors and friends meeting together to talk over common problems in relatively unstructured and unorganized meetings. SNCC workers encourage these people to arrive at “group decisions,” whether about protests, freedom schools, or projects for the good of their local areas. (Payne, 1966, pp. 97-98)

B. SNCC’s Position of Anti-Leadership: its Jeffersonian Distrust of Leaders ad its Ultra-Jeffersonian Assumption about Human Equality in Freedom

Why did SNCC take a position of anti-leadership? The answer could be found in its Jeffersonian distrust of leaders and, furthermore, in its ultra-Jeffersonian assumptions about human equality in freedom. An article by Jimmy Garett in the SNCC newsletter sounded SNCC’s modern Jeffersonian distrust of leaders:

> We are taught that it takes qualifications like college education, or “proper English” proper dress” to lead people. These leaders can go before the press and project a “good image” to the nation and to the world. But after a while the leaders can only talk to the press and not with the people. They can only talk about problems as they see them—not as the people see them. And they can’t see the problems any more because they are always in new conferences, “high level” meetings or negotiations. So leaders speak on issues

many times which do not relate to the needs of the people.[35]

The depth of SNCC's ultra-Jeffersonian distrust of political leadership was typified by the actions of a SNC-organized neighborhood group (community center) in Vicksburg, Mississippi. After meeting at some length to discuss their feelings about the city, they made an appointment for all of the members to meet together with the mayor. These people were unwilling to be merely "represented" by a small group of leaders in discussions with the city "power structure." (Payne, 1966, p. 98)

SNCC's ultra-Jeffersonian assumptions about human freedom in general and Negroes' desire for equal freedom in particular, found clear expression in an article written by Fruchter, a New Left activist involved in the community organization as a part of the New Left movement which went beyond the civil rights movement.

> Primarily a movement, SNCC is only incidentally an organization. As a movement, it is committed to certain assumptions which approximate ideals, rather than to a series of specific goals achieved through defined programs. SNCC's cardinal assumptions is that an individual if free only when he can effectively control, and carry out, all the decisions affecting the way he lives his life. SNCC's subsidiary assumption, more a statement of faith defining how it must operate than a statement of its orienting ideal, is that the rural southern Negro has been so systematically excluded form and oppressed by the majority society. From these two assumptions, one about the meaning of human freedom, the other the consciousness of the rural southern negor, all the paradoxes of SNCCs style follow. For what many northerners, especially northerners with organizational experience, perceive as a fuzziness in SNCC ideology, a failure to formulate programs and goals, and a paralyzing confusion about direction, all stem from SNCC's conscious choice to leave al those questions open. More than that, since SNCC assumes that the demand for freedom, on the part of local Negroes, will remain constant, and that the only meaningful freedom is a situation where a man controls his own life, they

[35] Quoted ibid., p.97; originally in The Nation, 10 May 1965, p. 493

> accept the inevitable conclusion that SNCC ought not to lead local people, or impose leadership, solutions, programs on them, but should become the too by which local people can begin to transform, and control, the organizations and institutions which presently dominate their lives. SNCC accepts what seems to be organizational confusion stemming form a refusal to utilize bureaucracies, hierarchies of responsibility and all the mechanisms of rationalized decision-making, and an inefficiency which seems a nightmare, because it is concentrating all its energies on reducing the gap between organizational structures into institution which evolve out of local communities and meet local needs. (Fruchter, 1969, pp. 113-14)

C. The Result of SNCC's Practice of Ultra-Jeffersonian Participatory Democracy

What Fruchter made clear was that SNCC's participatory democracy being practiced in community organizing in Mississippi aimed at "reducing the gap between organizers and local people" and letting every local Negro "control and carry out all the decisions affecting the way he lives his life." In order to realized this ultra-Jeffersonian ideal of equal participation, SNCC refused "to utilized bureaucracies, hierarchies of responsibility and all the mechanisms of rationalized decision-making" and deliberately avoided formulating "programs and goals" and even "direction" for the community centers so as to leave "all questions "open" to local participants' own decision. What was the result of this ultra-Jeffersonian participatory democracy? According to Fruchter's answer, "out of this refusal to organize, to lead, to bureaucratize, and to specialize functions, come real failures; judged by the standards of a normal centralized organization, SNCC is hopelessly inefficient. There are hundreds of services it cannot provide, and thousands of tasks it can only lamely accomplish." (Fruchter, 1969, p. 114) But this was only one half of Fruchter's answer that acknowledged the real failure in the short run. The other half of it emphasized the prospective success in the long run:

> But one of SNCC's purpose is to raise the question of just how well all the organizations operating on bureaucratic assumptions

> within the majority society have served human freedom; what SNCC assumes is that eventually organizations will be established to meet the needs of the southern Negro which are currently denied, and that these organizations will be as irrelevant and damaging as the Federal structures operating in the South today. SNCC tries to take its definition of human freedom, and the operating imperative which follow from it, as absolutes; it is prepared to accept all its supposed failures, and to judge what it is doing not by standards of efficiency or progress toward a solution, but by the numbers of local people it has involved, the qualities of relationships within the local organizations, and the new forms and institutions local people evolve to meet their own needs. Prediction in this fluid situation is hazardous, but given current examples like the MFDP, the cooperative evolving in some rural areas, and the hope that the embryonic Freedom Schools develop into an alternative educational system, organized on different assumptions from kindergarten to college, it is not too difficult to perceive the possibility that the movement may evolve an alternative set of institutions, developed and run by local Negroes, across the entire Black Belt. (Fruchter, 1969, p. 114)

4. A Description of the Operation of Freedom Schools Established by SNCC in Mississippi

Fruchter lonely mentioned, but did not elaborate on MFDP and Freedom Schools as examples to support his prediction that SNCC was likely to succeed in establishing alternative institutions run by local Negroes throughout the Black Belt in the long run.[36]In the following pages the focus

[36] Fruchter seemed to have neglected the fact that there was difference as well as similarity between MFDP and Freedom Schools. According to SNCC's ideal, both were, indeed, alternative structure: Just as MFDP should replace the regular Mississippi Democrat Party, so Freedom Schools should parallel and ultimately displace the regular Mississippi schools. But in SNCC's practice, MFDP would primarily rely on national attention and on the residual goodwill and moral courage of Jeffersonian labor and liberal leaders within the

is on Freedom Schools, though a quick look at MFDP in passing comes first. Although MFDP heavily relied on national attention and on the residual good will and moral courage of labor and liberal leaders within the National Democratic Party to achieve its goals in Atlantic City, it did conduct participatory democracy on the local level. According to Miller, MFDP's workshops on the local level were its basic tools of political education and decision-making. They were designed to do two things: (1) to share information; (2) to open discussion and begin to break through the feeling of being unqualified that still existed among many Negroes in Mississippi. In most places, workshops were led by members of MFDP. Only in new, unorganized areas did staff members organize initial workshops and these were soon led by people from the local community. Workshops dealt with real problems confronting MFDP, like organizing in the next community or county, or developing a program for coming county elections, or circulating Freedom Registration forms, or selecting local Freedom candidates to run for council, sheriff and other local posts. (Miller, 1969, p. 111)

A. Cobb's Proposal for the Objective of the Establishment of Freedom Schools

The establishment of Freedom Schools as part of the 1964 Summer Project in Mississippi was originally proposed by Charles Cobb, a SNCC field worker on leave from Howard University. Cobb envisioned Negro youth liberated from an inferior educational system, from the induced belief in their own inferiority, and transfigured by education and opportunity into committed activists in the movement for social change. He stated the objective for a system of Freedom Schools in a prospectus presented to SNCC in December 1963 which emphasized:

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national Democratic Party to achieve its goals at the Democratic national Convention in Atlantic City; Freedom Schools would, on the other hand, rely soley on the people themselves and would organize adolescents in Negro neighborhoods as another force for ultra-Jeffersonian equality in Mississippi. So, in this sense, Freedom Schools conducted participatory democracy on far more fundamental level than MFDP did, though the latter also did it on local level in some other sense.

1. The need to get into the schools around the state and organize the students, with the possibility of a statewide coordinated student movement developing.
2. A student force to work with us in our efforts around the state.
3. The responsibility to fill an intellectual and creative vacuum in the lives of young Negro Mississippians, and to get them to articulate their own desires, demands and questions. More students need to stand up in classrooms around the state, and ask their teachers a real question.[37]

As Cobb saw in Freedom Schools an opportunity to convince young Negroes of their individual potential, he advocated that they be established during July and August, principally for tenth-and eleventh-grade students, who, having theoretically one or two years of high school education left, could make practical use of the knowledge acquired in Freedom Schools before their graduation. Thus knowledge would include sharpening classroom skill, and instilling the basis for future statewide student action, such as student boycotts.

Cobb's proposal initially met firm resistance from Summer Project leaders.[38] After considerable debate, however, the potential benefits to Negro youngsters and the expectation of adding a new dimension to the movement persuaded critics to sanction the Freedom Schools as part of the Summer Project. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 61) To promote the recruitment of high school students into the movement, to introduce black students from every part of the state to one another, and to foster a high school movement strengthening both SNCC and MFDP, SNCC set up the Mississippi Student Union (MSU) in the spring of 1964. Along with ministers, educators, and other organizations, MSU helped to attract Negro youngsters to Freedom Schools. One thousand students had been expected, but by the end of July

[37] Quoted from Bacciocco, The New Left in America, p. 70-71; originally Charles Cobb, "Prospectus for a Summer Project," in Adopt a Freedom School, COFO Publications No. 5 (Jackson, Miss.: COFO, 1017 Lunch Street, Spring 1964), p. 1.

[38] That Cobb's personal initially met firm resistance form Summer Project leaders was understandable. SNCC had labored for three years at voter registration—in its opinion the central level for ensuring Negro betterment—and the prospect that these schools would siphon vital manpower from voter registration aroused opposition.

from fifteen hundred to two thousand students had enrolled in more than thirty Freedom Schools. Teachers reported 90 percent attendance. Although about forty professional teachers staffed these Freedom Schools, the majority of teachers in these schools were university students. (Bacciocco, 1974, pp. 72, 74)

B. The Curriculum in Freedom Schools: Solid Subjects, Leadership Development, and Citizenship Training

The curriculum in Freedom Schools consisted of three parts. The "solid" subjects originally included reading, writing, basic mathematics, and Negro history; the Freedom Schools' staff extended these to include typing, special tutoring, foreign languages and algebra, the two latter subjects unavailable in segregated Mississippi schools. In leadership development classes, students were trained in specific organizing skills useful in launching a high school movement and in preparing future activists. Staff members with the appropriate background taught the students rudimentary techniques of community relations, canvassing, handling press and publicity, organizing mass meetings and workshops, and the efficient operation of an office. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 72) A third selection of the curriculum, entitled the "Citizenship Curriculum," was designed to give young blacks both an understanding and appreciation of the Freedom movement for social change in the North no less than in the South and to provide insights into the students' own role in such a movement.[39] The Freedom Schools were divided into two sessions of six weeks each, with the majority of students enrolled in day schools and some of the more politically promising students attending boarding schools. Locations for the day schools varied from open

[39] Far from suggesting that life in the North offered an escape from the abuses of Mississippi, the teachers scrupulously explained the economic disadvantages of the Northern urban ghetto—a repository of immigrating uneducated Negroes without industrial training—for there is little doubt that Negroes had assumed life in the North to be an improvement over life in Mississippi (54 percent of black graduates from Mississippi colleges in 1963 had left the state to seek opportunities else where). If the Freedom School teachers dispelled illusions about the North, they also dispelled their students' sense of impotence. Ad teacher and student together explored specific causes of injustice, the youngsters began to view the Mississippi situation as a network of tangible and related problems that could at least be assailed, if not solved, by political action taken by students.

fields to church and lodge halls. Half of the working day was set aside for solid subjects; the other half of the day and evening was devoted to citizenship training and self-leadership development. (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 74)

C. Freedom Schools' Successful Competition with Regular Mississippi Schools

Because of the interruption of classes in regular Mississippi schools from early spring to summer to allow Negro high school students to chop cotton, the Freedom Schools competed with state schools for students that summer. The poor quality of education received in Mississippi schools accounted for at least as much support for the Freedom Schools from negro parents as did the political complexion of the project. Although there were isolated instances of harassment of teaching staffs, segregationists seldom hounded the Free Schools because, form their point of view, the threat the Schools represented to the Southern power structure was slight and remote in comparison with voter registration and MFDP. (Bacciocco, 1974, pp. 74, 75) But, form the viewpoint of SNCC, Freedom Schools represented its fundamental effort to train young Negroes for participatory democracy as its ultra-Jeffersonian challenge to anti-Jeffersonian democracy in Mississippi.

D. Freedom Schools as SNCC's Fundamental Effort to Train Young Negroes for Participatory Democracy

No one seemed to have better understood SNCC's fundamental effort to train yound Negroes for participatory democracy than Staughton Lynd,[40] who had the responsibility of coordinating the Freedom Schools project during July and August 1964. When he was asked how to start a Freedom School and what was a Freedom School like, Lynd answered, "I don't know." (Lynd, 1969, p. 102) he answered so, not simply because he had no previous experience in this respect,[41] but more importantly because he

[40] Quaker and a history professor, Staughton Lynd lived three years in a rural Georgia cooperative community before teaching at Spellman, a Negro women's college in Atlanta, Georgia. Lynd signed a contract with Yale University beginning in the fall of 1964, immediately after the summer Project.

[41] Lynd described his first immediate experience in starting two Freedom Schools and the

deliberately left the answers to these questions to be decided by students themselves. Having such an understanding in mind, we would not be surprised to hear Lund saying that in Freesom Schools "our approach to curriculum was to have no curriculum and our approach to administrative structure was not to have any." (Lynd, 1969, p. 102) This did not, of course, mean that the Freedom Schools had neither curriculum nor administrators in fact. In fact, they did have. What it really meant was that the curriculum was made by students themselves and the administrators were students themselves. The students who were the administrators of Freedom Schools were those who planned and held the Freedom School Convention in Meridian, Mississippi on the weekend of August 7-9, which, in Lynd's opinion, turned out to be one of the best occasions to train students for participatory democracy:

> … once the Freedom School coordinators (our word for "principals") approved the ideal of a young peoples' mock convention, coinciding with the statewide convention of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, the young people took over. They became the administrators. About a dozen students from all over the state met in Jackson to plan the convention. … The planning committee worked out a program. Essentially it was workshops each morning, plenary sessions each afternoon, and a Freedom School play Saturday night. … And not only did the youngsters plan the Convention. At the Convention, there was a noticeable change in tone between the first and second days. By Sunday, these teenagers were rejecting the advice of adults

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image of them as following: "Originally we planned to have two residential schools for high school students who in the judgment of COFO staff had most leadership potential, with a network of twenty day school feeding into them. Sometime in April it became apparent that sites for residential schools would not be forthcoming, and if they did, there would be no money to rent them. And we realized, after a few painful days, that this was a good thing. It meant that teachers would live within Negro communities rather than on sequestered campuses. It meant that we would have to ask ministers for the use of church basements as schools. In short, it meant we run a school system without buildings, equipment or money. … It meant, too, that each school would be on its own, succeeding or failing by improvisation without much help from a central point. In my own mind the image which kept recurring was that of the guerrilla army which 'swims in the sea' of the people among whom it lives. Clearly, whether we swam or drowned depended on the naked reaction of Negro children and their parents. No apparatus of compulsion or material things could shield us from their verdict." (Lynd, 1969, pp. 102-3)

> whether in workshops or plenary sessions, for they had discovered they could do it themselves. Beyond the Convention one could discern still one more stage in the development of academic self-government. A resolution of the Convention pledged the support of all the schools to a Freedom School in the Delta, planning to boycott the public school there. Here was a program not only executed by the youngsters, but initated by them. (Lynd, 1969, pp. 103-4)

As to students' making their own curriculum, Lynd considered this to be more "revolutionary" than their playing an administrative role in the Freedom School Convention. Learing that "students can and should make their own curriculum," he said to them: If you want to begin the summer by burning the curriculum we have given you, go ahead! We realized that our own education had been dry and irrelevant all too often, and we determine to teach as we ourselves wished we had been taught." (Lynd, 1969, 0.104) The curriculum drafted by Noel Day, a SNCC worker, was essentially a series of questions, beginning with the students' most immediate experience of housing, employment and education, and working out to such questions as: "What is it like for Negroes who go North? What are the myths of our society about the Negro's past? What in Mississippi keeps us from getting the things we want?" (Lynd, 1969, p. 104) Beyond this, teachers were given some fragmentary written material on Negro history, and the advice to emphasize oral rather than written instruction. This helped teachers in Freedom School to remember that "education is above all a meeting between people." (Lynd, 1969, p. 104)

In the Freedom School Convention, there was a common belief among students as well as teachers that curriculum should be built around the political platform the students themselves crested. They, therefore, sought to provide a model for how people can democratically put together a political platform. The students of each Freedom School asked; "If we could elect a mayor (or a state legislator, or a senator) what laws would we ask him to pass?" Having drawn up a program in this way, each school sent delegates to Meridian, where in eight workshops—on public accommodation, on housing, on education, etc.—they put together the twenty-odd platforms of the different schools, and prepared the results to the plenary session. At the

end of the convention when the program was declared adopted, a student asked for the floor. "Wait, " he said, "I move that copies of this program be sent to every member of the Mississippi legislature, to President Johnson, and to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and—wait, wait—a copy to the Library of Congress for its permanent records." (Quoted, Lynd, 1969, p. 105) The student was asking that the program of the Mississippi Freedom School Convention be taken seriously. Lynd thought it should be:

> … in the not very distant future candidates running for Congressional office will be real, not mock, candidates, and will have to declare themselves intelligently on a variety of issues. These candidates may come out of Freedom Schools. If we do not take their program seriously, it means not taking their ideas seriously. If we do not take their ideas seriously, we should ask ourselves what the Schools are for. (Lynd, 1969, p. 105)

V. ASSESSMENTS OF SNCC'S ULTRA-JEFFERSONIAN STRUGGLE FOR PARTICIPATORT DEMOCRACY

Having so described and analyzed SNCC's ultra-Jeffersonian struggle for Negores' equal participation on Mississippi, we cannot help asking now: What were its results and impacts? There were different answers to this question due to different assessments of the successes or failures of the struggle.

1. The Successful Results of SNCC's Efforts in Mississippi and the Bright Prospect of their Effects on the Future Activists

Todori was impressed with the results and happy with their impacts:

> Over 800 students form campuses all over the country went down South to place their energies and technical resources at the disposal of the local communities. Freedom Schools were set up under the most discouraging conditions; theatrical troupes were set up under the most discouraging conditions; theatrical troupes were formed to develop creative new techniques

of education and communication; freedom houses were opened; mass voterregistraion drives were held, even in areas which no activists had penetrated before; a bond of solidarity began to develop within the local communities themselves, composed of the most depressed strata of the black and white population; people began directing new energy toward organizing their own communities. The mass campaign of the summer of 1964 was important for a number of reasons, both within and outside the civil-rights movement. On the local level, the grass-roots organizational work revealed a new method of political activity which contrasted with the manipulation normally found in traditional party politics. … Furthermore, the method of democratic participation fundamental to the humanistic aims of the SNCC activists was tested creatively, if not in an orderly fashion. Within the organization, people were urged to express themselves, to organize, and to make their own decisions at every level and in all circumstances. On the outside, the experience was just as enlightening for the young people working in the South that summer as it was for the local residents, if not more so. They became acquainted with an America whose existence they had never suspected and began to understand the nature of the country's structure; looking at the South, but quick to apply their observations to the North, they regained the strong emotions they had lost in the sterile atmosphere of the campuses. From that moment, eight hundred potential activists were ready to engage in new radical campaigns, ready to change the very course of their lives and even to die, as some already had during that violent summer. (Teodori, 1969, pp. 17-18)

2. A Realistic Estimation of the Achievements and the Failures of SNCC's 1964 Mississippi Summer Project

While Teodori had in mind only the successful results of SNCC's efforts in Mississippi and the bright prospect of their effects on the future activists, Bacciocco realistically estimated both the achievements of the 1964 Mississippi Summer Project and its failures:

The accomplishments of the 1964 Mississippi Summer are the more notable in

light of the violent atmosphere in the state at that time. … In spite of the danger, however, the Summer Project was successful, above all, as an exercise in political initiative.

By the 60,000 signatures on Freedom registration forms, for instance, 60,000 Negroes signified their intention to take part in Mississippi politics. Over 200 of the summer volunteers elected to remain in Mississippi for varying periods instead of returning North as they had originally planned. These volunteers either continued the ongoing work in voter registration or stayed to teach at Freedom Schools or community centers. …

The Freedom Schools accomplished more than any other single program of the Summer Project. Because of their experience at these schools, many students were motivated to take a deeper interest in higher education; a number of them, recognizing their potential for the first time, subsequently applied for financial aid. … Some Freedom School teachers believe that the political education the students acquired revialed their academic training in importance. Many of the students inducted into the movement for social change in Mississippi became discussion leaders, organizers, and speakers in their own neighborhoods immediately after the summer. In at least two cases—in the Freedom Schools at Vicksburg and Holly Springs—white children joined black children briefly, raising the possibility of using the schools as a means of communication between the two races. …

If the Mississippi Summer Project accomplished some of its objectives, it also experienced defeats. Although thousands of volunteers were expected from the North, less than a thousand came, and programs essential to the overall success of the project suffered proportionately. With the workers thinly spread among voter registration endeavors, Freedom Schools, and community centers, only about fifteen hundred Mississippi Negroes were added to lists of registered voters. The small number of northerners also precluded the kind of threat to segregationist control of Mississippi that might have led to mass arrests and federal intervention. …

The major failure, however, occurred within the ranks of the Summer Project participants as the skeptical attitude of some SNCC staff members toward the northern while collegians at the beginning of the experiment turned to bitterness at summer's end. Some of the problems between black

Mississippi veterans and white students arose in part form their radically dissimilar backgrounds and values. Many blacks also felt that since whites had no racial grievances of their own, since by and large they were neither physically stigmatized nor economically deprived because of their race, they were incapable of genuine empathy with blacks. …

It is only fair to observe, however, that many white students had come to Mississippi with the best of motives and had behaved in an honorable and constructive way while they were there. That two hundered or more volunteers decided to stay for an indeterminate period testifies to their dedication and intergrity. …

Black staff members complained about—and black and white observers noted—the tendency of a sizable number of white students to take control of and dominate meetings, conversations, and organizational details. Not only was this trait personally offensive to the blacks but it jeopardized the rural Negroes' tenuous framework of self-confidence, so laboriously constructed by SNCC over the previous three years. …

Especially damaging was the perpetuation among southern Negroes of the myth that only white people, with their superior education and urban sophistication, could bring about change. Some students made unrealistic promises at the beginning of the summer, only to depart after a few weeks leaving black Mississippi as helpless and powerless as they had been before the summer started. Many SNCC field workers lost respect for these students, and the end result was of cardinal importance to the evolution of the New Lief. …

One of the major reasons why SNCC eventually banned white coworkers and built a Black Power movement instead was its judgment that uneducated and unaccomplished black people could not grow and develop under the intimidating influence of radical white allies, a conclusion based in large part upon its experience during the Mississippi Summer Project of 1964. (Bacciocco, 1974, pp. 79-80, 81-82)

3. A Critique of SNCC's Ultra/Jeffersonian new Left Idea of Participatory Democracy

Both Teodori's and Bacciocco's assessments of SNCC's endeavor in Mississippi were right in their own ways. But both being scholars and touching only the margin of SNCC's struggle for Negroes; equal participation in Mississippi, failed to get into the heart of the struggle. It was Bruce Payne, a SNCC field worker in Mississippi, who made an attempt to critically analyze some of SNCC's idea about participatory democracy, which lay at the heart of its struggle in Mississippi. In his overview of SNCC, Payne emphasized that "participatory democracy is the great hope of SNCC and the New Left (especially Students for a Democratic Society, SDS)." (Payne, 1966, p. 97) He compared the New Left idea of democracy with the liberal vision of it:

> As far as I can tell, the "New Left" ifeas of Mississippi SNCC bear a curiously symbiotic relation to the liberal vision. Like the traditional American reformers, SNCC is convinced that the solutions to the problems of the age have very much to do with the procedures by which we operate. The cure for democracy is more democracy. But while liberals opt for perfecting the system of parliamentary democracy, the New Left chooses the democracy of consensus. (Payne, 1966, p.99)

In this comparison, Payne unwittingly but actually compared the ultra-Jeffersonian New Left with the traditional Jeffersonian reformers with regard to their respective ideas of democracy. The ultra-Jeffersonian idea of democracy was what he called the "participatory democracy," or the "democracy of consensus" or the "politics of consensus": "The style of community organization pursued by members of SNCC aims at the politics of consensus, with neighbors and friends meeting together to talk over common problems, in relatively unstructured and unorganized meetings. SNCC workers encourage these people to arrive the 'group decisions' whether about protests, freedom schools, or projects for the good of local aread." (Payne, 1966, pp. 97-98) It was this kind of participatory democracy, according to Payne, that lay at the very heart of the movement not merely of SNCC in Mississippi, but also of the New Left as a whole:

> SNCC has regularly rejected the notion of an all-black movement (though not without considerable soul-searching). But in community organization work with its concentration on building a community that is self-confident and able to act for itself, there is a definite bias against coalition with others outside the group, and against attempts at individual betterment that do not involve the community as a whole. In Mississippi and in the North, community organization and participatory democracy seem to be taking precedence in thought of the new left, prior to jobs, housing, school desegregation, or voting. (Payne, 1996, pp. 98-99)

Payne had three major criticisms of the New Lefts's "participatory democracy as a substitute for traditional American political practices," First, he admitted the "great attractiveness" of the participatory democracy operating in Mississippi: "It is exciting to see people deeply involved in political activity, meeting together to discuss common problems, and making decision as a group rather than delegating their authority to representatives." But he warned SNCCers against the dangers that "participatory democracy can only be maintained on the basis of continuing crisis" and that "without such a condition no institutions can be designed that can maintain the intensity necessary to support them, "—" the very intensity of this sort of political organization, demanding whole-hearted commitment and much time and emotion, makes it particularly unstable. If oppression is deeply felt, a common enemy may maintain the intensity and keep the group together, but a recurrent state of crisis is usually necessary. " (Payne, 1966, pp. 90, 100) Payne' s first objection to participatory democracy was based on the following assumption:

> Involved in this objection is an assumption that making political decision is unlikely to be a sufficiently absorbing activity to maintain the support of large numbers of people over long periods of time. SNCC is right in assuming that most poor people have a pretty good idea of some of the things they want, but whether they are willing to work out the means to achieve their ends is another matter altogether, especially if it becomes apparent that they can be assisted by people more knowledgeable and experienced than themselves.

> Most people at most times are willing to delegate authority to someone who, they believe, shares their views, and who is competent at putting them into practice. The fact that we have often had irresponsible political leadership is not necessarily an adequate reason for attacking the idea of leadership itself. (Payne, 1966, p. 100)

Payne's second objection to participatory democracy was more simple: "Participatory democracy offers no solution to the major problems of governing a large country, state, or even a large city." it is, in short, "no solution for the problems of a large, complex society" —"Many problems undoubtedly admit of subdivision. But some … must be solved at a larger level. Democratic assemblies are particularly ill-equipped to receive and utilize complex information in an efficient or even useful way." (Payne, 1966, p. 100) But the third was Payne's "most serious quarrel with SNCC's notion of democracy." It was that participatory democracy "does not combine well with freedom or with a broader sense of fraternity."

Primitive societies, tribal organizations, religious communities, and various other associations provide us with numerous examples of similar systems at work. And among those groups practicing some form of participatory democracy, the common denominator seems to be a high degree of agreement on money issues, and a hostility to unorthodox opinions. Socrates was, after all, condemned by a vote of the Athenian assembly. (Payne, 1966, p. 100)

Payne was, in fact, a Jeffersonian rather than ultra-Jeffersonian democrat; what he really objected to was ultra-Jeffersonian rather than Jeffersonian participatory democracy. In Payne's own word: "I do not doubt that political participation by more citizens would provide a better support for civil liberties, but not by means of the equal participation of all in the decision-making process," … "My fear is that the new left may be wrong in some of the changes it seeks in the social order, and in some of the methods it uses to achieve them," and "My own hopes center around the attempts to restore state and local politics, developing more political participation and responsive political leadership at all levels." (Payne, 1966, pp. 101-2) Payne's hope was essentially to restore Jeffersonian participatory

democracy, though he himself might not know the Jeffersonian character of what he hoped for.

So far I have more than once referred to Jeffersonian/ultra-Jeffersonian participatory democracy without defining either of them. It is absolutely necessary to review Jefferson's own ideas of participatory democracy for the sake of clarity. But I prefer to postpone this review until I have finished my examination of the ultra-Jeffersonian support for SNCC's black New Left Movement in the South from SDS, which, in its formative years and especially during its community organizing phase, was known as "a northern counterpart, or northern parallel, of SNCC." (Bacciocco, 1974, p. 110) It is to SDS's parallel ultra-Jeffersonian New Left Movement in the Norht that we shall turn.

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「學生民主會」在美國北方的初期極端傑佛遜式實踐主義及「學生非暴力協調委員會」在國南方的傑佛遜／極端傑佛遜式新左派運動

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本文為關於早期美國新左派與美國民主傳統之間關係的一系列論文之第四偏。本篇雖同時討論「學生民主會」在美國北方的初期極端傑佛遜式實踐主義及「學生非暴力協調委員會」在國南方的傑佛遜／極端傑佛遜式新左派運動，但大部分內容均涉及後者而非前者。

在全篇五部份中，僅第一部份敘述與分析「學生民主會」初期對新廢奴主義者極端傑佛遜式民權運動的一班特殊支持。此種之詞一部份固然是由於直接受該運動的刺激而行程，一部份也是因為間接受到美國極端傑佛遜式自由與平等傳統的影響而產生。

本文第二部份首先分析「學生非暴力協調委員會」在民主目的方面的激化：由傑佛遜式的〈法律〉平等激化成極端傑佛遜式的〈政治、社會與經濟〉平等。然後再分析其在民主方法方面的添新：在舊的極端傑佛遜式民主方法〈非暴力直接行動或群眾之集體拒絕守法〉之外，增加了另一種新的極端傑佛遜式民主方法〈無限制的參與性民主〉。這兩種形成的民主方法一度在該會內部兩派系的支持者之間造成緊張關係。

本文第三與第四部份分別敘述「學生非暴力協調委員會」實踐參與式民主政治之兩種不同方式：(一) 傑佛遜式的實踐方式：其形式表現在南方，特別是在密西西比州的投票登記運動，其目的在於從密州政治體系的內部改良該州的反傑佛遜式民主，以鼓勵成年黑人實際上行使其投票的政治渠力；(二)極端傑佛遜式的實踐方式：其形式表現為一九六四年的密西西比暑季計畫，該計畫包括建立社區中心及自由學校，兩者的

目的均在於促使黑人平等參與及不需領導及官僚的另一制度。

本文最後部份為從不同角度評估「學生非暴力協調委員會」極端傑佛遜式實踐參與民主的努力：在各種評估中，包括對其在邊緣上獲得成功之推崇及對其在核心遭致失敗之批評。