

The Extent of Policy Integration and the Formation of Urban Regimes in the U.S.: An Exploratory Theoretical Structure

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Since Clarence N. Stone's study on the transformation of the governing regimes of postwar Atlanta, regime politics has been considered one of the major theories with the potential to integrate the various nuances of urban phenomena. However, many scholars, including Stone himself, have expressed their dissatisfaction with the dearth of theorization in the literature of regime politics up to this point. The aim of this paper is to continue Stone's work by constructing for it an exploratory theoretical framework. To do so, this paper distills from Stone's original work a more concrete theoretical hypothesis about the extent of policy integration and the types of urban regimes.

Essentially, I argue that Atlanta's postwar governing elite formed consensual, cohesive coalitions because they chose large-scale and highly complementary development programs. These elite collectively bore great insecurities. Then, by extending that line of argument to the political economies of three stylized regime politics (consensual/corporatist, confrontational/progressives, and machine politics), this paper develops an exploratory theory for the formation of urban

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regimes. Such a theory is based on a two-tiered methodology. The aforesaid theoretical hypothesis is the basic and homothetic tier, which allows the possibility for further generalizations. The second is the heuristic tier, which accommodates idiosyncratic and dynamic factors of regime formation. Such a methodology emulates Emile Durkheim's study on suicide and allows for more effective theory building. Finally, the theoretical and empirical implications of the above theory are discussed.

Keywords: regime politics (urban regimes), governing coalition, extent of policy integration, machine politics, consensual regimes, two-tiered methodology.

I. Introduction

Ever since Clarence N. Stone's study on the transformation of governing regimes of the post-World War Two Atlanta (Stone, 1989), regime politics has been considered one of the major theories with the potential to integrate the various nuances of urban phenomena, not just within a particular city, but across cities. However, many scholars, including Stone himself, have expressed their dissatisfaction with the dearth of theorization in the literature of regime politics so far (Pierre, 2005; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Davies, 2002). Yet, even Stone himself failed to grasp the theoretical implication of his revealing work. The aim of this paper is to continue Stone's work by critically re-examining his original work and constructing for it an exploratory theoretical framework.

Stone (1989) offers in-depth observations on the political and economic processes through which Atlanta's political governing institutions, once tainted by deep-seated machine politics and racial discrimination, have been remodeled on modern democratic governance. According to Stone, regimes are governing coalitions based on both formal and informal ties that encompass both formal and informal social institutions. Furthermore, when it comes to urban regimes, there can be many different types (Stone, 1989: 3, 189). These urban regimes bring with them various policy stakeholders, such as politicians, businessmen, the social elite, and professionals, who play specific roles

and interact with each other in stable, consistent, yet unique patterns. Urban regimes can take various forms. To give an example, a regime may be composed of split factions or party machines with formal political organizations under their control that are inclined to enclose public resources. This was the case with the political machines dominating Atlanta's urban politics before the Second World War. Regimes can also be rather broadly based, cohesive, consensual coalitions formed by the economic, political, and community elite who are seriously invested in the large-scale and well-integrated development of their local economy, as was seen in postwar Atlanta (Stone, 1989:184-185).

II. A Brief Summary of Stone's Work

According to Stone (1989: 3), the political regime of postwar Atlanta has been characterized by its stable governing coalition with the political, economic, and African-American community leaders at its core. This coalition then was then extended to professional African-Americans as well as the middle class, small- and medium-sized businesses, and the art and entertainment industries as peripheral members. After winning local elections at the mayoral and the city council levels, this governing coalition became the dominant political force in Atlanta. This coalition then started to pursue large-scale, well-integrated, and long-term CBD renovation and

economic development policies.¹ In addition, the governing coalition also introduced reforms to improve the social and economic status of African-Americans in Atlanta, such as hiring African-Americans for public school teachers and police officers, abolishing Jim Crow practices such as segregation in public places and transportation.

This governing coalition in postwar Atlanta was formed through a bottom up process where consensual decision-making has been the dominant policy decision procedure. Through well-integrated development policies, the governing coalition has transformed Atlanta from a prewar city full of racial discrimination, political domination by factions, and deteriorating infrastructures into a city with improved ethnic relations, modern democracy, a refurbished infrastructure, and an urban economy that is both internationally competitive and sustainable.

How can this reformation in Atlanta's postwar urban regime be explained theoretically? Stone argues that there are two conditions that preceded the formation and maintenance of Atlanta's postwar governing coalition. The first condition is set against the backdrop of a high-level of local autonomy and intense competition among U.S. cities where the governing elite in Atlanta had to mobilize many of the crucial resources required for integrated and large-scale development projects to forge the competitive advantage of Atlanta (Stone, 1989: 137, 201, 204). Leaders from different groups in the governing

1. For details of Atlanta's postwar redevelopment policies, see Stone (1989: 60-67, 136-148).

coalition stopped pursuing their own interests and forged collective goals with other groups (Stone, 1989: 169). Stone argues that the major political groups controlling the most strategic resources in the local political economy were not only able to change their political preferences but also build innovative common visions concerning the overall development of Atlanta and form constructive relationships with each other through negotiation and compromise. The governing coalition was capable of learning to solve problems and adapt flexibly to stresses that might have posed serious threats to their collective stability. In this way the governing coalition was able to become capable, cohesive, and dominant in policy issues they considered important (Stone, 1989: 210-212, 229-231; Stone, 2006).

However, according to Stone, there was still one more condition to be fulfilled before a coalition could dominate the local political economy. To pursue the large-scale and well-integrated urban renewal and economic development projects mentioned above, sustained coordination, resources and privilege from the local government was necessary. This implies that if the governing coalition had failed to control the local government, the local government would not have been able to accord with the coalition's development plans; all of this would have brought great risk to the entire development program. Stone argues that the governing coalition needed to expand to such an extent that it would be large enough to win local elections and gain the dominant power to make development decisions in the local government.

According to Stone, this was accomplished by extending membership of the governing coalition to other groups by the use of “selective incentives” (Stone, 1989: 169, 186-192). As a result of the advisable allocation of selective incentives, he argued, the political elite were able to expand their coalition to include small- and medium-sized enterprise owners, the African-American middle-class and community elite, and create a stable “grand coalition” (Dowding, 2001: 14). It was only with stable support and intensive coordination from this coalition-controlled local government that the development programs mentioned above were made possible (Dowding et al., 1999: 516; Judd and Swanstrom, 2006: 186).

Finally, Stone (1989) himself also realized that there is a need to deal with the problem of how the business elite, who were the initial members of the governing coalition in postwar Atlanta, came to a consensus and built cohesive structures while the situation was chaotic and uncertain (Stone, 1989: 171-174). Stone relies mainly on the idea of “investor prerogative” to address the issue of group cohesiveness among the business elite. Though Stone does not provide a formal definition of the term, the context of the following paragraph cited from his book seems to refine the term to some extent: “The business elite is small and homogeneous enough to use the norms of class unity and corporate responsibility to maintain its cohesion internally (Stone, 1989: 241)”. Thus, according to Stone, in a political environment of the U.S. where local governments compete with each other vehemently, a small group of individuals with ample capital and other strategically

important resources can achieve coordination through “the norms of class unity and corporate responsibility” (Stone, 1989: 3-12). Hence, such business groups will have the proclivity to become cohesive and enjoy its advantages in the emulation for power in local democracy.

Stone’s book provides an in-depth and dynamic description of the transformation of regime politics in postwar Atlanta (Stone, 1989). The rich information on Atlanta’s process of regime transformation no doubt has generated wide repercussions on discussions about the nature of local political power in American and other democracies, varieties and typologies of urban regimes within a certain country or across different countries, and possibilities of developing new theories of the formation of different styles of urban democracies. However, the literature accumulated thus far is wanting of clearer directions for theoretical and methodological issues (Stone, 2006; Pierre, 2005; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Kantor et al., 1997; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; 1999)? Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is, first, to distill from Stone’s original work a more concrete and consistent theoretical hypotheses that allow more nuanced yet more coherent theory building. Second, based on the aforesaid theoretical hypotheses, I will also develop an exploratory theoretical structure for the formation of regime politics, covering three types of stylized regime politics, namely consensual regimes, confrontational regimes, and regimes of political machine.

As will be shown in the analyses of stylized urban regimes presented in Section V and VI, such a theoretical structure follows the

popular approach of structure-conduct-performance analysis in economics and management science (Scherer and Ross, 1990; Baldwin, 1987). The analytical process of this theoretical structure has shown the possibility of breaking new ground in the current quagmire in the literature of regime politics. As shown in Section V and VI, once the structure of governance (types of a certain style of urban regime) of a city is identified and matched with the extent of innovation of its development policies, the roles and conducts of major stakeholders in the urban regime can then be identified, analyzed, and verified. The performance of such an urban regime in terms of its competitive advantage and indices of good governance can also be compared and reviewed from the former analysis.

III. Main Theoretical Postulates of Stone's Case

Without delving too much into details, I will borrow directly from the literature on regime politics of Atlanta by Stone (1989) and Wang (2007) three core postulates that can be used to build a more specified interpretation of the formation of Atlanta's postwar governing coalition, which also possesses more potential for further generalizations. These three postulates include, 1), Core members of the governing coalition, such as business and political elite, both perceived imminent threats (insecurities) and large opportunities for their political, economic, and social interests. As a result, they were willing to consider changing

their political preferences and initiate drastic actions through intensive negotiations with other leaders.

2), Following 1), and again, through intensive communications and negotiations, the pioneering political and business leaders were able to come to agreement on engaging in innovative, large-scale and well-integrated programs of urban renewal, economic development, and racial reconciliation. They formed the initial core of the governing coalition. By doing so, these pioneering leaders were able to avoid the danger of incurring significant losses to their current interests. These core elite then ventured to mobilize their resources and connections and wage concerted electoral campaigns to become the governing coalition of the city government. It was only at this point that selective incentives were adopted to solidify the position of the governing coalition (Wang, 2007: 34; Dowding, 2001: 14).

3), However, by agreeing to commit large amounts of resources to development projects and other social and political reform ventures, elite members of the governing coalition experienced other types of insecurity, such as those perceived as a result of being tightly knit together by the large-scale and well-integrated programs of economic development and related reforms, which were insecure in their own sense yet contained within them high hopes for salvation. Such insecurities were again reinforced by the inability of the governing coalition to diversify their financial and political risks.

Against the backdrop of such high levels of insecurity, economic, political, and social elite were pressed to forge cohesive groups for

collective actions. To further bind the members of the core groups, the leaders of different groups would also form common ideologies and values that were internalized as they engaged in intensive dialogue, mutual consultation, and monitoring.²

One thing particularly critical to the formation of administrative capacity and autonomy with the City of Atlanta's bureaucrats was that, after the initial core of the governing coalition formed, specific strategies had to be studied and planned by professionals with collective organizations set up by business elite, such as Central Atlanta Progress, Metropolitan Planning Commission, and Research Atlanta (Stone, 1989: 192, 201). Then, after the governing coalition won power over local politics in Atlanta through elections, the concrete policies of the urban coalition's redevelopment platform had to be formulated by both professionals and bureaucrats a step further according to the visions, goals and strategies of the governing coalition. However, since the redevelopment platform was highly integrated and members of the governing coalition were rather consensual and cohesive, professionals of CAP, Research Atlanta, Chamber of Commerce, and other similar bodies and bureaucrats of the City of Atlanta were empowered to take

2. As far as the importance of selective incentives in the formation of urban regime is concerned, Stone adjusted his position significantly later (Stone, 2005: 315). He alleges that "emotional commitment," "social or purposeful identification," and "purpose, grand purposes" are more important than selective incentives based on material rewards as means of combating the free-rider problem. As ambiguous as his new interpretations are, his later propositions are fully consistent with the theoretical structure that I will demonstrate below.

over the planning, implementation, and problem solving processes of the majority of policies mandated by the governing coalition (Stone, 1989: 169-172).

Besides contributing their professional training and knowledge, the bureaucrats and professionals had to consult and communicate widely with related elite in the governing coalition, and even among themselves, to engage in planning and management. Over the years, through joint innovations in the planning and execution of development programs, joint problem-solving when unexpected issues occurred, the bureaucrats and professionals created and accumulated tremendous amounts of integrated knowledge and skills on a wide variety of policy issues, in addition to gaining professional reputation and autonomy for (Carpenter, 2001). This may also be the reason why back in the 1940s, politics in Atlanta was still dominated by political machines, and the city council was in a much stronger position than the bureaucratic organizations.

However, as a result of the engagement of the redevelopment programs, bureaucratic organizations became relatively more dominant than the city council in postwar Atlanta (Stone, 1989: 191, 201), which is consistent with the argument made by Paul E. Peterson. Peterson asserts that development regimes tend to result in the enhancement of autonomy and capacity of bureaucrats while weakening the powers of political parties and city councils. The converse is also true (Peterson, 1981:133-136, 150-166). This process of committing huge amounts of resources to highly risky ventures, followed by mutual monitoring and

fine-tuning of their original policies, further reinforced the cohesiveness of the governing coalition.

After briefly reviewed the main theoretical perspectives put forth by Stone (1989) and Wang (2007), I will proceed to the third section of this paper and develop an exploratory theory based on theoretical postulates outlined in this section. However, before that, I will still discuss briefly the current status of the literature on regime politics and how Carpenter's view on relationships between policy innovation and bureaucratic autonomy can inform the deduction of a more effective theory of regime politics (Carpenter, 2001).

IV. An Exploratory Theory of Regime Politics

Before and after Stone, many scholars have tried to develop typologies of urban regimes either within the U.S. or across countries. These include Elkin (1987:18-35), Stone (1989; 1993:18), Fleischmann et al. (1992), Stoker and Mossberger (1994), Rauch (1995), Wolman and Spitzley (1996), Mckay (1996), Kantor et al. (1997), Imbroscio (1998), Dowding et al. (1999), DiGaetano and Lawless (1999), DiGaetano and Klemanski (1999), Mossberger and Stoker (2001), Ruhil (2003), Kilburn (2004), de Socio (2007), and Pierre (2014). However, as pointed out by Pierre (2005), Mossberger and Stoker (2001:814-815, 818), and Davies (2002; 2003), there is so far no clear or consistent definition of what an urban regime is; all the while the number of regime types has continued to expand (Reese and Rosenfeld, 2002).

In the literature, some scholars tend to use the term “regime” to describe any local political system. Others refuse to treat governing coalitions without business elite as urban regimes, that is, urban regimes composed simply of radical laborers or professional bureaucrats (Savitch and Thomas, 1991; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001:815). To be more precise, following Mossberger and Stoker (2001: 828-830) and Stone (1989), I will define an urban regime as the governing coalition or coalitions of a city composed of governmental and non-governmental actors based on both formal and informal relationships.

Furthermore, typologies of urban regimes developed so far are based on discrete categories that can hardly be compared by common explanatory dimensions. Consequently, such typologies do not embody meaningful theories of how different urban regimes and their governing features come about or how their political economies operate (Stone, 2005: 329-331). There are some exceptions, however. Scholars such as Reese and Rosenfeld (2002; 2012), Kantor et al. (1997), and Kilburn (2004) have tried to develop theories of urban regimes based on quantitative and nomothetic methodologies. However, the theories they have produced are at best simple descriptions of correlations between the so-called dependent and independent variables. They do not touch on the rich and dynamic processes of regime formation as presented in sections I and II.

In addition, as pointed out by Kantor et al. (1997) and Mossberger and Stoker (2001: 816), these studies do not cover all types of urban

regimes no matter if they are based on typological (idiosyncratic) or nomothetic methods. In other words, the typologies put forward so far are under-theorized and do not form theories of urban regimes that can be tested further, either within or between countries (Pierre, 2005: 446-449; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001: 814; Davies, 2002: 699). Finally, the hypotheses they built are intuitive, unsystematic, and few further hypotheses can be extrapolated from them, regardless of their being accepted or rejected in hypothesis testing (Doty and Glick, 1994: 230-231; Bacharach, 1989). With so many bottlenecks in the current literature of regime politics, it is no wonder that Stone himself and other scholars have expressed a dismal outlook toward the possible development of a theory of regime politics (Stone, 2005: 332; Pierre, 2005: 446-447).³

3. The literature of regime politics or “urban politics” is numerous and varied. Since they do not even agree among themselves about the appropriate definition of a ‘regime’ nor the appropriate approach to theory building, their current status is complex and changing; thus it will be difficult to review them in a theoretically productive manner. These difficulties will be listed in the following.

In the first place, the theoretical framework that will be adopted by this paper is quite an abrupt break away from the current literature, in which most quantitative research focuses on nomothetic methodologies, while qualitative research aims at idiographic perspectives only. This is why quantitative approaches aiming to build general theories have continued to fail, including testable typologies. Whereas historical and idiographic case studies, which have tried to catch the dynamics and details of regime formation, have not been able to come up with testable theories or hypotheses. Such problems have plagued major theories of urban political economy. Consequently, the data and inferences from theoretical approaches, such as growth machine theories, regulatory theories, and theories of local government, do not allow direct or productive applications for my research (Wolman and Spitzley, 1996; Logan and Molotch, 1987).

Thus, I adopt a short review of the status of the current literature in urban governance.

Secondly, as will be seen after the cases analyzed in Section IV and V, the second tier theories of each stylized urban regime can be treated as an independent theory of their corresponding type of urban regime. For example, the role, behavior, and performance of bureaucratic elite are very different between the regime of machine politics and the consensual regime. In other words, each type of stylized urban regime is a different context within which causal relationships can be treated differently. As such, it will be very difficult to identify the roles played by the variables, not to mention theories, a priori. For example, the role of race may be a reason which led to the formation of Atlanta's consensual regime. The same factor led to conflicts in other cities, such as Binghamton, Alabama, Detroit, Michigan and New Orleans, Louisiana (Stone, 1989: 241). Another example is Detroit. While similarly restrained by serious economic distress and the percentage of black population was surpassing that of the white in the 1970s and 1980s, as Atlanta was in the 1930s and 40s, Detroit was not able to get over racial conflict and initiate regime transformation (Digaetano and Lawless, 1999: 559).

Thirdly, I follow Stone's use of 'urban regime theory' rather than Pierre's 'urban governance theory' (Pierre, 2014), because Stone grasped the dynamic processes of Atlanta's regime transformation in a highly detail and comprehensive fashion. The absolute majority of researches on urban politics, be they quantitative or qualitative, individual or comparative case studies, pose static research stances, and pay scant attention to the dynamic mechanisms in the formation of new regimes, certainly not to the extent that Stone does.

Finally, the idea of the primary dimension of my theoretical structure, i.e., the extent of policy integration, comes from economics of knowledge management, knowledge sociology, and bureaucratic politics and policy innovation, which have been irrelevant from the current scope of the literature in urban politics or urban governance (Grant, 1996; Carpenter, 2001).

These factors make most research in the current literature of urban governance unhandy. The absolute majority of the research and data (both quantitative and qualitative) provide only partial facts, perspectives, and give very limited attention to the context. Many of them focus on single issues. While others may touch on urban governance, they do not cover development affairs. Still, even though many others may touch on both the dynamics of governance and development matters, they are not comprehensively matched with the dimensions required by my research design (as pointed out by 'guidelines' in Section VII).

(i) Designing a Two-Tiered Theoretical Structure

Due to the immense scope of the work required, I will follow neither the detailed case analysis of Stone (1989) nor the research I presented in the above two sections. Even though I argued that the current theories of urban political economy can hardly be directly applied to this study, one particular branch does provide some hints as to how the following theoretical framework can be configured. According to some scholars of urban politics, such as Peterson (1981: 131-149) and Kantor and David (1988), development policies in local governments of the U.S. are commonly matched with consensual and stable types of networked relationships between major stakeholders, i.e., elite from the business, political, professional and community arenas.⁴ While decision making processes in this type of policy regime prior to implementation tend to be closed, “local support is broad and continuous” when implementation starts (Peterson, 1981: 132). Finally, bureaucrats directing these development policies will also tend to be highly autonomous, capable, and professional (Peterson, 1981: 133-134). Such a type of public policy and its accompanying governing regime is very similar to those adopted by postwar Atlanta.

Furthermore, distributive type of public policies, as described by scholars such as Peterson (1981: 150-166), Lowi (1972), Franklin and

4. The federal government in the U.S. has not been the major polity responsible for development policies. Development policies are policy regimes unique in the sense that they only happen in the context of local U.S. governments.

Ripley (1990: 73-118),⁵ are a different type of policies with different style of governing regimes. Within this type of policies, a special subtype based on machine politics tends to form policy regimes with governing features that are just the opposite of those of the governance regimes which accompany development policies (Peterson, 1981: 152-156).

According to Peterson and many other scholars of machine politics in urban America from the 1870s to the 1940s, machine politics are based primarily on political factions composed of bosses, captains, and followers, and are connected by personal ties based on the exchange of all sorts of economic and political interests. These factions tended to engage in various illegal activities. They were also highly corrupt, some even violent, and became quite a distortion and hindrance to the development of democracy in the U.S., as will be described in more detail in section IV and V.

These two lines of literature together pointed out the match between two different types of policies with their opposite styles of governance regime. In Wilson's terms, this is equivalent to saying that "what the [urban] governments do (I inserted 'urban')" will be matched with "how they do it?" (Wilson, 1988). This is quite suggestive of my construction of the theory between urban types and their corresponding governance regimes. However, these two lines in

5. Since the federal government of the U.S. has not been the leading government body in charge of development policies, development policies are not counted as one major policy type in the categorization of these scholars.

the literature about types of public policies and their corresponding governance regimes have been basically descriptive. There has been no analysis as to why particular types of public policy go together with a specific mode of governing regime.

Based on my summary of Stone (1989) in the first part of Section III, the theory of policy innovation and bureaucratic politics argued by Daniel P. Carpenter (2001), and the literature in knowledge management as postulated by Robert M. Grant (1996) and Michael Polanyi (1958), the dynamics of the evolution of urban regimes can be more clearly delineated in the following way. Particularly, according to Grant (1996: 379-384), knowledge is the most valuable resource of an organization. The essence of organizational capacity hinges most critically on how knowledge is created and integrated across multiple bases of specialized knowledge under a common vision. Grant argues that organizational capacity is developed through a dynamic process, among well-networked internal and external participants, by fumbling, creating, integrating, and transferring specialized knowledge when encountering unexpected gaps between existing knowledge and reality, different knowledge bases, or passing through bottlenecks in the planning and implementation processes.

In such processes, the most critical aspect is the creation, integration, maintenance, and diffusion of ‘implicit (or tacit) knowledge’ since, unlike explicit knowledge, this type of knowledge has “the capacity to continuously and repeatedly reconfigure knowledge in new patterns of interaction” in the context of volatile environments

(Grant, 1996: 376-378). Therefore, groups and organizations that focus on a high extent of integration over areas of specialized knowledge tend to be based on common visions, and mobilize wide but highly interactive participation. These groups and organizations are also more competitive and cohesive.

In addition, Carpenter (2001) also argues for the critical role played by the integration of specialized knowledge across policy areas in molding bureaucratic autonomy and capacity. He holds that well-integrated policy innovations that allow the bureaucratic elite to build wide networks across areas (including political, social, and social elite) and generate broad, popular benefits not only gains them wide support and legitimacy from their societies, but also forges professional capacities and autonomy among civil servants.

By integrating the aforementioned literature, a more specified theoretical hypothesis that allows for further hypothetical deductions can be built as follows. Urban regimes that focus on well-integrated development policies, as a result of processes of knowledge integration, will form regimes in which the governing elite share common visions and govern through consensual decision-making, and where competent and autonomous bureaucrats dominate policy processes (this will be called the “consensual development type”). Comparatively, political parties and city councils tend to retreat to less influential positions.

Based on the above reasoning, I hypothesize that underlying the logic of urban machine politics in the U.S. is the fact that their development policies are based on highly incremental and ill-integrated

policy innovations. Since innovations which are incremental and highly fragmented can easily be emulated and surpassed, stakeholders naturally build their governing regimes (i.e., factions or political machines) through primary social relationships so that the political control of the governing elite can be stabilized and enhanced through closed and conservative emotional ties. In this type of urban regime, bureaucrats tend to be less competent and less autonomous; while political parties and city councils tend to become more dominant in policy processes (I will name this the “machine politics type”).


Furthermore, according to my reinterpretation of Stone’s theoretical postulates presented in Section III and the theoretical construct of Carpenter and Grant, the extent of integration among specialized knowledge is ‘the primary’ or ‘the pre-eminent’ source of organizational capacity. Other organizational features, such as management strategies, centralized vs. decentralized decision processes, and organizational structures, are just lesser factors whose influences on organizational capacity must first pass the primary dimension, i.e., the extent of integration among specialized fields of knowledge (Grant, 1996: 384-385). Therefore, these variables of other organizational features are at best secondary.

This is very similar to Durkheim’s adoption of ‘social facts’ as the most fundamental reason for explaining the various propensities of different social groups to commit suicide. According to the first tier of Durkheim’s theory of suicide (Durkheim, 1951), the suicide rate of a certain social group is solely determined by ‘social facts,’ which can be

translated into the extent of social integration. However, social facts are then influenced by a slew of variables in the second tier of his theory, such as family size, gender, economic status, economic cycles, and level of education.


Thus, I will also follow Durkheim and adopt a two-tier theoretical framework. In the first tier, the type of urban regime will co-evolve with the extent of integration among that regime's economic policies. Then, in the second tier, I will be looking for social, economic, technological, geopolitical, and political factors that can explain why a city adopts a certain level of integration of its development policies (See Diagram 1 and Diagram 2).

Diagram 1. A Linear Typology between the Extent of Integration and Different Styles of Urban Regime



Source: The author

Diagram 2. A Two-tiered Theory on the Formation of Urban Regimes



Source: The author

(ii) Research Design

Since many types of urban regime have been commonly and frequently discussed in the literature (Stone, 1989:188; Kilburn, 2004, 638-643; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Kantor et al., 1997), to avoid being trapped in the endless gathering and interpretation of data, I will focus my analyses on types of stylized urban regime, i.e. urban regimes that share many common features in their political economy and which are commonly treated as belonging to the same type in the literature.⁶

6. Many types of urban regime have been mentioned in the literature, e.g. the care-taker regime and the opportunities expansion regime discussed by Stone (1989: 188), the symbolic regime as mentioned by Stoker and Mossberger (1994), the subsistence regime by Ramsay (1996), the planner, the grantsman, and the clientelist regimes by Kantor et al. (1997). However, these types of urban regime will not be discussed in the following paper since there has been no common agreement in the literature about the feature of

Incidentally, in the literature, both urban regimes with well-integrated development policies and political machines are the most commonly accepted two types of ‘stylized’ urban regime. Therefore, in addition to another confrontational type of urban regime,⁷ those will be the two types of stylized urban regime to be analyzed in Section IV and V. These two cases will represent the two ends of the spectrum measuring the extent of integration of development policies of an urban regime, while the third will be located somewhere in between (See Diagram 1 and 2).⁸ Altogether, the three types of stylized urban regime that will be discussed in Section IV and V are not only the most popularly mentioned and have the most commonly agreed upon governing features, but also have sufficient data to allow for meaningful comparisons and analyses. Beyond these three types, other types of stylized urban regime with data sufficiently available await to be identified and agreed upon.

However, in order to develop sufficient coverage of each type of stylized urban regime, and thereby allow for meaningful comparison, it is necessary to look closer into the most important two dimensions in the first tier of my theoretical framework. The first dimension is the

these urban regimes, not to mention that there are no sufficient data for the in-depth, systematic analysis of each type these regimes.

7. Even though this type is not as widely accepted as the former two, but are also recognized by many scholars as will be mentioned in the subsection entitled Progressive/confrontational regimes.

8. See Section IV. iii (1) and IV. iii (2) for detailed discussions covering these two types of urban regime.

extent of integration of a city's development policies.⁹ The second is the style of urban governance (e.g. consensual development, machine politics, or...), which can be refined to include sub-dimensions such as: major members of the governing coalitions, their roles and interactions, the level of bureaucratic professionalization, relative power positions of the administrative branch vs. the city council, and their respective relationships with other major members of the governing coalition (e.g. chambers of commerce and social groups).

In the first tier of the following three case studies, I will portray the coevolution between the extent of integration among development policy and the governing style of an urban regime (See Diagram 1 and 2). In the second tier, I will analyze how the extent of integration among a city's development policies has been influenced by social, economic, historical, or geopolitical factors. These two tiers of variables of a stylized urban regime can then be used as guidelines to write case and comparative case studies of stylized urban regimes in the U.S.

9. Development policies basically include economic development, urban development and renovation, infrastructural policies. However, depending on the type of stylized urban regime, such policies can also cover social welfare, social services, environmental protection.

Theoretically, the extent of policy integration measures the degree of complementarity among different policies or sections in the urban economy. It can be approximated by the so-called Leontief's input-output analysis. However, since such analyses and data are not available for U.S. cities, this study must rely on secondary data portraying how the elements of development policies of a city come together as an integral whole on a case-by-case basis. See (Miller and Blair, 2009).

(iii) The Three Types of Stylized Urban Regimes in the U.S.

In the following case studies, I will first examine the case of consensual/corporatist regime on the right end of my theoretical spectrum and verify whether the case chosen (Indianapolis) is accompanied with a match between a high extent of integration among their development policies and a consensual type of governing regime (See Diagram 1 and 2). A city will be classified as consensual if there is one dominant governing coalition in the city and it is composed at least of political and business elite who govern on a consensual basis. Its extent of integration will be high if there are high levels of complementarity among its development policies.

However, in order to reinforce links between the case studies of stylized urban regimes and my theoretical structure, I will also hypothesize another two assumptions underlying the theoretical postulate in the first tier. The first is that development bureaucracies responsible for the planning and implementation of highly integrated development policies will be matched with a consensual type of urban regime. Similar to Atlanta's case, this happens because of the necessity to overcome the huge knowledge gaps in the process of policy integration, which in turn has stimulated the development of tremendous amounts of implicit knowledge that have forged high levels of consensus among political, business, and bureaucratic elite. Based on similar reasoning as in the case of Atlanta, bureaucratic agencies in Indianapolis in charge of development affairs will also enjoy high

levels of policy capacity and autonomy vis-à-vis the council and political parties.

On the other hand, cities with regimes of political machines will be located on the left end of Diagram 1. Based on theoretical derivations presented at the end of Section III (Carpenter, 2001; Grant, 1996), I will first consider whether the political machine type of urban regimes is matched by fragmentation and incrementalism among development policies. After that, similarly to the former case, I will deduce two more underlying assumptions. The first one is whether development bureaucracies of regimes of political machines, as a result of being trapped in fragmented and incremental type of policy innovations, are matched by low levels of policy capacity and autonomy. In addition, due to the formation of close and conservative personal ties based on primary social relations with political and business elite, development bureaucracies will become highly incapable, conservative, and corruptive. The second is that since development bureaucracies are less autonomous and capable, arguably they are less dominant in policy processes vis-à-vis city councils and political parties.

Finally, for the third type of confrontational regime, as a result of the continuous confrontation between major power groups and the stop-and-go fashion of development policies in such cities, I will hypothesize that the extent of integration of development policies of such a stylized urban regime is located somewhere between the above two ends. Furthermore, the relative policy capacity and autonomy of such development bureaucracies will also be somewhere between that

of the above two stylized urban regimes. Lastly, since serious political conflicts will have to be processed and negotiated through city councils, I will argue that councils of such cities will be the strongest in policy processes vis-à-vis their bureaucratic organizations.

Drawing on both quantitative and qualitative sources, I will then search for all possible social, economic, political, geographical, and historical factors that can be identified for explaining why each type of stylized urban regime adopts a matching extent of integration among development policies. Then, these materials will be organized into narratives explaining the idiographic factor leading to the formation of each type of stylized urban regimes.

(1) Consensual/ Development Type of Stylized Urban Regimes in Other Cities.

Following Stone, many scholars of urban governance have found other large American cities with regime politics similar to that of postwar Atlanta. For example, Indianapolis (like Atlanta, also a state capital) has developed since the late 1960s a governing coalition with features quite similar to that of postwar Atlanta, with some minor differences.

Before the initiation of that regime, Indianapolis possessed some features based on which the later governing coalition was able to draw on to construct their development strategies. First of all, in the mid-1960s, many business and political elite of Indianapolis and Marion County realized that organizations and structures of both the

city and county government were too fragmented and cumbersome for greater Indianapolis to advance its competitive advantage. As a result, political and business elite in both the city and the county, such as William H. Lugar and others, initiated the consolidation of the two governing bodies in the late 1960s. The consolidated jurisdiction, Unigov, was established by legislation in 1970 (Hudnut, 1995: 9-10). Secondly, the city is the host of the Indianapolis 500, a well-known annual car racing event. Furthermore, the city is in the geographical center of the U.S., making it a hub connected by many highways to major parts of the country. Finally, the CBD of Indianapolis is known for its Midtown Jazz Festival, a cultural event fervently held by African-American communities every summer, even though this unique cultural event was neglected in the early stage of the formation of Indianapolis' governing regime (Schimmel, 2001:265-266).

However, Indianapolis has been greatly inflicted by economic recessions since the 1960s due to the fact that its automobile-based economy was affected by foreign competition and dis-investment. Many manufacturing companies shut down, moved out, or merged with other companies. Worse still, the dismal economy of Indianapolis was aggravated by high deficit rates in both the U.S. federal government budget and international trade. Finally, like postwar Atlanta, Indianapolis' CBD and its related infrastructures have decayed over the last twenty years. In the late 1970s, the CBD of Indianapolis had become rather desolate. Overall, the city has seen a decline in its resident numbers and tax base (Schimmel, 2001: 265-266; Rosentraub,

2014:120; Hudnut, 1995: 6-8).

Like Atlanta, Indianapolis has a group of political and economic elite, encompassing both Democrats and Republicans, who were concerned about how Indianapolis could get away with long-term recessions and prepare for future growth. They formed the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee (GIPC) in late 1960s as a non-partisan public forum. The main purpose of GIPC was to discuss problems related to the progress and growth of greater Indianapolis. After the city-county elections of 1968, the GIPC continued as a nonpartisan public forum even though there were party realignments, from Democrat to Republican, in both the mayoral office and the new city's council majority (Hudnut, 1995: 9-10). The GIPC was later involved in policy deliberations on the city's major development projects, such as the downtown revitalization project (Indianapolis 2000) and development plans for the Eagle Creek Park and Reservoir. It also founded many nongovernmental organizations bridging public and private sectors, such as the Indianapolis Housing Development Corporation and Clean City Committee (Hudnut, 1995: 10).

Later, based on their social network, core members of the GIPC and other political and economic elite formed an initial core in a dominant governing coalition in Indianapolis. Major members of the initial core included business leaders from the Eli Lilly Company, one of the world's leading pharmaceutical companies. Others were top officials from Lilly Endowment, Inc., the second largest charity foundation in the country, set up by the Eli Lilly Company founder's

family. The rest were from nonprofit bodies composed of representatives from local community and business elite, such as the Greater Indianapolis Progress Commission, the Corporate Community Council, political leaders such as the mayors of the City of Indianapolis, heads of the Department of Metropolitan Development, and elite from the Chamber of Commerce (Schimmel, 2001: 269-270).¹⁰

The core of the governing coalition was nicknamed “city committee.” Similar to postwar Atlanta’s governing coalition forged by William B. Harsfield, the city council of Indianapolis also was bypassed by the city committee, with the exception of one member representing the voice of African American minorities (Schimmel, 2001: 269-270). The city committee initiated a search for new development directions. In 1972, the city committee and other business elite together identified improvement of living conditions and quality of life for the middle and upper-classes as the most critical factor in Indianapolis’ upcoming development. From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, by hiring private consulting firms and consulting with local banks, insurance and architectural firms, the business elite finalized a list of strategies after long deliberations within the governing coalition itself (Schimmel, 2001: 265-266, 269).

Items of the development strategy for overhauling Indianapolis’

10. Eli Lilly Company, being a large and highly professional pharmaceutical company, started to become interested in the early 1970s in enhancing the “living conditions” of Indianapolis as a pivotal condition for attracting high quality executives, managers, scientists, and technicians after being rejected by quite a large number of potential recruits (Schimmel, 2001: 268).

crumbling economy included the development of tourism and service industries, downtown redevelopment and renovation, and public infrastructure development (such as sewers, transportations, business lots for corporate headquarters, convention centers). In particular, these local elite also suggested the development of sports and cultural industries as “amenity infrastructures” for integrating their strategies (Schimmel, 2001: 271-272; Rosentraub, 2014:129). Throughout the process of planning and implementation, with the exception of one African-American state representative, all city-county council members had been excluded from participation in the governing core (Schimmel, 2001: 269). The governing coalition of Indianapolis was also accompanied by generous contributions from businesses and charity foundations and active volunteering from the citizenship.

In addition to policy steering by the city committee, policy deliberations also involved citizen groups and city departments (e.g., Department of Metropolitan Development). This governing coalition successfully boosted the economy of greater Indianapolis from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. It transformed Indianapolis’ downtown from “Indiana-no-place” into a cultural, sport, and artistic center. As a result, Indianapolis has been nicknamed “Indiana-show-place” or “the Cinderella of the rustbelt”, due to the fact that Indianapolis is one of the few Midwest cities that maintained steady growth in population, jobs, and per-capita income during the 1970s and 1980s (Rosentraub, 2014: 129; Owen and Willbern, 1985: 196-197).

Moreover, Indianapolis has hosted professional team sports

franchises such as the Colts (NFL) and the Pacers (NBA), amateur sports events such as the NCAA, National Sports Festival, and the Pam Am Games. It has also hosted cultural events such as the International Violin Competition (in 1982), and Indy Jazz. Leaders of the governing coalition (i.e., Richard G. Lugar and William H. Hudnut III) also won consecutively the mayoralty of Unigov between 1970 and 1992 (Owen and Willbern, 1985). Along this process, political patronage from mayors even of political appointees was significantly reduced, replaced by professional-based recruitment. The administrative organization of Unigov also became highly integrated and professionalized (Owen and Willbern, 1985: 137-148).

However, the percentage of African Americans in the total population of Indianapolis in the 1970 and 2010 was 18% and 27.5% respectively. Without being seriously threatened politically by the significant rise of the percentage of African American voters, core members of the initial governing coalition in Indianapolis did not take the African American community or the professional elite into account in the process of forging their grand coalitions. Unlike Atlanta, Indianapolis has not been regarded either as a center of African-American entrepreneurs and professionals, or as a hub of African-American education, culture, and political power, as Atlanta has (Atlanta Black Star, 2013).¹¹

11. Comparatively, Atlanta is not only more densely populated by African Americans than Indianapolis in both its city and environs, it has also been named “Black Mecca” (Atlanta Black Star, 2013; Renn, 2010). Metropolitan Atlanta was ranked as the

(2) Regimes of Machine Politics

After the civil war, between 1865 and 1930, many urban regimes dominated by political machines started to prevail in cities undergoing fast expansion (Reid and Kurth, 1992). These include cities in the Northeast such as Chicago (commerce and industry), New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland (manufacturing), Pittsburg (manufacturing), Detroit (manufacturing), and many others (Reid Jr. and Kurth, 1992; Kerstein, 2010; Connolly, 2016). There are also other cities featured by machine politics in the South and West in later years (toward the end of the 19th century), such as Atlanta, New Orleans and San Antonio in the South, and San Diego, San Francisco, and Los Angeles in the West (Waller, 1973; Ramsay, 1996; Reynolds, 1938; Walsh, 1972; Viehe, 1988; Miller, 1978). Many of these cities were originally small towns governed by consensual politics (Judd and Swanstrom, 2006:89-90; Kweit and Kweit, 1998:24-27).

In these cities, as their sizes expanded swiftly from the second half of the 19th century through the first half of the 20th century, political parties started to dominate local politics by building political machines through patron-client relationships that were long-term and personal-based. Political parties and their leaders dispensed benefits such as emergent loans, small amounts of cash for the needy,

number-one city in which African-Americans have been doing the best economically by Forbes Magazine; the ranking was based on three criteria: homeownership, self-employment rate, and median household income. In contrast, Indianapolis was not included in the top-ten list (Kotkin, 2015).

government employment opportunities, contracts, and regulatory licenses, such as public utilities for the loyal support of beneficiaries in local elections and for their political contributions. Beneficiaries were often a marginal population in the city. In the case of fast growing cities in the Northeast at the turn of the 19th century, ethnic immigrants who were struggling to get footholds in alien cities were major clients of such patronage (Shefter, 1994: 70; Judd and Swanstrom, 2006: 59-60, 85-86).

While having the appearance of being democracies, political machines in these cities carried with them negative connotations, such as corruption, bribery, violence, and illegal businesses, such as gambling, liquor, prostitution, as well as electoral fraud and other manipulations of electoral processes (Shefter, 1994: 75, 162; Judd and Swastrom, 2006: 53-60, 83-87, 277). The problem is then how to explain the formation of machine politics in these cities from the perspective of regime politics, as I have done with Atlanta.

First of all, the cities listed above were all once rapidly expanding from small towns into large ones. There was thus a strong need for investment in infrastructures such as roads, bridges, network systems such as sewage, waterworks, electrical power, public transit, public libraries, and public parks. Very much like the case of postwar Atlanta, the political, economic, and community leaders responsible for mobilizing financial and political resources for these projects relied heavily on borrowing to finance these infrastructure and development projects. However, as these cities were undergoing rapid expansion,

feasible scales and technologies of infrastructures were not only constantly being upgraded but also ill-integrated.

In other words, infrastructural technologies in these cities were highly incremental and fast changing (Teaford, 1984: 283-285; Tarr: 1984).¹² The trolley system is one such example. Around the 1850s, it was still in the form of a four-wheel streetcar drawn by a horse over rails. Very quickly they became two-horse drawn streetcars. Cable streetcars appeared in 1873. They were then replaced by electric cable streetcars in 1888. In 1891, streetcars running on internal combustion engines were introduced. Before 1906, most cable streetcars were electrified. (Donovan et al., 2010:253-254; Menes, 2001; Schultz, 1993). From this example, it is not difficult to see that the fragmented adoption of incremental infrastructural technologies in these cities can easily be copied, modified, and surpassed or replaced by newer ones and become highly vulnerable to emulation by potential politician-cum-business coalitions (Judd and Swanstrom, 2006: 24).¹³

To prevent such a scenario, local business and political elite resorted firstly to the building of political coalitions among themselves based on dyadic, primary social ties through pragmatic and versatile

12. Tarr argues that between the 1850s and 1880s, developments of urban infrastructure were “piecemeal, fragmented, labor-intensive, and decentralized,” while those of the period between the 1880s and 1910s could be described as “moving toward more capital-intensive, centralized, and integrated” (Tarr, 1984: 14-34).

13. See Burian et al. (2000: 43-51) for a detailed description about the evolution of sewage technologies adopted by American cities from the 1850s to the turn of the 19th century. For a general description of the evolution of urban technologies in the U.S. between the 1850s and early 20th century, see Roberts and Stealman (1999).

means of exchange, including patronage through public jobs or contracts, bribery, corruption, threats, and even occasional violence. The surge of large volumes of foreign immigrants into these fast-growing cities provided the candidates the materials for building such ties. These immigrants generally faced high levels of job insecurity and needed a network of help to gain a secure footing in an unfamiliar place. These ties were more oriented toward personal loyalty and more susceptible to manipulation and control. Secondly, through network of personal ties, the local elite also monopolized parts of the local electorate based on the patron-client relationships, as mentioned above. To exclude possible competition from swift technological change, local elite built political machines to bid for political dominance in elections from the social groups they built.

As a result of the highly incremental and fragmented urban development policies adopted, the leadership and management of political machines tended to be closed, conservative, and exclusive when compared to both the consensual governing coalition of postwar Atlanta or the confrontational regimes of Austin (Texas), as discussed below. Since quickly expanding cities outgrew the incremental technologies and services provided by political machines, these cities tended to be affected by urban problems like inadequate infrastructure, overcrowding in traffic and housing, slums, acute inequity and poverty, crime, and an appalling state of sanitation (Colburn and Pozzetta, 1976; Judd and Swanstrom, 2006:59-60, 81-84; Trounstein, 2008).

Based on incremental and fragmented technologies, political

machines also tended to partition privileges and resources of local governments and cause serious distortions to democratic governance. Furthermore, since the cohesiveness and areas of expertise of the professionals and bureaucrats in these cities were ill-integrated and still developing, they enjoyed relatively less autonomy in local policy process, and were more dominated by the city council compared to the case of postwar Atlanta (Carpenter, 2001; Teaford, 1984: 132-173). In sum, regime politics of urban machines tends to be less stable, weaker, and ineffective in democratic governance as compared to regimes of consensual development politics.

(3) Progressive/Confrontational Regimes.

After World War II, many cities in the American South and West were categorized by students of urban development as Sun Belt cities and shared some stylized features of development regimes which can be traced back to the prewar era. Santa Cruz, California; Austin, Texas; and San Antonio, Texas are all good examples.¹⁴ After being dominated by political machines, these cities all witnessed the appearance of pro-growth urban regimes dominated by the business elite in the early postwar years, as was the case in postwar Indianapolis. However, unlike the stable and consensual urban regime that appeared in postwar Indianapolis and Atlanta, postwar pro-growth regimes of these Sun Belt cities experienced difficulties holding on to their

14. For this type of urban regime in these cities, see (Gendron and Domhoff, 2009; Baum and Miller, 1993).

dominant positions (Abbott, 2003; Moore, 2007: 29-71; Gendron and Domhoff, 2009). After the reign of pro-growth coalitions, political regimes in these cities were replaced by progressive structures that tended to pay more attention to environment and resource conservation and social expenditures; they tended to be less stable, more fragmented, more confrontational and more open to citizen participation and challenges (Trounstine and Christensen, 1982).

Austin is a large city located in central Texas, of which it has been capital since 1839, with a population over 912,000 as of 2014. It has also been the location of the University of Texas at Austin since its founding. Austin is well-known as a world capital of live music and a center for the study of Nanotechnology. In the New Deal era, Austin initiated many major infrastructure projects, including a series of dams and power plants along the Colorado River, which were heavily subsidized by the federal government. These projects not only remedied the frequent overflow of the Colorado River but also supplied water to Austin's urban population and surrounding agricultural areas. In addition, the lakes and waters that formed after these dams were built, as well as the adjacent rolling hills, have become precious natural areas and resources for the city. These have also been important elements in attracting the in-migration of high-tech industries after the 1960s. Federal subsidies to Austin under the Work Progress Administration also included infrastructure items such as roads, sewage, and irrigation (Miller, 2006: 55, 58).

Austin's pace of development lagged significantly behind large

cities which based their growth on large-scale and heavy industry, such as those in the Rust Belt. Its population was 35,500 in 1920; 87,930 in 1940; and barely surpassed 130,000 in 1950 (Miller, 2006: 56). Around the early post war years, public employees of the state government and faculties and employees of UT Austin still constituted a major part of Austin's work force. This contrasts significantly with other major cities in the South, such as Dallas, Texas. In the case of Dallas, there used to be large landlords or businessmen who owned large portions of local land and exerted great influence over local development. This was not the case in Austin. Therefore, until the mid-1950s, Austin's progressives were the dominant force over city administration and the city council, along with the support of state government employees in Austin and the students and employees of UT Austin (Moore, 2007: 35).

In 1948, Austin's Chamber of Commerce hired a full-time industrial consultant to research development strategies for the city. That consultant made recommendations focusing on the development of clean industries, such as light electronic and R&D industries that would be more compatible with the environment, in addition to the development of local traditional poultry and air conditioning industries. Consequently, in the early 1950s, Austin's Chamber of Commerce did not welcome large out-of-town manufacturing industries and the city administration did not list industrialization as one of its priority missions (Miller, 2006: 55-57; Moore, 2007: 35). In addition, during World War II, the U.S. Air Force had installed military facilities in

Austin, including an Air Force base and a military magnesium refinery mill. The Air Force base contracted and trained local suppliers and hundreds of scientists and technicians in the manufacturing of radar, sonar, and other defense-related equipment. The magnesium mill was transferred to The University of Texas at Austin [UT-Austin] and was transformed into a research laboratory for emerging electronics. Many high-tech companies came into existence in Austin, so much so that the city developed into the “Silicon Hills” of the 1990s (Miller, 2006: 55-56).

Due to industrial expansion, Austin’s business community became dominant in the city council in the mid-1950s. As a result of their close connections to UT-Austin, the insufficiency of the city’s tax revenues, and the lack of job opportunities for UT-Austin’s graduates, the business community started to orchestrate more aggressively the planning of their vision of Austin’s development in 1955. The city council passed the Austin Development Plan in 1961. Accordingly, through tax favors for investments, Austin attracted many high-tech multinationals, such as IBM, Texas Instruments, Motorola, and Lockheed, to set up divisions in Austin’s city limits. Industrial employment rose from around 2% of the labor force in the mid-1950s to 11% in 1978. By the mid-1980s, Austin had already become a city where both high-tech industries and higher education were well-developed and complementary (Moore, 2007: 36; Miller, 2006: 57).

Against this backdrop, Austin has developed a number of major

industries, such as tourism, leisure, high-tech, and defense. These industries, unlike traditional capital-intensive manufacturing, do not have high demand for large-scale infrastructure (railroads, transport hubs, warehouses, logistics). Therefore, these industries did not participate in the investment and development of public infrastructures as large-scale, capital-intensive industries would have. Relatively speaking, Austin's major industries did not have strong proclivities to build political coalitions with local political, economic, or social elite, as in the cases for postwar Atlanta and Indianapolis.

Furthermore, unlike the older industrial cities in the northeastern region whose suburbs were mostly occupied by small towns, there was ample land available around the suburbs of the city of Austin as a result of its late development. As land prices rose, traffic and living space started to show signs of congestion, its infrastructure started to deteriorate, businesses and residents in the central business district [CBD] saw moving to the suburbs as a more viable option. As such, political or business elite were not confined to the original CBD and had the necessity (since without the option of moving out to suburbs, they were stuck in the inner city) to participate in the large-scale and well-integrated CBD renovation. This was not the case with Atlanta, where, as a result of no un-occupied suburbs available, the only choice left for local political and economic elite was to participate in the initiation of large-scale and well-integrated CBD renovation and urban development policies (Judd and Swanstrom, 2006: 242, 266). Henceforth, it has been relatively hard for business leaders to take part

in and forge strong consensus on well-integrated urban development policies (Trounstine and Christensen, 1982: 164-165; Judd and Swanstrom, 2006: 272).

On the other hand, building on the high percentage of UT-Austin's faculty and staff and the state government employees within the local labor force, Austin's community organizations, civil groups such as environmental protection organizations, and historical preservation groups also grew politically stronger in the 1970s (Miller, 2006: 58). This is particularly the case since the job security and salaries of these people all depended more on the state government and less on the local economy. Faculties and students, particularly those with humanities and social sciences, had a natural tendency to be more involved in local community and environment affairs. In addition, these people highly valued their communities and environments. Neighborhoods around the university campus attracted many small businesses with more liberal political stances, such as bookstores, art galleries, record stores, beauty parlors, and bars that were rather supportive to the growth of progressive community and environmental organizations. Finally, many rich families, including those from the high-tech industries, built their mansions on top of the aquifer of Austin's west side suburbs. The aquifer has been the primary water source for the city of Austin. This region, being also a beautiful scenic spot, was treated by the rich as an important environmental asset. Based on their preference for environmental conservation, many of these rich families also participated or supported the environmental organizations (McCann,

2003: 165).

Due to its background, Austin's urban and development politics became a long-term point of confrontation between the development regime and the progressives (Moore, 2007: 35, 37). One example of this is the war on water quality that started in the later 1970s. There was fierce political maneuvering between the two sides. In 1986, the progressives and environmentalists forced the passing of comprehensive water quality regulatory laws by the city council. They then planned to submit even more aggressive land-use laws, only to be defeated by the development regime (Moore, 2007: 36-38). However, this did not discourage the progressives/environmentalists. They waged a conservation movement for the endangered Barton Spring salamander and organized the Saving Our Spring (SOS) coalition. Through the SOS movement, they mobilized even wider opposition and in the end successfully passed water quality regulations. Nonetheless, in October of 1991, Austin's development regime significantly lowered the standards of water quality regulations through skillful administrative manipulation. However, this move irritated progressives and environmentalists as well as many citizens. They initiated a referendum and won in a 2 : 1 landslide victory in 1992. Not only that, but the progressives/environmentalists were also able to win the subsequent city council election and passed policies oriented toward environmental protection and community services (Moore, 2007: 41).

In summary, there was no consensus on specific approaches to Austin's overall development between the development regime and the

progressives. Therefore, Austin's urban policies appeared to be the products of seesaw battles, which tended to be piecemeal and fragmented, as the two camps took their turns in power. In other words, the lack of political consensus resulted in not only the lack of integration in Austin's urban planning and development policies, but also geographical discontinuities in Austin's urban landscape (Moore, 2007: 41). In contrast, the city council of Austin became the center of political confrontations. The city council was also more dominant in policy decisions than the city administration. The planning procedure of the city planning department also tended to be rather chaotic as a result of the scenario mentioned above. For instance, it frequently happened that planning charts could not be located. Some construction companies, after long waits, decided to proceed with the construction of houses on top of the aquifer, all without an official permit. The management style of the department was primarily ad hoc (Moore, 2007:47). In the early 1990s, due to the lack of integration in development policies, Austin was already plagued by traffic jams, dilapidated infrastructures, inadequate housing supply, soaring housing prices and rent, enlarged income disparity, pollution, and other issues. Even civil servants were critical of such confusing policy processes in the City of Austin (McCann, 2003: 165).

V. Mixing an Exploratory Typology and Narratives

The case analyses presented above can be summarized according to the two tiers of my theoretical framework. Each case will be analyzed synthetically first by the findings in first tier, followed by those of the second tier.

(i) Indianapolis

Based on the case of Indianapolis, I found that theoretical hypotheses deduced for the type of development/consensual urban regimes in the subsection entitled ‘research design (see p.17)’ have been confirmed and reinforced. According to the case study, Indianapolis’ urban regime has been transformed from a regime featured by political patronage to that of a consensual regime in and after the process of initiating highly integrated development policies and government reforms of both the administrative and legislative branches. Furthermore, similar to Atlanta, along such a reform process, there were wide and intensive communications/negotiations among the councils and the general public, the Mayors’ Office, Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee, the Chamber of Commerce, administrative committees, and civil groups (Owen and Willbern, 1985: chapters 5-8).

As a result of having to grab for practical solutions through

countless trials and errors in their implementation processes, administrative entities responsible for development affairs also became highly autonomous and developed highly professionalized capacities. In addition, the powerful peak organization presenting the interests of local business community, the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee (GIPC) was initiated by Democrat Mayor John J. Barton in 1964. Later, its chairmanship was passed onto another prominent Democrat businessman, Jack E. Reich (Owen and Willbern, 1985: 60). The city council, following my prediction, also became relatively less powerful in the policy reform processes as compared to the administrative branch, as can be witnessed by the fact that both the Department of Metropolitan Development and the Metropolitan Development Commission, which is specially designated to oversee the former, are empowered to manage development policies almost among themselves, unless reversed by the Council with more than 18 votes out of 29 (The League of Women Voters, 2016: 39).

Within the purview of the second tier, Indianapolis is a city that developed early on capital-intensive manufacturing industries. Consequently, like Atlanta, the whole city of Indianapolis confronted imminent threats of serious urban dilapidation and economic breakdown when its economy suffered serious recession in the 1960s. This was the main reason why Indianapolis, like Atlanta, pursued more aggressive redevelopment policies. However, the large proportion of heavy industries also carries with it a secondary impact on the high extent of integration among redevelopment policies. As in the case of

Atlanta, again, heavy industries were tied more intensively with the locality and prompted their capitalists to be more involved in local politics and the formation of urban regimes. Thirdly— and this also parallels with the case of Atlanta— Indianapolis developed much earlier than Austin, and therefore, her suburbs were pre-occupied by the developments of surrounding smaller towns and cities. Without spacious suburbs for further business expansions, well-integrated urban redevelopment policies in the central city was the only option.

However, since the share of the African-American population in Indianapolis in the postwar era was not as high as Atlanta, there was no racial realignment in Indianapolis' postwar politics. Therefore, in the formation of Indianapolis' new consensual regime in the 1970s, the participation of African-American elite was minimal. The percentage of African-Americans in 1950 and 1960 was 15% and 20% respectively of the population in Indianapolis. Although its population was expected to be increasing afterwards, it was not perceived to pose serious threats to the hegemony of the white political elite in the late 1960s (Thongbrough, 2000: 116). Consequently, the urban regime forged by Lugar did not include the African American community elite.

(ii) Urban Machine Politics

Theoretical hypotheses about the regime type of machine politics are also derived from pure logical deductions, based on the integration of theories mentioned in Section III. All hypotheses are also confirmed by the case study. First of all, the extent of integration of development

policies in the regimes of machine politics, as predicted, is found to be highly fragmented and incremental, matched by the highly conservative, closed, and corruptive type of political factions. Underneath the aforesaid layer, development bureaucracies of such cities are also found to be less competent, less autonomous, and less influential than the city council, as predicted. In addition, also pointed out by DiGaetano (1988: 257-262) and Brown and Halaby (1984: 90), as the extent of integration of development policies in many cities improved quickly between 1900 and 1920—even though it was not yet as mature as it was in the 1920s, a trend of centralization prevailed among these political machines.

As many researches in the literature of political machines in urban America have argued, the surge of large numbers of first generation immigrants has been one of the main reasons for the formation of urban machine politics, since these immigrants needed political machines as patrons to provide them with sorely needed economic security. However, according to my theory, immigrants are only one of many influential factors. The immigrant theme fails to explain the appearance of local political machines in New York City and Albany (NY state) relying on patronage systems as early as the 1780s and 1790s, during which time the waves of postbellum immigrants had not yet begun (Reid and Kurth, 1992: 430).

Furthermore, technologies available from Europe as a result of the first industrial revolution provided the bases on which urban development projects were initiated (Teadford, 1984; Tarr, 1984). The high level of local autonomy further provided the macroeconomic and

political context within which cities competed fiercely against each other by engaging in highly incremental and fragmented emulation in urban development technologies (Brown and Halaby, 1984).

(iii) Confrontational/Progressive Regime

As shown in the case of the progressive/confrontational type of urban regimes, the extent of integration of development policies of such cities is located somewhere between those of the consensual/development type and the regime type of machine politics, a result of being developed much later (starting from the 1950s in the case of Austin) and adopting well-matured development technologies (such as urban planning, dams, electric power systems, and super highways) and the inability to integrate those technologies in full-fledge fashion due to frequent political confrontation.

Secondly, the logistics-based infrastructures are not as well-integrated as in Atlanta, since most of industries in Austin are not heavy in nature, e.g. tourism and electronics industries, the complementarity among various development policies was not as intensive as that in cities relying more on heavy industry. This can be witnessed by the fact that these light industries not only do not participate in urban development policies but also have not been intensively involved in the building of local governing regimes in the postwar era (Moore, 2007: 36; Miller, 2006: 57).

Thirdly, being located in the Sun Belt and developed much later, these cities are endowed with many more environmental amenities, such

as lakes surrounded by hills with dense forests. Furthermore, the wartime policy of the federal government to locate many military bases and research facilities also matters. Finally, the fact that both UT-Austin and the state government are located in Austin also helps the mobilization and sustenance of the progressives of that city.

All these factors together converged in many high-tech, leisure, and tourism industries being located in these cities. These industries, together with the top-notch owners of properties near environmental or scenic areas, and the students and faculty associated with UT-Austin and the state government employees, all took progressive stances on environmental issues. At first glance, in all the three stylized urban regimes mentioned above, it seems that only the progressive activists in Austin failed to be mobilized by imminent threats of failure since they either had highly secure government or university jobs or were professional managers/engineers working for the high-tech or service industries. The majority of them owned their own homes in the western half of the city (west of Interstate 35), some even owned big ticket real estate. However, security in the value of their properties and even their jobs hinged precariously on the integrity of their community lives and the environment and natural resources around their estates (Maleki, 2016: 50; Allison and Peters, 2011),¹⁵ specifically the “clean air,

15. E.g. art, music, and UT; the cultural and scholarly scenes of Austin all have contributed significantly to the city’s level of livability. As of 2006, according to Money Magazine, Austin was ranked as the second most livable city in the U.S. (Allison and Peters, 2011).

landscape quality, and the laid-back life style that has become associated with the city” (Moore, 2007:60). But protecting the integrity of the community as well as the environment and natural resources was in each case a public issue that involved a large extent of externalities and could only be dealt with through collective actions. Therefore, as in the formation of Atlanta’s governing coalition or machine politics in Chicago, the collective actions of environmental and community activists in postwar Austin were also prompted by imminent threats of failure (Moore, 2007:35, 51-53, 58-59; Gendron and Domhoff, 2009).

VI. Conclusions

A couple of points may be raised based on my analyses. Firstly, this theory has the potential to surpass the barrier of meaningful theory building as pointed out by many scholars, such as typologies without underlying theories (Stone, 1989; 1993; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001), theories based on numerous exogenous variables that are intuitive and can be forever modified (Kilburn, 2004).¹⁶ At the same time, such a

16. Such a typology is methodologically more consistent compared to typologies as presented by Stone (1989; 1993), Mossberger and Stoker (2001), and Kilburn (2004). Typologies of the first two cannot be compared along specific or scaled dimensions. This leads to the under-theorization of the formation of different types of urban regime (Pierre, 2005: 446-447; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001: 814). The typology presented by Kilburn is based on traditional nomothetic methodologies in social science research. While dimensions or variables of Kilburn’s typology are measurable and comparable, the hypotheses Kilburn built are intuitive and unsystematic. No matter whether these variables are accepted or rejected in hypothesis testing; only a small number of

theoretical approach has the capacity to engage in dialogue with existing theories of political science and point to future possibilities of integration. For example, unlike the rational choice approach, which does not easily explain why rational individuals cooperate, the political economy of regime formation is capable of explaining why and how rational and selfish political actors do in fact cooperate. In contrast to Olsen's (and Stone's) reliance on selective incentives (Olsen, 1965), I have in this paper developed a preliminary yet practical approach that is capable of illuminating the endogenous logic of collective action. Furthermore, instead of Olsen's "advantage of small groups," this paper argues for the "advantage of large groups" underlying the idea of the "grand coalition" put forth by Dowding (2001: 14).

Secondly, while rational choice approach always takes as given preference and belief of political actors on the one hand and regimes and institutions on the other hand, and avoids tackling questions pertaining to changes in these premises, the theory of the political economy of urban regime formation can simultaneously explain the shaping of preference and belief and the formation of regimes and institutions. Together, this political economy of urban regimes and their formation can also connect with historical institutionalism and reinforce it with the two-tiered theoretical structure as illustrated in diagram 2 (Chai, 2001: 1-4, 13-14; Hermans, 1988).

Thirdly, the analysis proposed above integrates methodologically

discourses built on other hypotheses can be further generated (Doty and Glick, 1994: 230-231; Bacharach, 1989).

both nomothetic (the first-tier) and idiographic (the second-tier) approaches. Thus, this political economic analysis treats nomothetic and idiographic approaches as being complementary rather than agonistic. Such an integration, following the methodology adopted by Émile Durkheim's study on suicide, has also been emulated by other social science disciplines, for example, personality psychology (Hermans, 1988: 788-790). By doing so, possibilities of theoretical construction for the study of urban regimes by case or comparative case studies can be greatly enhanced by focusing on the relationship between the extent of integration among urban development policies and the styles of urban regime and their related sub-dimensions.

However, nuanced narratives in the background which affect individual cases can also be merged into this analytical approach through the individual interpretation of the researcher. Such case narratives, possibly encompassing geographical, social, economic, political, historical, or even personal factors underlying the formation of a certain stylized urban regime, will be the core in the study of city politics. In particular, as shown in postwar Atlanta's case, visions, strategies, and political actions of stakeholders also matter, together with the two primary variables.

Finally, according to Section IV and V, while it can be hypothesized that in the *ex post* sense different styles of governing regime are matched by different extents of integration among urban development policies, the forging of each city's peculiar style of governing regime took many years. This is a process initiated by

political deals full of political trial-and-error against the swiftly changing, highly risky panorama of urban politics in the ex-ante sense (Bowman, 1987; Swanstrom, 1985; Sanders and Stone, 1987; Wolman and Spitzley, 1996).¹⁷ It is likely that the popularity of each stylized urban regime commonly take decades after each wave of elites learn their political and economic lessons and finally head for a stabilized, stylized governing regime. In other words, from the perspective of dynamic competition, the forging of urban governing coalitions or regimes that can adopt appropriately innovative and integrated development policies according to their geographical, historical, social, and economic features do in fact matter.

Against the backdrop of high levels of competition among cities and the highly uncertain, highly complex urban democratic politics, no matter the type of politics, be it consensual, machine, or confrontational politics, political and other elite have to choose which route to follow—to follow the tide or go against it. It is obvious that politics as embedded in the processes of the formation, sustenance, and evolution of urban regimes is the foundation of urban affairs (Pierre, 2005: 446-458; DiGaetano, 2006: 430; Sanders and Stone, 1987). External or internal conditions, such as geographical, economic, social, demographic, or technological advantages may matter for urban

17. Such a point-of-view is in stark contrast with another perspective of economic supremacy on local autonomy. The later perspective emphasized the view that urban regimes are islands in the great economic ocean. Urban politics does not matter much. The best urban regimes can do is to adapt and survive (Wolman and Spitzley, 1996; Peterson, 1981).

development, against the backdrop of high levels of local autonomy, but it is only through intensive bargaining, persuasion, and the shaping of common visions and the forging of various styles of governing coalitions in local politics that innovative packages of development policies and technologies can be adopted and implemented.

As such, heavy interpretations of the past, the present, and forecasts of the future underlie the logic of urban development. Major stakeholders initiate and chart their political actions with these thoughts and tremendous amounts of “risk-taking.” Such endeavors demand political wit and management skill. In other words, the study of local politics should be at the heart of more than just regime politics, it should also be at the heart of the study of urban affairs and development. Put in another way, no matter the social, economic, or geographical forces, all have to go through the screening and transforming processes of urban politics to exert their final impact on the real world (see diagram 1). From the discussions presented in sections III and IV, it is not hard to see that the more integrated and innovative the urban development strategy, the more powerful the urban regime will be in transforming existing social and economic forces.

Urban regimes will also exert strong forces in shaping the institutions, values, and cultures of local communities. For example, postwar Atlanta’s political regime changed the highly discriminating and factional regime into significantly less discriminating regimes based on consensual politics. The major difference between different styles of urban regime is in their systematicities. As shown in diagram

2, all the second-tier narrative factors, be they social, economic, social, or historical, have to be screened by urban regimes. Some of them may remain untouched. Many of them will be significantly transformed. All of the three stylized urban regimes, once they took shape, were sustained for many decades, characterized by their unique styles of political, economic, social, and historical features.

VII. Further Discussions

The typological analysis of this article in no way means to be exhaustive. The theoretical structure outline so far is at best exploratory, expository, and rough. To claim higher validity, there is an obvious need to extend this theoretical structure to other areas. The most obvious research area that can be pursued is the search for ‘stylized’ urban regimes with their governing features in different countries, including those of the U.S. Following that, another step to test the validity of my two-tier theoretical structure more generally will be by comparisons with styles of urban regimes in the U.S. other than the three types examined in this article, as well as cross country urban regime comparisons.

Furthermore, to do so, this paper also proposed a standard set of variables that can be used as ‘guidelines’ to write case and comparative studies of stylized urban regimes in the U.S. and other countries. Such a road map covers mainly two dimensions. The first is the extent of integration of a city’s development policies. The second is the style of

urban governance (e.g. consensual, confrontational, factional), which can be refined to include subcategories such as: major members of the governing coalitions, their roles and interactions, the level of bureaucratic professionalization, relative power positions of the administrative branch vs. the city council, and their respective relationships with major members of the governing coalition. These two dimensions of a stylized urban regime can then be analyzed and measured along a one-dimensional typology, as discussed in section IV and shown in diagram 1. This is not the same as nomothetic theories built on simple correlational hypothesis, which do not allow for deeper, wider, and more systematic hypothesis building and testing. Thus, the study of regime politics provides significant possibilities that could surpass traditional bottlenecks in the construction of meaningful theories in urban politics and governance.

For the purpose of illustration, based on the first-tier theoretical hypotheses as suggested above, it may be deduced that, in the U.S. context, cities in the Northeast and Midwest regions would have been dominated by machine politics significantly longer than cities in the West and Southwest, since they had much larger populations decades earlier and had built significantly larger stocks of capital-intensive infrastructures with incremental, outdated technologies over the years (Connolly, 2016; Judd and Swanstrom, 2006: 277-278). On the contrary, cities in the West and Southwest, which developed significantly later than cities in the Northeast and Midwest, were much less invested in capital-intensive, highly fragmented, incremental infrastructures when

they were transforming into another style of regime politics around WWII. Together with the buildup of federal military and industrial facilities, and other reasons of political economy, cities in the West and Southwest regions could break away from machine politics much earlier and easier than cities in the Northeast and Midwest regions (Abbott, 2003: 11-13; Miller, 2006; Judd and Swanstrom, 2006: 277-278; Trounstine and Christensen, 1982:188).

In addition, following the literature of policy types (Franklin and Ripley, 1990), there are ample spaces to be explored with respect to policy type analysis under different styles of urban regime, as I have mentioned before. For example, even though Atlanta and Indianapolis are both consensual regimes, environmental and social welfare policies are also topics deserving of more systematic examination. However, due to the lack of well-synchronized data, this paper did not touch on these potential areas of research.

While the above discussions have been focused on the study of urban regimes in the U.S., one very important feature of urban politics in the U.S. context has not been explicitly considered, namely, that cities in the U.S. enjoyed high levels of local autonomy under the tradition of U.S. federalism. What if the local politics is situated in contexts of more centralized governance systems, e.g. European countries such as Britain or Asian countries such as Taiwan? What such differences imply for the building of a theory of urban regime has long been discussed in the literature of urban politics, yet without definite results (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Pratchett, 2004; Davies, 2002;

2003; DiGaetano, 2006).¹⁸ The effectiveness of my theoretical structure can be significantly enhanced if its application can be extended to countries with significantly lower levels of local autonomy (e.g. Britain and Taiwan).

Take Taiwan for example. According to the literature of local governance in Taiwan, local political factions have been identified as the dominant style of governance in local governments of postwar Taiwan. In addition, many traditional political researchers in Taiwan have resorted to: 1) the dualistic, sojourning authoritarian KMT regime and her divide-and-rule strategy (Chen, 1990; Wu, 1987), or 2) the electoral system based on multi-members district with single-nontransferable vote (MMD-SNTV), as the critical cause underlying the formation of local factions in postwar Taiwan. (Wang, 1998) However, the major problem of this perspective is that it cannot be applied to explain the formation of machine politics in U.S. cities, since the U.S. federal government was not an authoritarian regime that exercised a divide-and-rule strategy. In addition, as pointed out by Kao (2002) and Hsu (2008), after the first party rotation in 2000 when the KMT lost her national ruling power, and together with it, the power to

18. Pratchett has devised a theory of local autonomy integrating various viewpoints. His theory encompasses three dimensions of local autonomy, i.e., the freedom to initiate and carry out home-based policies, the freedom from interference from higher level governments, and the expression of local identity (Pratchett, 2004: 358-368). However, I consider local autonomy mainly as a result of the dynamics of urban regimes. Dynamic urban regimes, such as Atlanta and Indianapolis, tend to express more dimensions of Pratchett's local autonomy.

manipulate local politics, local political factions still existed, even though they had fractured into multiple sub-factions that were more volatile, less stable organizationally, less loyal, and weaker politically.

On the other hand, while the electoral perspective may have been shown to be partially correlated to the formation of local political factions in Taiwan, it was not as influential in American cities. For example, even many large cities such as New York City, Cleveland, and Cincinnati all adopted election systems contrary to the MMD-SNTV, i.e. proportional-representation-based electoral systems, for their city councils before WWII; they were, however, governed by regimes of machine politics. As such, while the above two theories may carry some influences on the formation of the dominant style of Taiwanese local governments, they are not the critical or primary factors for the formation of urban political machines (Sutherland, 2016:58). Furthermore, while they can provide simple explanations for the presence of local factions, they cannot deal with the evolution of local factions across time, cities or counties in Taiwan. My theoretical structure, in contrast, may have the potential to deal with many theoretical bottlenecks in the literature of local politics in Taiwan.¹⁹

19. For instance, the postwar governance history of the City of Taichung can be a case to my point. Roughly speaking, even elections for local mayors and council members were practiced under the highly centralized authoritarian regime, the majority of local governments had been dominated by local political forces that were closely controlled by the KMT through the dispensing of public resources and privileges, including mayoralty, council memberships, community financial institutions, local public transports, and public work contracts, etc. Before 1958, mayors or council members of most local governments were selected by the KMT from traditional rural gentry or

business elite who were both well-educated under the Japanese rule, well-known in the communities and willing to cooperate with the KMT (Lin, 2004: 41).

After Taiwan's national security was more assured by the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, the KMT picked up her pace of national development during the late 1950s. Local governments, including City of Taichung, started to be perfused with relatively more resources and privileges. However, to maintain her highly centralized and authoritarian control, the KMT government took over major development functions of local governments and left the latter with only residual, minor, and highly fragmented development projects (Chen, 1990; Wu, 1987). Henceforth, as predicted by my theory, political forces in the majority of local governments (including those in Taichung city) led by the somewhat public and cooperative traditional rural gentries were transformed between the late 1950s and the 1960s into the modern form of political factions, based on the minor privileges and dissipated resources (e.g. farmers' associations, credit cooperatives, farmland irrigation associations, and others) granted by the KMT government (Wang and Chao, 2008: 40-48; Tsai and Chang, 1994). In addition, after having acquired better economic status and social influence, local factions of Taichung City had all based their own development on special local economic and political interests nurtured by the KMT. These local factions were capable of nominating their own leaders and winning the mayoralty and other important positions, which included either the speaker or vice-speaker of the city council during this period (Lin, 2004: 41). Like American party machines mentioned in Section V and VI, these modern local factions in Taiwan were not only all quite conservative, closed, and rivalrous in their organizations, but also oriented toward rent-seeking.

The KMT government initiated the so-called "Ten Major Construction Projects" around the island in the late 1960s, to both reboost the national economy and consolidate the power of the party and the state. Two of them, i.e. the Port of Taichung and National Highway No.1, invoked heavy participation by the City of Taichung. Yet KMT did not leave that chance up to the discretion of the City of Taichung. All these projects were both very large in scale and required intensive integration and communication between a wide array of policy stakeholders (Chiou, 1996: 138-139). Taking advantage of the need for wide and intensive coordination and cross functional integration among administrative units (including different levels), the city council, the mayor, and the party (also including different layers), the KMT not only succeeded in lifting her local chapter as the decision center above the mayor and the City Council of Taichung, but also filled the mayoralty and both the speaker and vice-speaker of the city council

from her own party cadres without local connections between late 1960s and 1978 (Lin, 2004: 83-94). Thus, the KMT not only established a centralized control on policy decisions within the city government but also pushed the dominant local factions aside to marginal positions (Lin, 2004: 83-94).

In the mid-1970s, many trends across Taiwan occurred hampered the continuation of KMT's tight political control of Taichung City. In addition to civil unrests due to incidences of environmental and labor issues, the lack of well thought-out and integrated public infrastructure and services confronting the ever increasing urban immigrants also generated significant discontent among urban voters.

Taking on such a rare opportunity, three non-KMT politicians came out and successfully challenged the KMT in the 1977 county mayoral election. Among them was Zeng Wen-po, who became the first de facto non-KMT mayor in the postwar history of Taichung city. Without KMT's support, Zeng worked together with local factions and initiated innovatively large-scale urban land adjustment programs which were financially based on self-liquidating principle. Yet, Zeng did not carry out these land adjustment programs in well-integrated fashion either. With the mayor's support and the newly found channel of participation in the land adjustment programs of the city government, local factions' vitality was revived.

Yet, starting from the next mayoral election until the early 1990s when democratization was initiated by the KMT, the KMT regained control of Taichung City by promising local factions more participating roles in Taichung's development policies and retained her power to nominate mayoral candidates from party cadres by consulting with the major local factions. Being more active in development policies of the city provided chances for both local factions to mobilize resources, expand organizations, and rally their political powers again during the period from the late 1970s onto the late 1990s (Lin, 2004: 54). Local factions became more audacious in rent-seeking through the minor and fragmented resources and privileges that they captured from the local government, legally or illegally. Rent seeking even became rampant toward the mid-1980s (Zhan, 1989). As they grew faster in their resources and power, they started to become more structured and diversify into other industries such as real estate, construction, and financial service (Chen, 2013).

Finally, even if I can expand the above analysis to later periods of Taichung City or to other Taiwanese cities so as to enhance the validity of my theory, due to the scope of this paper, I will not get into that part here.

In short, I have applied my theoretical structure to explain variations across the three stylized urban regimes in the U.S., where urban governments enjoy high levels of autonomy. I also explored in footnote 18 the possibility of extending my structure to explaining the evolution of the regime in Taichung City (Taiwan), which has been more constrained by the central government than cities in the U.S. Although it is not comprehensive due to the lack of data,²⁰ some preliminary comparisons between local factions of Taiwan (as demonstrated by the case of Taichung) and political machines of the gilded age of the U.S. may be drawn here.

The case of Taichung City's regime politics shows that my theory has the potential of providing consistent explanations toward the formation and the evolution of urban regimes of a city like Taichung under the highly centralized national power. While Taichung City might have some unique governing features of her own, it has shared major common governing features with other cities in Taiwan too. Among these common features, local factions have been the main one. Therefore, it would be quite worthwhile to examine the urban regimes of other cities with the theoretical structure as I laid out in this paper.

Furthermore, some international comparisons can be made between the case of Taichung City and the other three cases mentioned in IV.

20. Particularly considering the fact that there has been no such practice as identifying 'stylized' urban regimes in Taiwan yet. While the literature of local factions in Taiwan has identified local factions as the dominating force in local politics, it has never been connected with the extent of integration among urban development policies.

Firstly, while sharing many features with their U.S. counterparts, local factions in Taiwan have been much more constrained by the central government. As pointed out by Judd and Swanstrom (1998: 61) and Teaford (1984: 132-173), as economies with large scale urban technologies made significant progress in the early 20th century, many cities with political machines also started hiring experts and initiating progressive reforms, either passively or actively. No local factions in Taiwan have ever engaged in such endeavors by themselves.

If we follow that reasoning, we can see that local governments in Taiwan have long been dominated by local factions and highly reliant on higher level governments for the funding, planning, and execution of important development projects. Consequently, they have long been held back by their low capacities to engage in urban development policies, even compared to that of political machines in the U.S. Without such capacities, urban governments in Taiwan have been unable to break through their long-term development bottlenecks by initiating well-integrated urban development policies. Local governments in Taiwan have also been incapable of engaging in inter-governmental cooperation, except where the central government possesses enough power and resources and is willing to see through the conflict-ridden processes of communication and negotiation among local governments. Whereas, in the U.S., in addition to those well-integrated urban development policies, governance innovations based on intergovernmental cooperation among different levels of local governments abound, for instance, in regional special districts,

inter-agency cooperation, and joint-power agreements. This is primarily because, in an environment where competing cities must be responsible for financing their own development, U.S. cities have been forced to nurture their capacity to integrate elements of development policies across adjacent local governments, no matter the types of urban regime.

Similar to the above case of Taichung, it is reasonable to hypothesize generally that, in a country where political power is highly centralized at the top, the power of the national government will have significant impacts on how cities govern themselves. However, the theoretical postulates of the Taichung experience, except those in the first tier of my theoretical structure, cannot be generalized directly to other countries with a strong central government, since the latter often discriminates among different localities in her allocation of policy resources and privileges. Not to mention that such discrimination also tends to vary significantly in times of regime change, even though the political powers are still highly centralized. Henceforth, except the general assumption that the central government's policy toward cities may contribute significant influences to how cities adopt different extents of integration among their development policies and their governing features consequently, nothing much can be concluded at this point without further studies.

One limitation of this research that can hardly be emphasized more strongly is that it is exploratory, since it is based on comparisons of three stylized urban regimes only in the U.S. In addition, as a result of the two-tiered theoretical structure, the research design is neither

quantitative nor qualitative, but a combination of the two. This makes it quite difficult both to learn from and engage in dialogues with traditional quantitative or qualitative researches in the literature of regime politics. Another limitation following the former one is that it makes the task of determining the overall effectiveness of this research very difficult.²¹

Finally, as identified by Pierre (2014: 27-32), many traditional styles of urban regimes may be blurring quickly as they react to the competitive pressure of globalization; their governing styles may also become highly volatile and transient. This will make both the identification of stylized urban regimes and the following analyses of the political economy of their formation and evolution more difficult.

21. The methodology employs classic logic positivism as seen in the research carried out by Durkheim (Rosenberg, 1988: 118-142), Torricelli, and Semmelweis (Hempel, 1966: 3-8). It will be beyond the scope of this paper to cover this issue completely, since it will require a much longer discussion.

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政策整合程度與美國城市治理 體制的形成： 一個探索性的理論架構*

王輝煌**

此假設主張，亞特蘭大戰後的治理菁英之所以能夠形成具共識、有凝聚力治理聯盟主要乃因他們選擇大規模且高度整合的發展政策，並因此而承受很高的集體不安全感之故。本文接下來將根據此一假設檢視三種在美國城市治理文獻中常被提及，相當流行且標準化的城市體制，亦即共識型、對抗型及派系型體制，並針對城市的形成歸納出一個在方法論上具有兩層次的理論架構。此一理論架構乃以前述的理論假設做為基礎，作為理解三種不同城市體制的一般性理論，具同質性以及可再後續一般化的特性。第二的層次則是屬於異質性的分析，容許針對個別城市體制類型的形成提出殊異且動態的闡釋。這樣的理論仿效涂爾幹的自殺論，在理論的建構上比較有效。最後，本文也將針對上述的理論與實證分析加以延伸討論。

關鍵詞： 體制政治（城市體制）、治理聯盟、政策整合程度、派系政治、共識型體制、二層級方法論

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