

House Party Leadership Selection, 1959-1994

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The main assumption of this paper is that U.S. House leadership selection reflects the preferences of party members, therefore the comparison between winning and defeated candidates reveals how party members shape party organizations. The analysis of House leadership selection from 1959 to 1994 shows significant that apprenticeship in the leadership ladder plays a role in the Democratic Party, and committee experience matters more in the Republican Party. Geographical considerations, south and non-south remain strong across both parties. The difference in party leadership selection can be explained by the fact that Democrats were the majority party in this period.

Keywords : party leader, committee assignment, apprenticeship, geographical consideration

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1. Introduction

The debate over the role of political parties in the United States Congress is one of the fascinating topics in American politics. Past research analyzed political parties in party reform (e.g. Rohde, 1991), committee assignment (e.g. Shepsle, 1978; Cox and McCubbins, 1993), and roll-call votes (e.g. Smith, 1989). It is found that committees, the counterpart of party organizations, directed the legislation before the 1975 party reform. After 1975, party organizations, took over committee assignment, roll call voting, and agenda setting. The characteristic of party organizations, however, is not adequately studied. Aldrich (1995) contended that party members formed congressional parties to overcome collective action and social choice problems. The political party was created to further the politicians' goals and ambitions, so it is an "endogenous institution." (p. 4) Nevertheless, the understanding of party organizations would not be complete without basic knowledge of the selection of party leadership.

The main assumption of this paper is that House leadership selection is by the preferences of party members. The contrast between winning and defeated candidates will reveal how party members shape party organizations. It is dangerous for a study to rest on a single untested assumption. Strategic voting, for instance, may account for electoral outcomes. Party members may not waste their vote for candidates unlikely to win, so the winning candidate may not represent what type of leadership that party members look for. On the other hand, politicians may not jump into a campaign with only a tiny hope for victory. Candidates would represent one portion of party members, but they will strategically enter into the leadership selection. Therefore, the inference from electoral outcomes would be problematic. Since there is no better way to erase

the possibility of strategic voting and entry, this paper is to explore what kind of characteristics of leaders are required by party members. Intuitively, party members may look for someone of strong ideology who can symbolize the party and withstand the opponent party. When Joseph Martin was running his first-term party leader, for instance, one of his supporters said he was not running for a party leader but as a "symbol" of Republicans (Bacon, Davidson, and Keller, 1995:1356). Or, members may prefer to a committee chairman because the chairmanship is usually the equivalent of influence. Thus, observing House leadership selection can help us understand House leadership and party organization.

In this study, I will investigate House leadership selection from 1959 to 1994. The result will show that apprenticeship in the leadership ladder plays a large role in the Democratic Party, but committee experiences is more important to the Republican Party. Geographical considerations remain strong across both parties. The contrast between the two parties can be explained by the fact that Democrats were the majority party in this period.

2. Institutionalization of Party Leadership

Majority leaders were identified as substantial leaders in the House around 1899 (Ripley, 1969). Subsequently, both parties developed their party organizations to strengthen the power of party leaders in the early twentieth century. Before 1960, the two parties merely had policy committees and whips under party leaders. In 1967, Democrats added the Steering Committee, which emphasized policymaking, to party organizations. In 1968, both two parties set up several policy committees and allowed whips to appoint officers, including chief deputy whip, deputy whips and regional whips. Leadership circle

contained various party committees and stratified whips, building coalitions engaged in every piece of legislation¹. Party leadership went to the committee chairs after the revolt of 1910, as due to resentment toward Speaker Reed's iron-fisted leadership style. At the beginning of the 94th Congress, however, the Democratic Study Group urged the caucus to vest committee assignment power in the Steering and Policy Committee chaired and assigned by the floor leader (Rohde, 1991). Since then, party leadership has been firmly rested in the leadership circle. Party leaders thus took over the power of committee assignment and legislation scheduling, even though the members do not necessary vote along with party lines (Krehbiel, 1993). By now, it is beyond question that party leaders represent the congressional parties and direct the House, which is increasingly partisan. (Rohde, 1991:51)

To observe the development of House leadership, students of legislative behavior examined the context and the individual factors of party leadership (Jones, 1981; Sinclair, 1983). Ripley categorized the context as types of majority, presidential-bipartisan, presidential-partisan, congressional, and truncated majority, and he analyzed the role of majority party leaders in these four contexts (Ripley, 1969). Polsby (1968) and Canon (1989) measured the boundary, complexity, and universalistic practices of party organizations and argued that congressional parties have moved toward greater institutionalization. The evidence of the institutionalization includes: seniority system being accepted since the early twentieth century (Polsby, 1968:165), and succession at top level being highly structured (Canon, 1989:301). Cooper and Brady (1981) noticed the interaction between context and leaders and made a strong case for it.

1. For further introduction of party leadership, see Peabody (1984) review of contemporary research on leadership.

They discussed the transition of leadership style from Speaker Cannon to Rayburn, identifying party strength measured by levels of party voting as the crucial context of House leadership, which arguably accounts for the transition of leadership styles.

Although there have been several studies devoted to the role of party leadership in the House of Representatives, the study of party leadership selection has been little more than narrative chronology. Researchers described leadership elections but did not tend to generalize their findings. Polsby (1969) observed the contest of party leader in 1962 through interviewing the candidates, Carl Albert and Richard Bolling, and the representatives involved in the contest. He found that Albert and Bolling had different constituents and strategies. Albert had a broader base inside the House than Bolling did, but Bolling had more support from outside the House. Polsby argued that the different magnitude and characteristic of inside and outside support determine the result of election. Peabody (1976) reviewed several contests for leadership from the 1950s to the 1970s. Not only did he attempt to discover the manner of leadership, but also he intended to answer the question: How and why did the leadership change occur. He concludes that the pattern of leadership selection is in continuity and the underlying characteristics of the contests are well connected with party structure and election result. Brown and Peabody (1992) had done an extensive case study of the Democratic Party leadership election in 1986 and they found that campaign money, regional characteristics, campaign strategy, and incumbency account for the outcome. They asserted that contests for leadership posts are among the most fiercely fought conflicts in Congress in spite of their low visibility” (Brown and Peabody, 1992:323). The studies above pictured the campaign strategy of the candidates that corresponded to the environment at that time, and also explained voting preference of the

representatives under the scenario. The underlying determinants of party leadership selections, however, have not been analyzed systematically because of limited observations. Even though Peabody (1976) suggested the factors influencing leadership selection, we still do not know exactly which type of representative will receive most of support to be elected as the Speaker, floor leader, or whip.

Unlike the case studies above, Sullivan's research design (1975) is well set up to reveal the characteristics of majority and minority party leaders in the House and the Senate from 1955 to 1973. He tried to utilize party unity and conservative coalition opposition to characterize the winning candidates in leader contests, but he did not find any significant relationship between the two characteristics of the candidates and election outcome. Therefore, he concludes that ideology and party support are not the relevant criteria of leadership selection.

In this study, I intend to derive the determinants of House party leadership selection by comparing the characteristics of the winning candidates with the defeated ones. This study rests on the premise that there is a pervasive criterion in party leadership selection in the House directing members' vote choice. Presumably, the criterion may be the candidates' ideology, region, seniority, party support, or office experience. Electoral outcome is assumed to reflect the members' preference, therefore the determinant of party leadership selection, say, ideology, would imply what party leadership means to the representatives. Aggregate data across thirty years (1959-1994, 85th-104th Congress) are to be used to investigate the general characteristic of House party leadership election.

The premise implicitly used by previous researches is that context dictates who runs for the position and who can win, so the preconditions for each new leadership would be more influential than aggregate preference. For example,

Seligman contended that: "Leaders are always, covertly or overtly, 'preselected' by their supporters according to the situational needs of the groups." (cited Jones, 1981: 119) Polsby (1969) and Peabody (1976) depicted the scenario of several party leadership elections in detail, but they left the readers wondering what the key point affecting every election is. Certainly, many variables need to be controlled for as we investigate aggregate-level data, but over-emphasis on the individual settings for every campaign will render a general pattern unattainable. Theoretically, it is impossible to derive any strong inference from the bivariate analysis of this kind using a small population of votes and limited control for environmental factors. The findings from the bivariate analysis can at last show the association between the factors and electoral outcome, and they could lead to a promising theoretical ground for more observations in the future.

3. Selection of Party Leaders

The popular treatment of congressional leadership covers the party leaders and committee leaders (Hinckley, 1970). In this study, however, I will simply deal with the party leaders. In 1975, the Democratic caucus adopted party reform and rejected committee leaders' influence in the House.² Moreover, the characteristics of committee and party leaders, according to Hinckley's analysis, are similar. She points out that the leaders of the two subsystems, party organizations and committees, may differ on ideology but they resemble each

2. Rohde (1991) gives a detailed description and evaluation of the party reform in 1975 in his book, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. According to his observations, party leaders can impose restrictive rules on the floor or broaden the amending power to reach budget resolution or reconciliation. On the other hand, Smith (1989) presents how the change of legislative procedure in terms of amendment inhibits the influence of the standing committees. Through using amendments, it is clear that party leaders can wield their power in order to govern floor consideration, which may not be consistent with major decision in committees.

other in regional characters. More importantly, they have similar career patterns prior to the leadership positions and they clinch the positions in the same environment, the presence of a stable selection process. She concludes that: “party and committee leaders have grown up together congressionally speaking.” (Hinckley, 1970: 285) Here I leave committee leaders aside and focus on party leaders alone.

According to the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report and Nelson (1977), the party leadership circle covers the Speaker, floor leaders, whip organization, the Democratic Caucus (or Republican Conference), the Policy and Steering Committee (or GOP's Committee on Committee), the National Democratic (or Republican) Congressional Committee, and the Campaign Committee. In this study, I will restrict the scope of the party machinery to the Speaker, floor leaders, and whips. Since the last century, the caucus elects the three important offices of party leadership except Democratic whip, which was appointive until 1987. In most elections members cast the ballots to choose the leaders, but sometimes members reach consensus so they proclaim the leaders rather than voting or candidates withdraw from contests, so the winning candidates run unopposed elections³. Having seats in the Policy and Steering Committee or Committee on Committee, floor leaders control committee assignment and policy making substantially. Although several party organizations handle various duties, the top three position are authorized by the caucus to lead the House of Representatives. In this sense, the main focus of this study is on the high rung of the leadership circle.

Note that the two parties have different points of view regarding the

3. In the 1962 majority leader contest, Richard Bolling announced his withdrew one week before the caucus meeting. In 1973, Samuel Gibbons gave up his campaign after he learned that he had no chance to win over Thomas O'Neil. Also, Leslie Arends gave up his bid for the minority leader.

importance of whips. Members at the Republican Conference elect the whip, but the Democratic Caucus did not do so until 1987. Ironically, Democratic whips often moved up to the positions of party leader and Speaker, so the appointment of the position resulted in keen intraparty competition. For example, shortly after 1972's contest in which Thomas O'Neill defeated Samuel Gibbons and grabbed the office of floor leader, John McFall, John Brademas, and even Gibbons, campaigned for the appointive whip (Peabody, 1976: 251-256). O'Neill, who was chosen by Hale Boggs, picked McFall eventually, but Wright defeated McFall's bid for majority leader overwhelmingly four years later. On the other hand, the leadership ladder in the Republican Party was not as pervasive a norm as in the Democratic Party. Leslie Arends remained Republican whip instead of handing it to the former Majority Leader Charles Halleck when the Republicans lost their majority in the House in 1955. Gerald Ford challenged Halleck in 1965 and Newt Gingrich succeeded Richard Cheney in 1989 without serving as whip before. It is fairly certain that, however, whip is the post second to Speaker and floor leader ever since it was established. Speaker Champ Clark called the whips "the right hands of the two leaders." (cited Ripley, 1964: 562)⁴

4. Six Hypothesis

In their extensive research on several leadership elections, Polsby (1969) and Peabody (1976) suggest campaign strategy and individual factors, such as leadership style, seniority, and committee assignment, are crucial to the election outcome. Sullivan (1975) assumed that party unity and conservative coalition opposition would play a role in elections but found no significant relationship

4. On the development of party whip organizations, see Ripley (1964).

between them and election outcome. Here I will retest Sullivan's hypothesis and incorporate the factors mentioned by Polsby and Peabody in the following six hypotheses.

Seniority Hypothesis: Given that the seniority system has operated in Congress for a long time, it affects leadership selection as well. In the early postwar House, seniority is often the equivalent of chairmanship in the standing committees (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). Although seniority does not guarantee influence any more after the party reform, seniority still stands for long service, which is perceived as one of the requirements for being a party leader. For example, David Bonior rolled over Steny Hoyer partly because Hoyer was less senior than Bonior by four years (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1991: 1875). It is understandable, therefore, to assume that *the winning candidates are more senior than the defeated ones*.

Loyalty Hypothesis: Party leaders shoulder the responsibility of aligning each elements of the congressional parties and they are expected to steer the House on behalf of the congressional parties (Sullivan, 1975), thus the winning candidates may be required to show stronger commitment to the parties. The hypothesis is that *the winning candidates have higher party support score than do the defeated candidates*.

Ideology Hypothesis: In July 1989, Gingrich succeeded to Richard Cheney, as whip who was chosen as Secretary of Defense. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report analyzed Gingrich's victory and claimed it as a message that "minority majority wants more activism, less accommodation." (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1989:625). Although conventional wisdom states that ideology has an enormous impact on the behavior of legislators, the role of ideology in House leadership selection may vary with the external environment. For example, the party may need a moderate leader when a highly popular

president gets elected because such a president is likely to make many recommendations to Congress (Ripley, 1969:12). When the party receives high turnover in the mid-term election, however, a partisan leader may be desirable to avoid possible collapse of the party coalition. Since the party has different expectations on the leader's stand in various external settings, the members are likely to choose the candidates with moderate ideology as regards the whole party. Here my primary proposition is that *the winning candidates will be closer to the mean ideology of members than their opponents are*. The small population of candidates is not sufficient to add controls to the hypothesis; however, for the completeness of analysis, I control for the composition of the two branches of government and net gains or loss of Democrats' seats to see the effect of the two environmental variables. Details are given at Appendix B.

Regional Consideration Hypothesis: Due to the intense civil rights issue, the Southern representatives always acquire representation in the leadership circle. Although one-party politics in the South has gradually diminished since the 1970s, Southern delegates remain influential in every contest for leadership. In other words, regional factor is a strong predictor of leadership selection. "Southerners are the best politicians around here" (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1971: 176). Even in the Republican Party, region could be a key factor. In 1989's election, Edward Madigan was handicapped by having his regional characteristics same as the Minority Leader, Robert Michel (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1989:625). In this sense, I assume that *Southern candidates should win more elections than non-Southern candidates do*. The regional characteristic of the leadership team is posited to have impact on leadership selection as well. Representatives may not like to see either overrepresentation or under-representation, therefore they may deliberately balance the composition of the party leadership team. When there has been a

party leader from the south, for instance, the members tend to pick a non-Southern candidate to fill in the other post. For this reason, I proposed that *there should be a significant association between the two groups of candidates and the composition of the leadership team.*

Apprenticeship Hypothesis: The party machinery provides an arena for the members to practice their leadership skills and coalition-building, apprenticeship is regarded as both commitment and contribution so to the party, people who are already in the low rung of the leadership team may have a better chance to win the leadership contest. As matter of fact, it is rare that party leaders are ousted once they have entered the leadership team, although there have been few exceptions. For example, McFall was defeated by Wright as McFall attempted to move up to party leader from whip. Because of the reasons of ability and commitment criteria, therefore, apprenticeship should to be an important characteristic of the winning candidates. I proposed that *the winning candidates are more likely from the leadership ladder than are their opponents.*

Committee Assignment Hypothesis: Presumably, committee assignment represents the influence of the representatives. Only a small number of representatives can join the three exclusive committees: Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Rules. Because those three committees are directly involved in budget and legislation schedule, members in the three committees cannot serve in any other committee. Not surprisingly, in the first session of every new Congress, the three exclusive committees receive a significant fraction of transfer requests from freshmen and non-freshmen members (Cox and McCubbins, 1993:39). According to Shepsle's research, freshmen can only obtain these posts with the sponsorship by the Speaker or a majority coalition in the party caucus; (Shepsle, 1978: 232). Cox and McCubbins also noted the importance of party loyalty regarding the exclusive committees. It is reasonable

to assume that those members in these three committees are more qualified for party leadership than others. For instance, Richard Gephardt and William Gray were assigned to the Ways and Means and the Appropriations Committees early in their careers, only a few years before their appearance in the leadership ladder. When Ford defeated Halleck in 1965's minority leader election, he resigned as ranking member in the Appropriations Committee because the conference just voted to prohibit a member from serving on a legislative committee and in a leadership position. John Rhodes, who also joined the leadership team very soon, succeeded Ford's position. Because the Republicans put more members on the three committees instead of allowing party leaders to serve on the committees, I proposed that *the members with the exclusive committee assignment would be likely to win leadership election, particularly within the Republican Party.*

These six hypotheses will be tested by simple independent samples test and tabular analysis. Without control for other variables constant, the evidence presented here may not entirely sustain the six hypotheses, yet the findings are promising and replicable.

5. Data and Variables

Data to the fact that Samuel Rayburn and Joseph Martin switched over between minority party leader and the Speaker from 1937 to 1953, this study does not begin until 1959, when Halleck ousted Martin by four votes in the floor leader election. Furthermore, because there was no score reported by interest groups on member's ideology and party unity after 1994, campaigns after 1994 are not included. There are 22 campaigns, 19 actual votes, and 51 cases. The unit of analysis is the candidate, thus one name may show up in the data set more than one time. The details of each election are given in Appendix C.

Operationalization of Variables

Committee: Serving in the three exclusive committees before party leader election, will be coded 1, 0 otherwise.

Apprenticeship: I follow up with Peabody's (1976) definition of party leadership. For the Democratic Party, the five major leadership positions are the Speaker, majority leader, majority whip, chairman of the Democratic Caucus, and chairman of the Democratic national Congressional Campaign Committee. For the Republican Party, the five party positions are leader, whip, chairman of the Republican Conference, chairman of the Republican Policy Committee and chairman of the Republican National Congressional Campaign Committee. The candidate served for one of the ten party positions before the contest will be coded 1, otherwise 0⁵.

Region: According to the conventional four-part scheme, South includes Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. The candidate whose district is in one of the states will be coded as 0, 1 otherwise.

Seniority: Seniority means the length of time in House. To obtain the variable, I simply subtract the year when the candidates run for the contest from the year when the candidates entered the House⁶.

Loyalty: Congressional Quarterly's "party unity" scores were used. "party unity" scores are based on the number of times a congressman voted in agreement with a majority of his own party.

5. It must be arguable to apply this decision rule to pre-reform House because of the vast power of chairmen of the standing committees. I ran the analysis separately for both two groups of pre-reform and post-reform contests, but I found no difference.

6. In Sullivan's (1975) research, he used the breakdown of seniority rank reported by Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Here I use the year in the House rather than the seniority rank to tap into the length of time that the candidates serve in the House.

Ideology: I utilize Congressional Quarterly's scores based on the percentage of times a congressman supported the Conservative Coalition on roll calls. Also, I collected the mean score of the Conservative Coalition within the two parties, which are subtracted from the candidates' scores. The result of this calculation will be used as the indicators of the relative distance of the candidates' ideology and their own party.

6. Findings and Analysis

Seniority Hypothesis: Figure 1 clearly shows that there is no significant difference between the winning candidates and the defeated candidates in terms of seniority. The Democratic winning candidates are usually more senior than their opponents, but that is not the case for the Republicans. The Republican winning candidates are almost as senior as their opponents, while the Democratic winning candidates are on average more senior than their opponents by four years. This confirms Hinckley's finding that Republican candidates for party leadership came from the same senior stratum (Hinckley, 1970).

Loyalty Hypothesis: Figure 2 illustrates that the winning candidates of both parties have higher party unity scores than the defeated ones have. The difference, which is around 5 points, is not statistically significant.

Ideology Hypothesis: To test the ideology hypothesis, I calculate the difference between candidates' ideology score and the party's average ideology score, then comparing the difference for the two groups of candidates. For Democrats, the average difference between the two groups is about eight points. The winning candidates are closer to the mean ideology point of members, but the relative distance is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the winning Republicans are very similar to the defeated ones in terms of the distance between the candidates' ideology and members' ideology. The result

indicates that in both parties all of the candidates share the similar ideology.

Up to this point, the three criteria can be rejected as the governing principle of House leadership selection. The winning and defeated candidates do not differ on the party unity and ideology. A likely explanation for the finding would be that both parties do not intentionally recruit the maverick as party leader. On the other hand, party organization is conceived of “strategy of inclusion.” (Sinclair, 1983: 134-147) Rohde (1991) also found that Southern appointee whips have greater party unity score than the other Southern delegates. It indicates that party members are likely to be ideologically moderate once they decide to run for the leadership.

Neither is Seniority an important factor because most candidates would not enter a leadership contest without resource or credit. From this angle, seniority is important because it plays as a filter. Therefore, seniority may decide whether or not members put their names on the ballot, but it is not shown in the empirical data.

Geographical Consideration Hypothesis: The route to leadership, indeed, includes consideration of party ladder, region, and committee position. I use the cross-tabulation analysis to display the association between the candidates and their geographical characteristics. According to my hypotheses, geographical consideration is crucial to leadership selection, so there would be geographical bias between the two groups. Table 1 supports my proposition. For the Democratic Party, there were eight winning candidates from non-South area, but four from the South. It indicates that the Southern Democrats strongly control the leadership team. Actually, only two Democratic leadership teams after 1960 did not recruit any Southerner⁷. One third of Southern delegates won the

7. The two teams were Speaker Foley, leader Gephardt, and whip William Gray and his successor, David Bonior. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report noted the composition problem and commented that it was gap Foley is under pressure to fill in some way. (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1989: 1445)

contest, but only forty percent of non-South delegates succeeded in elections. Geographical considerations affects the Republican Party in a significant way. One-third candidates from the non-South area won leadership election, but four of five candidates from the South survived in party leadership selection. This implies that Southern Republicans are more likely to win than Southern Democrats are.

Table 1. Region by Candidate

	Democrats		
Region	Winning	Defeated	Total
South	4 (33.3)	8 (66.7)	12 (100)
Non-South	8 (42.1)	11 (57.9)	19 (100)
	Republicans		
Region	Winning	Defeated	Total
South	4 (80.0)	1 (20.0)	5 (100)
Non-South	5 (33.3)	10 (66.6)	15 (100)

The row percentages are in parentheses.

To examine the possible intervening effect of the composition of the leadership team, I control for the geographical characteristics of the other leaders (floor leader or whip) in the team. Table 2 did not present any significant relationship between candidates and their regions when the composition of the team is controlled. When the Democratic Party has a leader from the South, only one-third of Southern candidates wins. When one of the Republican Party leaders is from the South, on the contrary, only one-third of Southern Republican candidates loses. This suggests that Republicans take geographical considerations into account as well as Democrats do, but

Democrats pay more attention to balance the regional representation in the leadership teams. Therefore we may see all-South or all-non-South leadership team in the Republican Party. After the 1980s, actually, many Southern Republican leaders, such as Lott (Mississippi) Gingrich (Georgia), Armev (Texas), and DeLay (Texas), appeared in the leadership team. The Southern Democrats, on the other hand, spread out across the different period. For instance, Albert (Oklahoma) served from the 1950s to the 1960s, and Wright (Texas) from the 1970s to the 1980s.

Table 2. Region by Candidate, Controlling for the Composition of Party Leadership

Composition	Candidate Region	Democrats		
		Winning	Defeated	Total
South	South	2 (33.3)	4 (66.7)	6 (100)
	Non-South	2 (40.0)	3 (60.0)	5 (100)
Non-South	South	4 (66.7)	2 (33.3)	6 (100)
	Non-South	8 (57.1)	6 (42.9)	14 (100)
		Republicans		
		Winning	Defeated	Total
South	South	4 (66.7)	2 (33.3)	6 (100)
	Non-South	--	--	--
Non-South	South	1 (20.0)	4 (80.0)	5 (100)
	Non-South	6 (66.6)	3 (33.3)	9(100)

The row percentages are in parentheses.

Apprenticeship Hypothesis: Unlike the characteristics above, leadership experience strongly correlates with election result. For the Democratic Party, ten of fifteen candidates with previous service in the leadership team won, but fifteen of seventeen candidates without previous expertise lost. On the

contrary, only half of Republican candidates with apprenticeship succeed in their attempt to climb into the party ladder. Moreover, thirty percent of Republican candidates (6/20) were from outside the leadership team, but nearly fifty-five percent of Democratic candidates (17/31) had no previous apprenticeship. This implies that Democrats are more interested in party organizations based on party leadership, considering whip was appointed until the 1980s. The finding reinforces the finding that Democrats emphasize earlier leadership position more than Republicans do.

Table 3. Apprenticeship by Candidate

	Democrats		
Apprenticeship	Winning	Defeated	Total
Non-apprentice	2 (11.8)	15 (88.2)	17 (100)
Apprentice	10 (71.4)	4 (28.8)	14 (100)
	Republicans		
Apprenticeship	Winning	Defeated	Total
Non-apprentice	2 (33.3)	4 (66.7)	6 (100)
Apprentice	7 (50.0)	7 (50.0)	14 (100)

The row percentages are in parentheses.

Committee Assignment Hypothesis: The requirements for the exclusive committees are high party loyalty and interest. For Republicans, however, party loyalty and interest may not be the only two thresholds because their long-standing minority status forced them to fit potential members in the scanty few exclusive committee positions for future party leadership. In other words, Republicans may view the exclusive committees as the prerequisite for party

leadership so that candidates with those committee assignment have more credits than their opponents. For instance, John Rhodes, Robert Michel and Trent Lott were assigned to the Appropriations and the Rules Committee before they became deputy whips. Their opponents, on the other hand, were not assigned to those advantageous positions. Therefore, I expect to see the exclusive committee assignment strongly associated with electoral outcome for Republicans. Table 4 shows that within Republicans three of eleven non-exclusive committee members won their elections, but six of eight exclusive committee members entered into the leadership team. Not surprisingly, the association between committee assignment and election outcome is statistically significant.

Table 4. Committee Assignment by Candidate

	Republicans		
Committee	Winning	Defeated	Total
Non-Exclusive	5 (31.3)	11 (68.8)	16 (100)
Exclusive	6 (42.9)	8 (57.1)	14 (100)
	Democrats		
Committee	Winning	Defeated	Total
Non-Exclusive	3 (27.3)	8 (72.7)	11 (100)
Exclusive	6 (75.0)	2 (25.0)	8 (100)

The row percentages are in parentheses.

For the Democrats, committee assignment plays a modest role in leadership selection, because the exclusive committee positions are not scarce. Table 4 shows that six of fourteen candidates with apprenticeship in the exclusive committees were elected, but five of sixteen leader hopefuls without exclusive committee position won election as well. For Democrats, obviously, exclusive committee positions

do not guarantee further promotion because the position is not as rare a resource as party leadership. Therefore, exclusive committee position is a less important factor in party leadership selection. Members not from the exclusive committees may win the leadership due to their service in the low rung of leadership team. For example, Albert and Wright, who were never assigned to any exclusive committees, had been whip and deputy whip respectively before they won the higher office. Therefore, it might be fair to contend that committee assignment is less critical for Democrats who vie for party leadership.

The result above shows distinct governing rules for the two parties. Democrats emphasize apprenticeship in the leadership ladder but Republicans committee leadership. My finding confirmed Peabody's (1976) conclusion: "House Democrats developed a pattern of harmonious succession from floor leader to Speaker, but Republican leadership have been opened to members in different areas." Why do the two parties adopt different rule? Or, do the two parties have different strategy to build up their party organizations? Rohde's (1991) contextual perspective argues that in the 1970s the Democratic members wanted the leaders to be strong, so they changed the rule to give more power to party leaders while weakening the committees. Parallel situations were later happened to Republicans. Republicans felt the need to fight against the homogeneity of Democrats, so they began to empower the leadership team. In this case, preference of members is determined by environmental change. For instance, Northern and Southern Democrats ideologically converged, leading to successful party reform. Also, the minority status may contribute to Republicans' emphasis on the exclusive committees rather than establishment of strong party organizations. (Jones, 1970) More observations are warranted, though. Perhaps it would be a good opportunity to investigate the importance of minority status by observing the pattern of Democratic leadership selection, after Democrats'

majority status was taken by the Republicans in 1994.

7. Summary and Discussion

This study tries to answer the question: What are the characteristics of congressional party leadership? I find that the Democratic party leaders had more apprenticeship in the leadership ladder than committee leadership, but the Republican party leaders were selected from the exclusive committees. The composition of the leadership team always adjusts to environment, so that the considerations of ideology, party unity, seniority are far from the norm of leadership selection. Geographical representation remains critical to House leadership selection, however. Southern delegates receive over-representation in the Republican Party. Although their voices are not so loud in the Democratic leadership circle, geographical balance is in order with Democrats. Those demographic factors, however, are not statistically significant. It is demonstrated that prior experiences in committee and party ladder are emphasized by Republicans and Democrats respectively. Republicans, favor the candidates from the exclusive committees, and Democrats tend to elect the candidates with previous service in the leadership team. The generalization drawn from these data and analysis is tentative, of course, because more environmental factors need to be controlled for.

It is asserted that incumbents has a variety of resources to withstood challenges (Peabody, 1976). This study supports the conventional wisdom and provides empirical evidences. Additionally, Sullivan's (1975) argument was supported; ideology and party loyalty are not utilized in leadership selection. The two governing rules, committee assignment and leadership ladder, imply that party leadership is not only the instrument to obtain public good or

collective action, but also the reward for ambitious elites. Aldrich (1995:21) claims that: Just as winning elections is a means to other ends for politicians (whether career of policy ends), so too is the political party a means to these other ends.” Only when elites are motivated to run for party leadership, the leadership team can bind the representatives and approach the ideal of “party government”.

This study also provides an opportunity to reconsider the research on legislative leadership. Jones (1981:118) argues that: “The key to understanding legislative leadership lies in the membership, not in the leaders. Leadership is generally acknowledged to be an interactive phenomenon between leaders and followers.” My finding indicates that both Democrats and Republicans favor Southern leaders and emphasize the apprenticeship and committee experience respectively, but I have not dealt with the interaction between leaders and party members. Moreover, more information about leadership could be added to the data in the future. For example, the ability of collecting campaign money should have an impact on the election. This field of research has started from the description of leadership change and selection, and it should move on to the stage of modeling the probability of winning election.

Appendix A

Data Sources

Committee assignment: Committees in the U.S. Congress, 1947-1992 . Garrison Nelson with Clark H. Bensen, eds. Washington, D.C. : Congressional Quarterly.

Conservative coalition support and party unity scores: Directory of Congressional Voting Scores and Interest Group Ratings. J. Michael Sharp (ed.), Washington, D.C. : Congressional Quarterly, 1997.

Party leadership: Congressional Quarterly Almanac and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, various issues.

Seniority: Committees in the U.S. Congress, 1947-1992. Garrison Nelson with Clark H. Bensen, eds. Washington, D.C. : Congressional Quarterly.

Congressional election outcome: Congressional Elections, 1946-1996. Washington, D.C. : Congressional Quarterly, 1998.

Appendix B

Impact of Ideology and Party Unity

To see if the impact of ideology and party unity vary under different settings, I present Table B-1 and Table B-2 to examine if two groups of candidates differ on ideology and party unity when controlling for the composition of the legislative and executive branches, and net loss of Democratic seats. Because Republicans are always the minority in the House until 1994, so they may need a strong party leader in unified government to support their president. On the other hand, Democrats may not need any specific party leader to deal with divided or unified government. Regarding net loss of Democratic seats, I proposed that the members would expect a leader with high party unity and strong ideology to retain their parties after they lose seats.

Table B-1. Mean Scores of Party Unity and Conservative Coalition Support for Candidates by Party and Government

		Candidate	
		Winning	Defeated
United-Democrats	Party Unity	73.5	70.4
	Conservative Support	43.0	42.8
	Weighted-Party Unity	1.1	1.0
	Weighted-Conservative Support	0.5	0.6
Divided-Democrats	Party Unity	87.4	72.8
	Conservative Support	34.8	37.3
	Weighted Party Unity	1.1	0.9
	Weighted Conservative Support	0.8	1.6
United-Republicans	Party Unity	82.2	72.8
	Conservative Support	70.5	71.0
	Weighted Party Unity	1.1	1.0
	Weighted Conservative Support	1.1	1.0
Divided-Republicans	Party Unity	82.0	80.4
	Conservative Support	72.4	72.5
	Weighted Party Unity	1.1	1.0
	Weighted Conservative Support	1.1	0.9

Table B-1 shows that in unified government, Republicans opt for a leader with high party attachment. In divided government, however, Democrats tend to elect someone with high party unity scores. Ideology did not matter with the presidential party.

Table B-2. Mean Scores of Party Unity and Conservative Coalition Support for Candidates by Party and Net Loss of Democratic Seats

		Candidate	
		Winning	Defeated
Win-Democrats	Party Unity	82.6	75.6
	Conservative Support	37.2	43.1
	Weighted-Party Unity	1.1	1.1
	Weighted-Conservative Support	0.7	0.6
Lose-Democrats	Party Unity	82.9	70.2
	Conservative Support	37.6	37.6
	Weighted Party Unity	1.1	0.9
	Weighted Conservative Support	0.7	1.5
Win-Republicans	Party Unity	82.3	66.8
	Conservative Support	69.0	69.5
	Weighted Party Unity	1.2	0.9
	Weighted Conservative Support	1.1	0.9
Lose-Republicans	Party Unity	82.0	84.4
	Conservative Support	74.0	74.0
	Weighted Party Unity	1.0	1.0
	Weighted Conservative Support	1.1	1.1

Table B-2 indicates that no matter what the outcome of congressional election is, Democrats want a leader who can align every element of the party. Interestingly, Democratic leader may be more ideological when they win election. On the other hand, Republicans demand a leader with high party attachment when they lose election (or Democrats did not lose seats), but they do not need that much when they lose election. The level of Republican leader's conservatism would not change with election outcome.

Appendix C

Party Leader Elections

Table C-1 House Leadership Selection

Month Year	Office	Candidates	Votes
Jan. 1959	Minority Leader	Halleck/Martin	74/70
Jan. 1962	Majority Leader	Albert/Bolling	Bolling withdrew
Jan. 1965	Minority Leader	Ford/Halleck	73/67
Jan. 1965	Minority Whip	Arends/Frelinghuysen	70/59
Jan. 1969	Speaker	McCormack/Udall	178/58
Jan. 1971	Majority Leader	Boggs/Udall/Sisk/Hays/O'Har	95/69/31/28/25
Jan. 1971	Speaker	Albert/Conyers	220/20
Jan. 1973	Speaker	Albert/Conyers	202/25
Jan. 1973	Majority Leader	O'Neill/Gibbons	Gibbons withdrew
Jan. 1973	Minority Leader	Rhodes/Arends	Arends withdrew
Dec. 1975	Minority Whip	Michel/Pettis/Erlernborn	75/38/22
Dec. 1976	Majority Whip	Wright/Burton/Bolling/McFall	148/147(third ballot)
Dec. 1980	Minority Leader	Michel/Vander	103/83
Dec. 1980	Minority Whip	Lott/Shuster	96/90
Dec. 1986	Majority Whip	Coelho/Hefner/Rangel	167/15/78
Jan. 1989	Minority Whip	Gingrich/Madigan	87/85
Jun. 1989	Majority Leader	Gephart/Jenkins	181/76
Jun. 1989	Majority Whip	Gray/Bonior/Anthony	134/97/30
Jul. 1991	Majority Whip	Bonior/Hoyer	160/109
Dec. 1994	Majority Whip	DeLay/Walker/McCollum	119/80/28
Dec. 1994	Minority Leader	Gephart/Rose	150/50
Dec. 1994	Minority Whip	Bonior/Stenholm	143/38

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美國眾議院政黨幹部選舉， 1959-1994

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美國國會政黨的研究強調政黨組織的重要性，但是並未研究政黨成員對政黨領袖的偏好。基於選舉結果可以反應投票者的偏好的假設，本文探討 1959 至 1994 年的美國眾議院政黨幹部選舉當選與落選的眾議員的特徵，包括服務年資，意識形態，政黨忠誠度，是否為南方選區，過去是否擔任過黨職，以及是否進入過三個最重要的委員會。研究發現，兩黨出身南方的眾議員較出身非南方的候選人容易當選，在民主黨，擔任過政黨幹部較未擔任過的候選人容易勝選，但是在共和黨，擔任過三大重要委員會的候選人較受到支持。兩黨差異的原因可能在於民主黨長期為多數黨，故更強調政黨領袖的重要性，尤其是在全院表決的過程，而共和黨為少數黨，故強調委員會的功能。

關鍵字：政黨幹部、委員會、黨職、地緣關係

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